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ABSTRACT
This research focuses on anti-Americanism in Europe. Old Europe, including countries
like France, Germany, Italy, Spain, the Netherlands and Belgium, is significantly more antiAmerican than New Europe, which includes countries such as Romania, Bulgaria, Poland and
Hungary. In this project, however, I have made a number of observations that go beyond than
this simple conclusion. I examined factors that could be behind these different levels of antiAmericanism in Old Europe and New Europe, and one key answer that emerged was ―cultural
similarity.‖ There are, of course, other factors that impact attitudes towards the United States and
Americans, such as the frequent travels to and from the U.S., a country‘s trade ties with the
American government, and people‘s views on U.S. policies in the Middle East and towards the
environment. But even when we take all these elements into account, cultural similarity still
plays a significant role in why Old Europe is more anti-American than is New Europe. The
United States and New Europe resemble each other more culturally than Old Europe and the
U.S. do, particularly in their levels of religiosity. Secularism never took root in New Europe and
the United States with the force that it has in Old Europe. As the two case studies have shown,
Romanians and Americans go to church more often, pray more frequently, and place more
importance on religion in their lives than do the French.
The second element of cultural similarity investigated in this dissertation is tolerance.
There is a significant relationship between levels of anti-Americanism and tolerance towards
women, immigrants/foreign workers and immigrants in Old Europe versus New Europe. New
Europe and the United States are, in general, more intolerant than Old Europe.
The results presented in this dissertation provide a better understanding of European antiAmericanism than was previously the case in the already extensive literature on this topic. There
is a clear cultural divide in the European Union between Old Europe and New Europe that
parallels their respective attitudes towards the United States and the American people.
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CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION
1.1

THE WHAT AND THE WHY

In 2003, with the war in Iraq looming over the United States and its EU allies, then
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld made a comment that reverberated in all European
capitals. Addressing the foreign media in Washington, he was asked: ―Sir, a question about the
mood among European allies. If you look at, for example, France, Germany, also a lot of people
in my own country -- I'm from Dutch public TV, by the way -- it seems that a lot of Europeans
rather give the benefit of the doubt to Saddam Hussein than President George Bush. These are
U.S. allies. What do you make of that?‖ Rumsfeld‘s answer was:
Now, you're thinking of Europe as Germany and France. I don't. I think that's old Europe.
If you look at the entire NATO Europe today, the center of gravity is shifting to the east.
And there are a lot of new members. And if you just take the list of all the members of
NATO and all of those who have been invited in recently -- what is it? Twenty-six,
something like that? -- You‘re right. Germany has been a problem, and France has been a
problem. But you look at vast numbers of other countries in Europe. They're not with
France and Germany on this; they're with the United States. (Rumsfeld 2003)
The reaction to these comments was swift. Coomarasmy (2003) describes German and
French leaders as being ―profoundly vexed‖ by Rumsfeld‘s comments. He notices that they were
also quick to dismiss the distinction made by Secretary Rumsfeld as a mere attempt to pitch
Eastern and Western European countries against each other in order to maintain American world
supremacy against the increased influence of the European Union – ―divide et impera‖
(Coomarasamy 2003).
This project tests the validity of Rumsfeld‘s supposition that there are two divided
―Europes.‖ This is the “what‖ of my dissertation – what I am substantially interested in. There
are two levels of inquiry employed toward this end. The first level deals with the possibility that
there are different degrees of anti-Americanism in different parts of Europe. If Rumsfeld is right,
then I should find that countries within ―New Europe‖ (the Polish or the Romanians) are
friendlier toward the United States than are those within ―Old Europe‖ (the French or Germans).
Table 1.1.1 contains the list of all European countries part of this analysis and the Old Europe –
New Europe division.

Austria
Belgium
Denmark
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
Ireland

TABLE 1.1.1: OLD EUROPE – NEW EUROPE COUNTRIES
OLD EUROPE
NEW EUROPE
Bulgaria
Cyprus
Czech Republic
Estonia
Hungary
Latvia
Lithuania
Poland
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Table continued.
OLD EUROPE
Italy
Luxembourg
Malta
Netherlands
Portugal
Spain
Sweden
United Kingdom

NEW EUROPE
Romania
Slovakia
Slovenia

Assuming that distinctions in feelings towards the United States do exist in Old versus
New Europe, the second level of inquiry will investigate the reasons behind these divergent
degrees of anti-Americanism. I have chosen to focus on two sets of explanatory variables, both
related to cultural differences between Old Europe, New Europe, and the United States – one set
of variables is focused on religion and the other is focused on tolerance (see below Chart 1.1.1). I
have also added to my analysis several alternative, non-cultural, explanatory variables: strength
of economic ties, as measured by the trade to GPD ratio, numbers of times a person had traveled
to the U.S., as well as views on American involvement in Iraq, the Palestinian problem and
environmental protection around the world.
Chart 1.1.1: Cultural Similarity and Anti-Americanism in Old versus New Europe
EXPECTED RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CULTURAL
SIMILARITY AND PRO-AMERICANISM

HIGH CULTURAL
SIMILARITY

NEW EUROPE

THE RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN CULTURAL
LIKENESS AND PROAMERICANISM
OLD EUROPE
LOW CULTURAL
SIMILARITY
LOW PRO-AMERICANISM

HIGH PRO-AMERICANISM
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The reason - the “why‖- of my research is that I am keenly interested in the changes that
have occurred in Eastern Europe for the last twenty years, and wish to better understand the real
causes of these changes. I am originally from Romania (part of Rumsfeld‘s New Europe), and
grew up during Communism with older people telling me stories about how ―the Americans‖
have betrayed us after World War II and ―sold us‖ to the Soviets. However, almost as soon as the
Ceausescu regime fell in December 1989, the democratic Romania became wholeheartedly proAmerican. At the same time, it remained a profoundly francophone country, the only one in
Central and Eastern Europe where the majority of the population speaks a Latin-language. Then,
following the United States withdrawal from the International Criminal Court treaty, Romania
was the first country to follow the U.S.‘s lead by also withdrawing. Later, when the war in Iraq
started, Romania again broke from its bigger sibling in France, by clearly and unequivocally
siding with the Bush Administration. Why did Romania choose the Americans over the French?
Is it because Romania truly is part of Rumsfeld‘s ―New Europe,‖ and is now more sympathetic
to the U.S. than to the French from an international political perspective? If that is the case, what
are the values that make the Romanians prefer the United States more than the France? These are
the types of questions that contributed to the development of this project.
1.2

THE HOW

I describe in the next section the methods and data – the how – I use to examine the
questions discussed above. Toward this end, I employ two forms of methodological inquiry for
this purpose: 1) statistical analysis (independent samples t-test, chi-square test and multivariate
regression) using public opinion data (from the Eurobarometer, the World Values Survey and
other similar databases) as well as trade/economic data, and 2) qualitative (case study) analysis
using archival data, mass media information, etc. This empirical analysis component of this
dissertation begins with a series of quantitative tests of my primary research questions using
public opinion poll data. This is followed by a qualitative analysis of the relationships uncovered
by the earlier, quantitative analysis.
1.2.1

QUANTITATIVE METHODS

One of the three quantitative methods used in this research is the independent-samples t-test
comparing means between populations of respondents from Old Europe, New Europe and the
United States. This method was used in those cases in which the independent variable was a
dummy variable (coded 0 and 1) and the dependent variable had more than two values. The
second quantitative method utilized in this dissertation is the Chi-Square test for independence. I
used this method in those cases in which the dependent variable is a dummy variable, classifying
the respondents in two distinct categories (agree/disagree, mentioned/not mentioned). The third
statistical tool used in this research was a multivariate regression with several independent
variables and anti-Americanism as the dependent variable.
1.2.2. QUALITATIVE METHODS
The qualitative method used in this analysis is the case study. The Merriam-Webster
Online Dictionary defines a case study as ―an intensive analysis of an individual unit (as a person
or community) stressing developmental factors in relation to environment‖ (Merriam-Webster
Online Dictionary n.d.). George and Bennett define a case as an ―instance of a class of events
such as revolutions, or various categories of governmental regimes, economic systems or
3

personality types that the researcher chooses to study with the goals of discovering the causes of
similarities or differences among instances of that class of events.‖ (George and Bennett 2005,
17). In Gerring‘s description, a case is ―a spatially delimited phenomenon (unit) observed at a
single point in time or over some period of time‖ (Gerring 2007, 19). For the purpose of this
project, I draw from each of these definitions in examining the differences in levels of antiAmericanism in France and Romania by limiting the analysis to two political units, over a ten
years period and one class of societal elements – anti-American attitudes.
One aspect of case study methodology often criticized is the case selection process.
George and Bennett (2005) argued that the problem with case selection bias for case studies is
different from the case selection bias in statistical research, and this discrepancy stems from their
distinct epistemologies: ―the goal of statistical analysis is to acquire enough knowledge about as
many units of interest in the population as possible, to be able to make general claims about the
group under study. The goal of case studies is to acquire as much knowledge as possible about
one unit, such as a country, or a specific historical event, and then use this information to devise
new theoretical questions‖ (George and Bennett 2005, 21) As these epistemological differences
are reflected in methodological ones, the two authors argue that in a statistical analysis, if the
researcher does not select his cases randomly (unless you can include the entire population in
your analysis, which is not feasible in most instances) then the results of a statistical analysis
could be biased, possibly showing either a relationship between variable when none exists, or no
relationship when in reality there is one. A case study subject (country, historical event,
politician, etc.) cannot be selected randomly. It must be a special case, standing out from the
crowd in a way that makes the causal connections between independent and dependent variables
more visible to the researcher.
The ―most similar case‖ case study methodology, focusing on Romania and France, is
used in this research. These are ―cases that are comparable in all respects except for the
independent variable, whose variance may account for the cases having different outcomes on
the dependent variable‖ (George and Bennett 2005, 81). George and Bennett also advise the
researchers to select their cases for theoretical reasons, and not just because the cases are
interesting, while Yin suggests that it is good to ―use your own, prior expert knowledge in your
case study‖ (Yin 2003, 137). I believe that my cases meet all these requirements. I have
theoretical and personal knowledge of those two cases, and they are both relevant to my overall
research question: Romania is part of ―New Europe,‖ France is ―Old Europe,‖ and these
countries‘ levels of anti-Americanism appear to be notably different despite the fact that their
strong cultural, political, and economic ties with each other might have suggested otherwise.
The case studies in this research project are largely used for descriptive purposes, and are
attempts at providing a snapshot of the bigger picture of cultural similarity and anti-Americanism
across Old and New Europe, seeing if there is a relationship between these two phenomena. Two
European countries, one from Old Europe (France) and one from New Europe (Romania) were
chosen for this purpose.
1.2.3. EMPIRICAL DATA
There are six main sources of data used in the statistical analysis part of my dissertation.
Five of these are public opinion polls/ surveys: the Eurobarometers, World Values Survey, Pew
Research Center‘s Global Attitudes Project, Voice of the People and the United States
4

Citizenship, Involvement and Democracy surveys. The sixth database contains economic/trade
data (trade to GDP ratio) and was created specifically for this project by combining information
from the U.S. government‘s trade data and EU‘s national budgets data. These databases are
presented in detail below, starting with the Eurobarometer surveys.
I.

The Eurobarometer Surveys

The Eurobarometer Surveys are ―the products of a unique program of cross-national and
cross-temporal social science research‖ (Center 2007). This program moved under the
management of the Commission of the European Community (CEC) in early 1970, when
simultaneous surveys were conducted in the member countries of the European Union. Initially,
the Commission‘s goal was to find out how much the Europeans knew and/or cared about the
Common Market and other communitarian institutions, as well as what the major national goals
were for each member state in the eyes of its own citizens. The areas of interest later expanded to
include not only people‘s attitudes toward the European Union, its institutions, and other
international actors (such as the United States, UN or NATO), but also their views on other
topics such as the quality of their lives, happiness, religion or hopes for a better future (European
Comission n.d.). The official launch of the Eurobarometer surveys took place in 1974, and they
have been conducted since then every spring and fall. I use two Eurobarometer surveys for my
dissertation: Eurobarometer 62 (2004) and Eurobarometer 63.4 (2005).
Eurobarometers 62 (2004) and 63.4 (2005) were conducted in 29 European nations, but
only information from the following countries has been kept in my databases: Belgium,
Denmark, Germany, Greece, Spain, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal,
United Kingdom, Austria, Sweden, Finland, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia,
Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Bulgaria and Romania. The variables from these
two surveys used in this research measure anti-American feelings in Old and New Europe, as
well as levels of religiosity. Eurobarometer 62 (2004) database used for this analysis contains 51
variables and 29,334 respondents. Eurobarometer 63.4 (2005) database contains 61 variables and
29,328 respondents. Codebooks for these two databases, containing the wording of the questions
as well as the coding for each answer, can be found in Appendices 6 and 7.
II.

The World Values Survey

The World Values Survey (WVS) organization is a ―worldwide network of social
scientists studying changing values and their impact on social and political life‖ (World Values
Survey 2008). The WVS in collaboration with EVS (European Values Study) conducted national
surveys in 97 societies, where they discovered the existence of profound changes that have taken
place over time in what people believe it is important in their lives. European Values Study is ―a
large-scale, cross-national, and longitudinal survey research program on basic human values […]
and a unique research project on how Europeans think about life, family, work, religion, politics
and society‖ (European Values Study 2007). In order to measure these beliefs and values, five
waves of surveys were carried out, from 1981 to 2007, in 97 nations. For the purpose of this
analysis I am using only information collected since the 1998 survey.
The WVS argues that peoples‘ beliefs and values play a key role in a country‘s economic
and democratic development. While the WVS network analyzes the causal link between global
cultural changes and economic development, quality of life, and democracy, my interest is to
5

examine whether the tolerance and religiosity levels measured by WVS can explain different
levels of anti-Americanism in Old Europe and New Europe. My database contains responses
from the following countries: Bulgaria, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway,
Poland, Romania, Sweden, Slovenia, Spain, Great Britain and the United States (62 variables and
19,897 respondents). The codebook for this database, containing the wording for each question
as well as the coding for each answer, can be found in Appendix 1.
III.

Pew Research Center’s Global Attitudes Project

The Pew Research Center‘s Global Attitudes Project conducts ―public opinion surveys
around the world on a broad array of subjects ranging from people‘s assessments of their own
lives to their views about the current state of the world and important issues of the day‖ (Pew
Research Center 2011). It is directed by Andrew Kohut, president of the Pew Research Center,
and co-author (along with Bruce Strokes) of America against the World: How We Are Different
and Why We Are Disliked. The project was initiated in 2001 and for my dissertation I am using
the surveys conducted in 2002 and 2007, as they not only contain questions/variables pertinent to
my own research, but they also cover the geographical areas I analyze (New Europe, Old Europe
and the United States).
The 2002 Pew Global Attitudes survey (referred to henceforth as Pew 2002) was
conducted in 44 nations. I focused on the following countries for the purpose of my research:
Bulgaria, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Poland, Slovak Republic and
the United States. The variables from this survey that I use in my analysis are those concerning
levels of tolerance towards women, homosexuals, and foreigners/immigrants, levels of
religiosity, and levels of anti-Americanism in Europe. The restricted PEW 2002 database I
created for this analysis contains 38 variables and 6,031 respondents. The codebook for this
database, containing the wording for each question as well as the coding for each answer, can be
found in Appendix 3.
The 2007 Pew Global Attitudes survey (referred to henceforth as Pew 2007) was
conducted in 47 nations. The modified database I use for this project contains information from
the following countries: Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Sweden, Bulgaria, Czech
Republic, Poland, Slovakia and the United States. This data is used in testing hypotheses
regarding levels of anti-Americanism, religiosity, as well as tolerance towards women and
foreigners/immigrants. The restricted PEW 2007 database used in this dissertation contains 38
variables and 9,837 respondents. The codebook for this database, with the wording for each
question and the coding/value for each answer, can be found in Appendix 5.
IV.

Voice of the People

Voice of the People Survey is conducted annually under the auspices of Gallup
International Association. The edition used in my analysis is the ―Millennium Survey‖ conducted
in over 50 countries between August and October 1999, with the results published in 2000
(ICPSR n.d.). The countries included of my database are: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech
Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia,
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden,
United Kingdom and United States. Answers from this survey are used to test my hypotheses
regarding levels of tolerance towards women, homosexuals and foreigners/immigrants, and
6

levels of religiosity in Old Europe, New Europe as well as the United States. The restricted
database I use contains 42 variables from 21,736 respondents, and the codebook for it can be
found in Appendix 4.
V.

United States Citizenship, Involvement and Democracy Survey

―United States Citizenship, Involvement and Democracy‖ CID Survey Project (U.S. CID)
was conducted in 2006 for the Center for Democracy and Civil Society at Georgetown
University by International Communications Research (Howard, Gibson and Stolle 2005). It
represented a partnership with the European Social Survey (ESS), which has been carried out
twice a year since 2002. As a result of including several questions from the ESS survey in the
U.S. CID survey, the United States information was compatible and could be included in a sole
database (which I use for my dissertation) containing U.S. data alongside data from 11 European
countries surveyed in 2002: Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Spain, France, United
Kingdom, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal
and Sweden. This active database contains 22 variables and 43,360 respondents and its codebook
(with the wording for each question and the coding/value of each answer) can be found in
Appendix 4.
VI.

“Trade to GDP Ratio” Database

I created the ―trade to GDP ratio‖ database by combining information from two
different sources: United States‘ government trade data and the European Union‘s budget data.
The steps I took in order to build a database containing ―trade to GPD ratio‖ for individual EU
countries and the U.S. are described below:
1. I collected trade data (yearly imports and export) in millions of dollars from the U.S.
census website: http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/index.html .
2. I then collected national GDP data in millions of Euros from the EUROSTAT website:
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/statistics/search_database
3. I converted the millions of Euros from the EUROSTAT website into the millions of
dollars from the census website. I converted these currencies by first moving the
information regarding the U.S. GDP in millions of Euros from the EUROSTAT website
in separate excel files.
4. Then, I took the information regarding the U.S. GDP for the same years from the website:
http://www.bea.gov/national/index.htm#gdp . Because it was in billions of dollars, I had
to multiply these numbers by 1000 to get to millions of dollars.
5. The currency information converted into millions of dollars in the same excel file as the
information in millions of Euros, and divided the dollars by Euros, which gave me the
parity for the conversion.
6. I then went back to step 2 listed above (GDP in millions of Euros from EUROSTAT) and
using the parity from step 5, I changed the millions of Euros into millions of dollars.
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7. I then used the trade data from the census website and the final GDP data from step 6 to
find the ―trade to GPD‖ ratio from 1998 to 2010 for bilateral trade relations between
individual EU member states and the U.S.
VII.

Case Studies Data

The richest sources of data for my dissertation are previous studies done on the topics of
tolerance, religiosity, and anti-Americanism in France and Romania, as well as empirical data
from the surveys used in the quantitative analysis chapters. World Values Survey information
will be used to present the cultural similarities between France, Romania and the United States,
while the 2005 Eurobarometer data will gauge levels of anti-Americanism. I will also examine
data from archival records (i.e. survey data not used in the statistical analysis as well as
organizational records, such as governmental agencies reports), and relay my personal
experiences from both countries as they are relevant to my research.
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CHAPTER 2 – LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS BUILDING
2.1

ANTI-AMERICANISM IN A DIVIDED EUROPEAN UNION – A CULTURAL
EXPLANATION

Anti-Americanism in Europe is not new. It has come and gone in waves, usually
exacerbated by specific U.S. foreign policies such as the war in Vietnam, the Iran-Contra
scandal, and more recently, George W. Bush‘s war in Iraq. Even during times of relative ―good
will‖, such as the period of the Clinton Presidency, the trans-Atlantic relationship has been
marred by tensions. Clinton, one of the most popular American Presidents as far as the Europe is
concerned, has been accused by Europeans of trying to undermine their economy during the
famous beef hormone dispute (EU trying to prevent meat from American cattle injected with
growth hormones from entering its markets, and the U.S. taking the matter to the World Trade
Organization) (World Trade Organization 2009). With George W. Bush‘s ―war on terror‖, antiAmericanism in some parts of Europe has reached new all-time heights. Younger generations of
Western Europeans, born after the end of the Cold War, have come to see the United States not
as their protector against the threat of the Soviet Union (as some of their parents and grandparent
did) but rather as ―the country . . . in European eyes -- of arrogance‖ (Moisi 2003).
For this dissertation, when I use the term anti-Americanism in Europe, I am referring to
the negative attitudes of some Europeans toward the U.S. and the American people. Surely,
certain policies of the U.S. government (the war in Iraq, support for the state of Israel, etc.), as
well as a number of politicians such as George W. Bush or Donald Rumsfeld, figure prominently
among the targets of European anti-Americanism. But Europe‘s hostility is not limited to these
narrow targets. Harnden (2009) quotes President Obama as saying that America as a whole is
blamed at times for ―much of what is bad in the world‖ because of its haughtiness and
unwillingness to cooperate with others, especially with the European Union: ―Instead of
celebrating your dynamic union and seeking to partner with you to meet common challenges,
there have been times where America has shown arrogance and been dismissive, even derisive.‖
I use data from the Eurobarometer as well as from the World Values Surveys to measure how
citizens of the European Union view the United States‘ role in fighting poverty in the world,
dealing with terrorism, helping the international economy, and promoting world peace; these
questions tap into a pool of public opinion feelings toward the United States in both Old and
New Europe.
2.2

CULTURAL SIMILARITY, TOLERANCE AND RELIGION

This section covers two of the primary aspects of cultural similarity: tolerance and
religiosity. The core argument of this research is that there is a relationship between these two
elements of cultural similarity and anti-Americanism: the more culturally similar a country is to
the United States, the lower its levels of anti-Americanism. I begin with an overall definition of
cultural similarity.
2.2.1. CULTURAL SIMILARITY
Cultural similarity is the concept used in this dissertation to describe the closeness in
cultural values between countries/regions. The goal is to show that anti-Americanism levels are
lower in New Europe than in Old Europe because the newest members of the European Union
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have more in common, culturally, with their American counterparts than Old Europeans do. The
central argument of this research is that countries/populations who share similar cultural values
are inclined to feel closer to each other than countries/populations divided by cultural
differences. This is a fairly ‗common sense‘ suggestion: we like people who we perceive to be
similar to us. This promotes balance in an individual‘s values system and prevents cognitive
dissonance, which has been described as the existence of strong contradictions between a
person‘s various beliefs and opinions about herself and her environment (Festinger 1957) . When
we like people who are like us, we indirectly validate our own opinions and behaviors through
them.
In the international studies literature, the concept of cultural similarity has typically been
associated with research pertaining to the either the democratic peace theory, or to Huntington‘s
famous ―clash of civilizations‖ argument. For example, some studies based on the democratic
peace theory have looked at how cultural similarity between governments and political structures
strengthens or weakens the impact of democratic dyads on inter-state wars – the more culturally
similar two democracies are the less likely they are to fight against each other (Henderson 1998).
Others have investigated the impact of perceived cultural similarity between two states on their
respective publics, and in turn, the impact of public opinion on governmental foreign policies –
the more two nationalities perceive each other as culturally alike, the more they would pressure
their governments to establish bi-lateral friendly/cooperative relations (Geva and Hanson 1999).
The research in this dissertation differs from those mentioned above in that it is not
looking at the impact of public opinion on specific governmental policies. Its focus instead
reflects Nincic and Russett‘s arguments regarding the origin of levels of American public
hostility or friendliness towards a given country: ―the American public will strive to achieve a
measure of congruity between its level of approval for a foreign nation and the extent to which
the foreign nation is perceived as similar to the United States in terms of certain salient
attributes‖ (Nincic and Russett 1979, 69). My theory is that the public in New Europe will do the
same thing. ―New Europeans‖ will look at the United States and see the Americans as having
cultural values similar to their own, especially when it comes to tolerance and religion; this
perceived cultural similarity will affect their overall feelings towards the U.S.
2.2.2. RELIGIOSITY AND TOLERANCE
Religiosity is here understood as the way an individual interprets the world through the
perceptual lens of his faith, as well as how strictly he observes its rites/rituals. As it pertains to
this research, I argue that there is a negative relationship between religiosity and antiAmericanism in Old Europe and New Europe. I expect to find that New Europe and the United
States share similar (higher) levels of religiosity, compared to a more secular Old Europe.
There is a vast literature on how America‘s religious beliefs are seen by the rest of the
world. Using data from the PEW surveys, Kohut and Stokes argue that ―To Europeans,
Americans‘ religiosity skews what should be secular policy decisions, such as on teaching
creationism in schools, and the death penalty, abortion and gay marriage‖ (Kohut and Stokes
2006, 93). This negative view of how faith and governmental affairs intermingle in the United
States was particularly accentuated in the first decade of the 2000s following the election of
George W. Bush as America‘s 43rd President.
10

Those Europeans already worried about his openly-proclaimed faith and wide support
among evangelical Christians became even more concerned about the influence of religion in
George Bush‘s foreign policies when he began framing the war on terrorism as a war against
―evil.‖ In his 2002 State of Union address, President Bush made several references to the ―good
vs. evil‖ battles awaiting a post-9/11 United States: ―States like [Iran, Iraq and North Korea], and
their terrorist allies, constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world‖; ―Our
enemies believed America was weak and materialistic, that we would splinter in fear and
selfishness. They were as wrong as they are evil‖; ―Those of us who have lived through these
challenging times have been changed by them. We've come to know truths that we will never
question: evil is real, and it must be opposed‖; and ―This time of adversity offers a unique
moment of opportunity -- a moment we must seize to change our culture. Through the gathering
momentum of millions of acts of service and decency and kindness, I know we can overcome
evil with greater good‖ (Bush 2002). Much of the world had a negative reaction to this rhetoric.
The Muslim world saw it as an attack on Islam and non-Christians in general, while Europeans
were mostly concerned about the blurring of lines separating Church and State, especially after
Bush‘s successful 2004 reelection campaign:
―He's convinced he's right, and he's almost got this feeling he has a quasi-divine mission
to fill as the president of the United States,‖ said the Rev. Michel Kubler, executive
religion editor for La Croix, a Roman Catholic newspaper in France. ―His reelection will
only reinforce these convictions, and he'll feel infallible, which of course will only
increase European disquiet. A transatlantic divide has existed for years between
increasingly secular Europe and religious America, shaping perceptions on issues ranging
from abortion and stem cell research to the death penalty, same-sex marriage and
conflicts in the Middle East. As the results of the U.S. election sink in, the early
consensus among European religious and political thinkers is that the religion gap is
likely to widen‖ (Bryant 2004).
This research aims to uncover and examine a ―religion gap‖ like the one Bryant mentions
above not only between Europe as a whole and the United States, but inside the European Union
as well—between Old Europe and New Europe. European political scientists have started to
notice a weakening of continental religious ties with the integration of newer, more Eastern
countries into the broader economic and political systems of Europe. Schlesinger and Foret
(2006), for example, analyzed how the impact of new religious groups in European society
manifested itself in the debate over the inclusion of references to Christian values and beliefs in
the European Constitution. They argue that New Europe ―flexing‖ its newly found political
muscle within the EU made the intensity of the debate over religion and the European Union
Constitution much more pronounced than the secular Old Europe expected. Grace Davie (2006)
not only agrees with them, but also suggests that these kinds of clashes will probably intensify in
the future, with secularism under pressure not only from former communist countries that are
now members of the EU, but from within Old Europe itself, where growing numbers of
immigrant populations are using religion to maintain their identities and to create a niche for
themselves in otherwise homogeneous societies (Davie 2006).
Tolerance, as discussed in the political science literature, comes in two forms. One
represents the baseline for being tolerant, which means that even if you object to something, you
still agree to live with it. The second form reflects a higher standard of tolerance that asks a
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person not only to agree to live with people, beliefs and behaviors one disapproves of, but to also
recognize them as having equal rights in society (King 1976). The focus of this analysis in on the
latter variety of tolerance, and for this purpose I have selected three groups that at various points
in time have been the target of intolerance in Europe and the United States: 1) homosexuals, 2)
women, and 3) foreigners/immigrants – people who speak a different language, have a different
nationality, or who ―look‖ different than the majority of the population. Survey questions
regarding people‘s views on these three groups are used as measures of tolerance. They cover a
diverse array of societal beliefs about women as mothers, wives, educated individuals, and
political leaders, about homosexuals as neighbors (and the acceptance of homosexual life style),
and about immigrants as neighbors and a positive influence on a society.
This look at tolerance exclusively focused on attitudes falls in line with distinctions
between tolerance and toleration made by Andrew Murphy and Philip Brooks. Brooks defines
tolerance as ―a disposition: toleration is the behavior in which the disposition finds expression‖
(Brooks 1887, 6). A century later, Murphy builds on this distinction and suggests that we should
use the term toleration ―…to refer to social or political practice‖ and tolerance ―… to refer to
attitudes‖ (Murphy 1997). He argues that although toleration in an intrinsic part of a liberal
democracy, tolerance is not. A democracy can survive with intolerance, but not without
toleration, and the danger begins the moment that a negative attitude towards a group (i.e.
women or homosexuals) changes into actively denying that particular group equal rights in the
society (i.e., not allowing women to vote, drive or work outside the home, or denying gays and
lesbian couples same civil rights granted to heterosexual households). The entire group of
variables used in this dissertation looks at tolerance - attitudes towards homosexuals, women,
and foreigners/immigrants.
In the 1980s, several authors focused their attention on changes in intolerance levels in
American society during the Cold War. What they found was not that the public was more
intolerant in the 1982 than thirty years prior, but rather that they had shifted the targets for their
existing intolerant dispositions. As Sullivan, Piereson, and Marcus (1982) note, ―attitudes
towards Communists, socialists, and atheists are now more favorable [because] citizens are now
able to point to other political groups towards whom they feel more hostility‖ (69).
Homosexuals, immigrants and women are three groups that have figured prominently in the
minds of 21st century Americans as ―new outlets‖ for their intolerant attitudes.
As early as July 2011, major U.S. media outlets were discussing the passage of a law in
New York allowing gay marriage, the end of military‘s policy of ―don‘t ask don‘t tell,‖ and
Presidential hopeful Michelle Bachman‘s views on homosexuality as ―personal bondage,
personal despair and personal enslavement‖ (Stolberg 2011). In 2010, PEW Center survey
findings demonstrated that nearly half (48%) of the American population were opposed to samesex marriage, while 60% of respondents supported gays and lesbians serving openly in the
military, demonstrating that there were still notable segments of U.S. society holding intolerant
views toward these groups (Pew Research Center 2010).
Immigration debates are equally heated in the U.S. as of this writing. Samuel Huntington
wrote that ―the single most immediate and most serious challenge to America‘s traditional
identity comes from the immense and continuing immigration from Latin America, especially
from Mexico, and the fertility rates of these immigrants compared to black and white American
natives‖ (Huntington 2004, 32). Huntington perceives the Latino immigration as so dangerous to
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the fabric of America‘s ―melting pot‖ precisely because these new immigrants refused to fully
assimilate, or ―melt,‖ into the existing U.S. culture. Huntington‘s perspective has been echoed in
discussions over English as the official language of the United States, but also more recently in
attempts to reduce or eliminate tax-subsidized medical services for uninsured illegal immigrants,
and plans by high ranking Republican legislators to end birthright citizenship (Preston 2011).
These high-profile policy initiatives reflect fairly widespread concern within the
American citizenry about the impact immigrants have on the American society as a whole
According to a Pew 2011 survey, 61 percent of Americans approve of Arizona‘s newest and
toughest immigration laws (which require, among other things, for foreigners to carry their
immigration papers with them at all times, and for police officers to ask to see these documents if
they have any reasons to suspect someone might be an illegal immigrant). Further, 39 percent of
respondents support a constitutional change that would deny automatic citizenship rights for
children of illegal immigrants (Pew Research Center 2011).
Women are the third minority groups analyzed here as a target of intolerant attitudes.
While gender equality issues such as equal pay for equal work, or equal access to jobs and
education are met with general societal approval in America and the European Union, there are
still at least two very controversial issues remaining: abortion, and, to a lesser degree, divorce. In
the United States, abortion ―has inspired marches and murder, and spawned a set of competing
interest groups that have mobilized tens of millions of dollars a year to influence public opinion
and voting behavior‖ (Jelen and Wilcox 2003, 489). And these ―pro-life‖ and ―pro-choice‖
campaigns seem to have worked as their proponents hoped. As of this writing, abortion is one of
the few issues capable of changing a person‘s long time affiliation with a party. For example, as
Abramowitz (1995) observed during the 1990s elections, some very religious Democrats voted
for the Republican Party because of their own party‘s stance on the abortion issue. Overall,
America remains deeply divided over the issues of abortion. A 2011 Pew Survey found that a
majority of Americans (54 percent) believes that abortion should be legal, which represents an
increase in support from the 46 percent in 2009. When it comes to the political affiliation of prochoice supporters, these divisions are clearer – 34 percent of Republics versus 65 percent of
Democrats and 58 percent of Independents ( Pew Research Center 2011).
Homosexuality, immigration, and gender equality/abortion issues are much less
controversial in the European Union than in the United States. However, with the newest waves
of EU expansion including a growing number of formerly Communist countries, the general tone
of public debates on these issues has been slowly changing. There are stronger voices now within
the European Union from New European countries – like Poland and Romania – speaking out
against gay rights and against abortion, than was the case in the past. And this creates tensions
between Old and New Europe. For example, in June 2011 the Wall Street Journal (2011) covered
a dispute between EU Justice Commissioner Viviane Reding and the Hungarian Government
concerning the use of EU money for an anti-abortion campaign in lieu of gender equality
projects (such as training women for in-demand jobs in sectors traditionally reserved for men).
Reding officially requested that the Hungarian government remove all posters printed for this
anti-abortion campaign paid with EU money, while the Hungarian officials blamed the whole
incident on a misinterpretation of the EU Progress Program.
To reiterate, the central argument of this project is that there is a relationship between
how tolerant a European society is and its levels of anti-Americanism. Similar levels of tolerance
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create a cultural ―likeness‖ between countries and the United States, while dissimilar levels of
tolerance create a form of cultural ―enmity.‖ Combined with the arguments presented in the
previous section, the cultural similarity – anti-Americanism theory can be summarized as
follows: New Europe and the United States are more similar in terms of their levels of
tolerance and religiosity than Old Europe and the U.S. are, and this rapport explains much
of the difference in levels of anti-Americanism in Old Europe and New Europe.
2.3

TRADE, TRAVEL, THE MIDDLE EAST POLICIES, THE ENVIRONMENT
AND ANTI-AMERICANISM – ALTERNATIVE THEORIES

This section presents the relationship between anti-Americanism and four factors not
explicitly related to cultural similarity: strength of trade ties between a country and the U.S.
(more trade with the U.S. equals more pro-Americanism), travels to America (more travels to the
U.S. equal stronger pro-American), position on Middle East policies (the more pro-Israel and
supporting the war in Iraq, the more pro-American) and the environment (the more you support
protecting the environment, the more anti-American you are likely to be).
2.3.1. TRADE AND TRAVEL
Discovering what lies behind anti and pro-Americanism has been a long time interest of
American scholars, who were surprised by the speed at which the high level of support and
sympathy expressed around the world immediately following the 9/11 terrorist attacks
transformed into hostility and opposition to America‘s handling of its ―war on terror.‖ In 2005,
amid a wave of anti-Americanism studies, Anne Applebaum (2005) set out to identify the proAmericans still out there in the world. She found them and they looked something like this: ―the
British small businessman who […] has been on Florida on holiday. Or the Indian stockbroker,
the South Korean investment banker, and the Philippines manufacturer, all of whom have
excellent relations with their American clients and all of whom support a U.S. military presence
in their parts of the world‖ (40). Pro-American feelings in post 9/11 Europe seem to have been
damaged not only by unpopular policies such as the invasion of Iraq, but also by America‘s
economic, cultural and political disengagement from the European Union, while focusing its
attention on the Middle East and, to a lesser extent, China and Russia. Gienow-Hecht (2006)
summed this up the following way:
Between the late 1940s and the end of the Cold War, political criticism remained
consistently embedded in the critique of cultural imperialism, and it also became
increasingly academic. While the 1990s witnessed a temporary retreat of political antiAmericanism, the events following 9/11 re-created a scenario reminiscent of the 1950s—
but without the European sympathy generated by years of foreign investment, cultural
exchange, and political goodwill on the part of the United States (1089, emphasis
added).
These discussions of sources of pro-Americanism mirror arguments from studies done in
the tradition of modernization theories, according to which ―the more two societies interact and
have economic and cultural ties, the more they develop a sense of ―fellow-feeling‖ between
individuals in those societies‖ (Dore 1984, 412). Applying these theories to the present research,
we should observe lower levels of anti-Americanism in countries that have strong trade ties with
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the United States (as measured by a ―trade to GPD ratio‖ variable), where the citizenry support
free markets/capitalism, and where its citizens have traveled to the U.S.
In a similar analytical approach, Chiozza (2009) investigates the impact of several,
related factors such as the number of student visas granted by the United States to the citizens of
a certain country, trade dependence, and American direct investments on anti-Americanism. He
finds that ―military, economic, and cultural engagement with the United States is not by itself
sufficient to create a political context immune to anti-Americanism‖ (Chiozza 2009, 151). While
he uses the 44 countries surveyed in 2002 by the PEW Research Center, it would be interesting
to see if his findings are reflected in an exclusively European sample, five years later.
2.3.2. THE MIDDLE EAST AND THE ENVIRONMENT
The reason ―Middle East‖ and ―the Environment‖ are lumped together in this section is
because they both represent policy issue areas that have attracted the world‘s attention and
antipathy towards the United States over the years. The war in Iraq, America‘s support for the
state of Israel, and its perceived biases regarding the Palestinian problem have generated
widespread condemnation and fueled anti-Americanism from Paris to Riyad and from Berlin to
Tehran. President Bush‘s failure to promote environmentally-friendly policies has triggered
criticism from the more ecologically-minded Europeans, as well as from environmentalists
within the U.S. Goldengerg (2009), for example, quotes Josh Borner, a spokesman for the Sierra
Club as saying ―[Bush] has undone decades if not a century of progress on the environment.‖
One of the favorite explanations for anti-Americanism inside the Bush 43 administration
was ―They hate . . . a democratically elected government. They hate our freedoms: our freedom
of religion, our freedom of speech, our freedom to vote and assemble and disagree with each
other‖ (CNN 2001). However, as many opinion polls conducted all around the world have
shown, most people actually approve of democratic ideas and believe that democracy is the best
performing governmental system possible right now (Norris and Inglehart 2002). The 2011
upheavals in Tunisia, Egypt, Syria and Yemen have also demonstrated that the young Arab men
and women who might have been burning the American flag a year ago were now willing to
sacrifice their lives to bring democracy in their countries and oust from power dictators like
Hosni Mubarak or Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali, long-time allies of the United States.
So, if it is not American ideals of freedom and democracy, then why do others in the
world ―hate‖ Americans? Part of this answer comes from the polls referenced earlier. When
asked what upsets them about the United States, Europeans have pointed their finger, among
other issues, at the 2003 Iraq war, America‘s unwavering and lopsided support for the state of
Israel, and George W. Bush‘s environmentally-unfriendly policies such as unilaterally
withdrawing in January 2010 from the Kyoto Treaty (Pew Research Center 2007).
Chapter 9 of this dissertation presents a test of the relationship between anti-Americanism
and the views of respondents from Old and New Europe on U.S. foreign policies in the Middle
East, including the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as on environmental issues such as
global warming. I expect to find that high levels of anti-Americanism are positively correlated
with an individual‘s interest in ecological causes, his/her support for the Palestinians, and his/her
desire to see a quick withdrawal of American troops from Iraq and Afghanistan.
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2.4

THEORY AND HYPOTHESES

The core hypothesis at the basis of this research, as well as an alternative hypothesis and
list of all the more specific hypotheses to be tested in the following chapters, is presented below.

Overall hypothesis: Citizens of New Europe are more pro-American than are citizens of
Old Europe because New Europe and the United States are more culturally similar than
are Old Europe and the U.S.

Alternative hypothesis: Citizens of New Europe are more pro-American than citizens of
Old Europe because they travel to the U.S. more often, because they approve of American
foreign policies in the Middle East and on the environment, because their countries have
stronger economic ties with the U.S. economy, and because they support a market
economy.

Graph 1 – Tolerance, Religiosity, Trade and Anti-Americanism

Trade and
Travel
Israel and
the
Environment

Cultural
Similarity

LEVELS OF ANTIAMERICANISM

The following six chapters cover the quantitative analysis used to test the hypothesis at the
foundation of this research, which examines the relationship between anti-Americanism and
levels of religiosity and tolerance towards women, homosexuals and immigrants/foreigners.
These tests are conducted in three distinct geographic regions: Old Europe (Western Europe),
New Europe (Eastern Europe) and the United States. Alternative explanatory factors (trade
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levels, frequency of travels to the U.S., attitudes towards America‘s policies in the Middle East
and the environment) are also examined in Chapter 9. The following annotations were used
through the rest of the dissertation: p ˂ .05*, p ˂ .01** and p ˂ .001***. A list of sub-hypotheses
can be seen below. ―No answer‖ responses were deleted from all the databases used in this
empirical analysis. ―Don‘t know‖ answers were kept in an analysis when a judgment was made
that they were the equivalent of a ―middle-of-the road‖ or moderate response, especially in the
case of otherwise dichotomous variables where the respondents had only two options (yes or no).
―Don‘t know‖ answers were deleted in the cases on questions giving the respondents either a
large number of choices (for example scales from 0 to 10, 1 to 5, etc.), or the possibility of
choosing a clear ―moderate‖ answer (for example ―favorable‖, ―neither favorable nor
unfavorable‖ and ―unfavorable‖).
The core argument of this research is that Old Europe and the United States are less
culturally similar than New Europe and the US, which explains why Old Europe experiences
relatively higher levels of anti-Americanism than New Europe. In order to test this theory, three
dummy variables were created for each of the databases presented below in Chapters 4 – 8 that
measured differences in cultural indicators (tolerance towards women, immigrants and
homosexuals, and levels of religiosity) for three regional pairings: Old Europe and New Europe,
New Europe and the United States, and Old Europe and the United States. Unfortunately, due to
time and space restrictions, only the results of the statistical tests involving the Old Europe/New
Europe, and New Europe/United States comparisons are presented below in detail. Details of
statistical analysis involving an independent variable coded 0 for Old Europe and 1 for the
United States are presented in the text only when they contradict the main hypothesis, according
to which we expect to find statistically significant differences in levels of tolerance and
religiosity between Old Europe and New Europe (culturally divided Europe), as well as between
Old Europe and the United States (lower cultural similarity), but no statistically significant
differences between New Europe and the United States (higher cultural similarity).
The wording of each dependent variable, as well as its value/coding are presented in
Chapters 3-7 in tables containing their respective crosstabulation results. In some cases, when
these variables are coded on a scale from 1 to 10, only the two extreme as well as the middle
values are presented in the above mentioned tables.
A list of detailed hypotheses can be seen below:
Hypothesis 1: There is a statistically significant difference between levels of antiAmericanism in Old Europe vs. New Europe (OE ˃ NE).
Hypothesis 2: There is a statistically significant difference between levels of tolerance
towards women in Old Europe vs. New Europe (OE ˃ NE), and in Old Europe vs. the United
States (OE ˃ US).
Hypothesis 3: There is no statistically significant difference between levels of tolerance
towards women in New Europe vs. the United States.
Hypothesis 4: There is a statistically significant difference between levels of tolerance
towards immigrants/foreigners in Old Europe vs. New Europe (OE ˃ NE) and in Old Europe
vs. the United States (OE ˃ NE).
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Hypothesis 5: There is no statistically significant difference between levels of tolerance
towards immigrants/foreigners in New Europe vs. the United States.
Hypothesis 6: There is a statistically significant difference between levels of tolerance
towards homosexuals in Old Europe vs. New Europe (OE ˃ NE) and in Old Europe vs. the
United States (OE ˃ US).
Hypothesis 7: There is no statistically significant difference between levels of tolerance
towards homosexuals in New Europe vs. the United States.
Hypothesis 8: There is a statistically significant difference between levels of religiosity
in Old Europe and New Europe (OE ˂ NE) and in Old Europe and the United States (OE ˂
US).
Hypothesis 9: There is no statistically significant difference between levels of religiosity
in New Europe and the United States.
Hypothesis 10 (alternative theories): High anti-Americanism levels are positively
correlated with weak trade ties with the U.S., infrequent travels to the America, as well as strong
support for the Palestinians, the environment and for a quick withdrawal of American troops
from Iraq and Afghanistan.
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CHAPTER 3 – EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS: ANTI-AMERICANISM
IN A DIVIDED EUROPEAN UNION
My first hypothesis states that there is a statistically significant difference between
levels of anti-Americanism in Old Europe vs. New Europe (higher levels in Old Europe
than in New Europe). To test this hypothesis, mean averages of anti-Americanism were
compared across respondents from Old and New Europe using independent-samples t-tests and
chi-square methods. Answers to direct questions about overall feelings towards the United States
and the American people, as well as responses regarding the perceived role United States plays
on world stage, are used in this analysis to measure anti-Americanism,. The overall results,
presented below individually and chronologically (per database used) indicated support for this
hypothesis.
3.1 . PEW 2002
Six variables from this database were used as dependent variables to test the difference in
means between levels of anti-Americanism in Old vs. New Europe. The results of the statistical
analysis are summarized in Table 3.1.7 and they are preceded by a detailed description of each
test.
All six are ordinal variables, and for all six of them the statistical test used was an
independent-samples t-test. The results of this test, as well as the crosstabulation and the wording
of the questions in each case, are presented below. The independent variable, Old Europe vs.
New Europe, was coded 0 for Old Europe, and 1 for New Europe. An alpha level of .05 was used
in all statistical analyses.
Results of the statistical analysis for each dependent variable are presented below,
starting with the ―U.S. world politics‖ variable.
i.

The crosstabulation results for the dependent variable “U.S. world politics” can be seen
below in Table 3.1.1.
TABLE 3.1.1: In making international policy decisions, to what extent do you think the
United States takes into account the interests of countries like our country?
In making international policy decisions, to what extent do you
think the United States takes into account the interests of
countries like our country?
Great deal
Fair amount
Not too much
Not at all
1
2
3
4
8.0%
34.6%
40.9%
16.5%
Old Europe
New Europe
2.8%
25.1%
47.0%
25.1%
An independent groups t-test revealed that opinions about the United States in Old
Europe (M = 2.66, SD =.84) significantly differed from those in New Europe (M = 2.94, SD =
.78), as predicted, t (4305) = -11.50, p ˂.001***). However, the direction of the hypothesis was
not confirmed by this test. It appears that while the average citizen from Old Europe believes that
the United States takes into account the interests of his country ―a fair amount‖ in making
international policy decision, the average citizen of New Europe sees the interests of his country
taken into account by the U.S. ―not too much.‖ One possible explanation for these results would
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be that the public in both regions has realistic expectations of U.S. views of the European Union
– it would be expected for the American government to be more concerned about the interests of
their economically strong and militarily powerful, longtime allies like United Kingdom or
Germany, then they would be of countries, like Bulgaria or Slovenia, which are, relatively
speaking, less significant in the international arena.
The results of the crosstabulation for the second dependent variable, “U.S. world
poverty” can be seen below in Table 3.1.2.

ii.

TABLE 3.1.2: In your opinion, do United States' policies increase the gap between rich and
poor countries, lessen the gap between rich and poor countries, or do United States policies
have no effect on the gap between rich and poor countries?
In your opinion, do United States' policies increase the gap
between rich and poor countries, lessen the gap between
rich and poor countries, or do United States policies have
no effect on the gap between rich and poor countries?
Increase gap between
rich and poor
1
Old Europe
New Europe

No effect
2

69.5%

20.9%

Lessen the gap
between rich
and poor
3
9.6%

60.9%

24.6%

14.5%

An independent groups t-test showed that views of the United States policies regarding
world poverty in Old Europe (M = 1.40, SD = .65) are significantly different from those in
New Europe (M = 1.54, SD = .73), as predicted, t(4085) = -6.10, p ˂ .001***). The direction of
the hypothesis is also confirmed, with Old Europe holding a more negative view of how
American policies affect the gap between the rich and poor countries.
iii.

The results of the crosstabulation for a third variable, “U.S. world problems,” are
presented below in Table 3.1.3.
TABLE 3.1.3: In terms of solving world problems, does the United States do too much, too
little, or the right amount in helping solve world problems?
In terms of solving world problems, does the United States do too
much, too little, or the right amount in helping solve world problems?
United States
does too much
1

United States
United States
United States does
does right
does too little
nothing
amount
3
4
2
21.7%
36.3%
33.2%
2.9%
Old Europe
New Europe
24.7%
43.9%
17.8%
3.4%
An independent groups t-test showed that views of the United States policies vis-à-vis
world problems in Old Europe (M = 2.18, SD = .82) are significantly different from those in
New Europe (M = 2.00, SD = .79), as predicted, t(4174) = 7.37, p ˂ .001***). The direction of
the hypothesis is also confirmed, with more people in Old Europe believing that the United
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States should do more to solve world problems, while almost half of the people interviewed in
New Europe see America as doing its part in helping solve world problems.
iv.

Crosstabulation results for the fourth dependent variable, “U.S. culture,” are presented
below in Table 3.1.4. ―Don‘t know‖ answers were re-coded to fit the middle of the scale,
as equivalent to a ―neither, nor‖ classification.
TABLE 3.1.4: Which of the following phrases comes closer to your view? It's good that
American ideas and customs are spreading here, OR it's bad that American ideas and
customs are spreading here.
Which of the following phrases comes closer to your view? It's good
that American ideas and customs are spreading here, OR it's bad that
American ideas and customs are spreading here.

It’s neither good, nor
It's bad that American
bad that American
ideas and customs are
ideas and customs are
spreading here
spreading here (Don’t
3
know)
2
30.0%
6.8%
63.2%
Old Europe
New Europe
34.1%
13.5%
52.4%
An independent groups t-test revealed that opinions on Americanization in Old Europe
(M = 2.33, SD = .90) are significantly different from those in New Europe (M = 2.18, SD =
.91), as measured, t (4473) = 5.51, p˂.001***). In both regions, the majority of people in believe
that it is bad that American ideas and customs are spreading in their countries. However Old
Europeans are more concerned than their New Europe counterparts about the effects of
Americanization on their societies and cultures. 63 percent of people interviewed in OE
answered that it was bad that American ideas and customs were spreading in their countries,
while almost 53 percent of those interviewed in NE argued the opposite. It is also interesting to
notice the fairly large number of Europeans (7 percent in Old Europe and 14 percent in New
Europe) who either do not have enough information or who do not care enough about the topic to
formulate an opinion about the impact of American ideas and customs might have on their
societies.
It's good that American
ideas and customs are
spreading here
1

v.

The crosstabulation for my fifth dependent variable, ―opinion on U.S.,” is presented
below in Table 3.1.5.
TABLE 3.1.5: What is your opinion of the United States?
What is your opinion of the United States?

Old Europe
New Europe

Very
favorable
1
14.1%
15.8%

Somewhat
favorable
2
55.4%
59.2%
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Somewhat
unfavorable
3
25.1%
20.6%

Very unfavorable
4
5.4%
4.5%

An independent groups t-test showed that opinions regarding the United States in Old
Europe (M = 2.22, SD = .74) are significantly different from those in New Europe (M = 2.14,
SD = .72), as predicated, t (4263) = 3.54, p ˂ .001***). Although the majority of Europeans have
a fairly positive attitude towards the United States, Old Europeans hold more ―somewhat
unfavorable‖ views of their transatlantic partner.
vi.

Crosstabulation results for the dependent variables measuring European views of
Americans can be found below in Table 3.1.6.
TABLE 3.1.6: What is your opinion of Americans?
What is your opinion of Americans?
Very favorable
1

Somewhat
favorable
2

Somewhat
unfavorable
3

Very unfavorable
4

15.2%
63.2%
17.8%
3.8%
Old Europe
New Europe
13.8%
63.5%
19.2%
3.4%
An independent t- test of the “opinion on Americans” dependent variable revealed no
significant differences in opinions on Americans between Old Europe (M = 2.10, SD = .68) and
New Europe (M = 2.12, SD = .67), as measured, t (4226) = -1.01, p = .31 ns).
vii.

Conclusion
The results of above findings are summarized below in Table 3.1.7.
TABLE 3.1.7: Anti-Americanism in Old Europe vs. New Europe as measured by variables
from the PEW 2002 survey/database (codebook in Appendix 3)
Region
U.S.
U.S.
U.S. world U.S.
Opinion
Opinion on
world
world
problems
culture
on the
Americans
politics
poverty
U.S.
1.51***
2.39***
1.68***
2.33***
2.10 ns
Old Europe 2.66***
(0.84)
(0.81)
(1.05)
(.46)
(.90)
(.68)
1.64***
2.58***
1.61***
2.18***
2.12 ns
New Europe 2.94***
(0.78)
(0.85)
(1.21)
(.48)
(.91)
(.67)
Notes: a) Old Europe – New Europe difference is significant at p ≤ .05.
b) p ≤ .01 *, p ≤ .05**, p ≤ .001***, ns = not significant
These results indicate that while in Old Europe, the population makes a clear distinction
between the American people and the American government, in New Europe pro-Americanism
manifest itself at both levels. For example, when it comes to OE, 55 percent of the people
surveyed have a ―somewhat favorable‖ view of the United States. The percentage increases to 63
percent when asked the same question about Americans. This is matched by the percentages of
those who see the United States in a ―somewhat unfavorable‖ light (25 percent) versus those who
see the Americans in the same way (17 percent).
At the same time, these results also show that people in Old Europe believe more than
then counterparts in New Europe that the United States takes into account their countries‘
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interests when making foreign policy decisions. They are also more inclined to be critical of
these decisions, and they would like to see the United States playing a more positive and
proactive role in solving the world‘s biggest problem, such as the increasing gap between rich
and poor countries. OE is also more concerned with the impact of globalization /
Americanization on their societies. Overall, these results confirm my initial hypothesis: Old
Europe is more anti-American than New Europe, with the caveat that this antiAmericanism seems to be directed more towards the U.S. government and not the
American people.
3.2 . EUROBAROMETER 62 – 2004
Six variables from this database were used as dependent variables to test the difference in
means between levels of anti-Americanism in Old vs. New Europe. The results of the statistical
analysis are summarized in Table 3.2.7 and they are preceded by a detailed description of each
test.
All six are ordinal variables, and for the first one examined, a chi-square test was used,
while for the other five, an independent-samples t-test was employed. The results of these tests,
as well as the crosstabulation and wording of the questions in each case, are presented below.
The independent variable, Old Europe vs. New Europe, was coded 0 for Old Europe, and 1 for
New Europe. ―Don‘t know‖ and ―neither nor‖ answers were re-coded to represent a middle value
for all the dependent variables that did not already have such a value. For example, the majority
of the answers were coded 1 = positive, 2 = negative, and 3 = neither nor. They were re-coded as
1 = positive, 2 = neither nor and 3 = negative. An alpha level of .05 was used in all statistical
analyses. Results of the statistical analysis for each dependent variable are presented below,
starting with the ―EU foreign policy independent of U.S.‖ variable.
i.

Crosstabulation results for the “EU foreign policy independent of U.S.” dependent
variable are presented below in Table 3.2.1.
TABLE 3.2.1: European Union foreign policy should be independent of United States
foreign policy
European Union foreign policy should be independent of
United States foreign policy
Tend to agree
Tend to disagree
1
2
89.8%
10.2%
Old Europe
New Europe
90.7%
9.3%
A chi-square test of independence was performed to examine the relationship between the
country where the interview was conducted (Old Europe vs. New Europe) and the respondents‘
views on a European Union foreign policy more independent of the United States. The
relationship between these variables was fairly weak, X² (1, N = 23014) = 4.72, p ˂ .05*,
although not in the direction predicted by my hypothesis. Despite the small difference in the
overall percentages, respondents in Old Europe are less likely than their New Europe
counterparts to advocate a European Union foreign policy more independent of United States.
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Crosstabulation results for “U.S. Role in World Peace” dependent variable are presented
below, in Table 3.2.2.

ii.

TABLE 3.2.2: U.S. Role in World Peace
In your opinion, would you say that the United States tend to play a
positive role, a negative role or neither a positive nor a negative role
regarding peace in the world?

Old Europe
New Europe

Positive
1
21.1%
32.2%

Neither nor
2
14.9%
21.0%

Negative
3
64.0%
46.8%

An independent groups t-test showed that opinions regarding the role U.S. plays in
promoting world peace in Old Europe (M = 2.43, SD = .81) are significantly different from
those in New Europe (M = 2.15, SD = .87), as predicated, t (24316) = 25.49, p ˂ .001***). A
sizably larger percentage of those interviewed in Old Europe (64 percent) than New Europe (46
percent) believe that the United States policies have a negative impact on peace in the world.
iii.

Crosstabulation results for the “U.S. Role in Fighting Terrorism” dependent variable
are presented below in Table 3.2.3.
TABLE 3.2.3: U.S. Role in Fighting Terrorism
In your opinion, would you say that the United States tend to play a
positive role, a negative role or neither a positive nor a negative role
regarding fighting terrorism?

Old Europe
New Europe

Positive
1
37.1%

Neither nor
2
14.4%

Negative
3
48.5%

52.6%

16.8%

30.7%

Results from an independent-samples t-test (t (24273) = 28.40, p ˂ .001***) revealed that
Old Europe (M = 2.11, SD = .91) is significantly more likely than New Europe (M = 1.78, SD =
.88) to see the United States foreign policies as having a negative impact on trying to eradicate
terrorism in the world. A year after the Iraqi invasion and the beginning of the war in
Afghanistan (both policies labeled by the American government as part of the war on terror),
almost half of those interviewed in Old Europe answered that in their opinion, the U.S. plays a
negative role in fighting terrorism. At the same time, over 50 percent of respondents in New
Europe (where several national governments expressed official support for the war in Iraq,
sending troops there) see the impact of the United States in the struggle to eliminate terrorism as
a positive one.
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iv.

Crosstabulation results for the “U.S. Role in Economic Growth Worldwide” are
presented below in Table 3.2.4.
TABLE 3.2.4: U.S. Role in Economic Growth Worldwide
In your opinion, would you say that the United States tend to play a
positive role, a negative role or neither a positive nor a negative role
regarding economic growth worldwide?

Old Europe
New Europe

Positive
1
37.5%

Neither nor
2
19.9%

Negative
3
42.6%

50.0%

25.1%

25.0%

An independent-groups t-test showed that there are statistically significant differences
between opinions on the America‘s role in promoting economic growth worldwide between
respondents in Old Europe (M =2.05, SD = .89) and New Europe (M = 1.75, SD = .82), as
predicted, t (23086) = 26.23, p ˂ .001***). While only one in four respondents in New Europe
believe that the United States plays a negative role regarding world economic growth, almost
half of those interviewed in Old Europe agrees with this view.
v.

Crosstabulations for the “U.S. Role in Fighting Poverty Worldwide” dependent
variable are presented in Table 3.2.5.
TABLE 3.2.5: U.S. Role in Fighting Poverty Worldwide
In your opinion, would you say that the United States tend to play a
positive role, a negative role or neither a positive nor a negative role
regarding fighting poverty worldwide?

Old Europe
New Europe

Positive
1
16.8%

Neither nor
2
21.3%

Negative
3
62.0%

33.8%

31.7%

34.5%

Results from an independent-samples t-test (t (23497) = 41.76, p ˂ .001***) showed that
Old Europe (M = 2.45, SD = .76) is significantly more likely than New Europe (M = 2.01, SD =
.82) to view the United States‘ role in fighting world poverty as a negative one. While over 60
percent of those interviewed in Old Europe believe that the America‘s impact on fighting world
poverty is a negative one (and only little over 16 percent choosing the ―positive role‖ answer),
opinions in New Europe are more evenly distributed along the three possible answers (positive,
negative and neither/nor).
vi.

Crosstabulation results for the “U.S. Role in Protecting the Environment” are shown
below in Table 3.2.6.
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TABLE 3.2.6: U.S. Role in Protecting the Environment
In your opinion, would you say that the United States tend to play a
positive role, a negative role or neither a positive nor a negative role
regarding environment protection?

Old Europe

Positive
1
14.5%

Neither nor
2
16.1%

Negative
3
69.5%

New Europe

36.8%

27.3%

35.9%

An independent-groups t-test results (t (22977) = 51.48, p ˂ .001***) revealed that there
are significant differences between opinions on America‘s role in protecting the environment in
Old Europe (M = 2.55, SD = .73) and New Europe (M = 1.99, SD = .85). While views on the
impact U.S. has on environmental protection are fairly evenly distributed in New Europe
between ―positive‖, ―negative‖ and ―neither/nor‖, a significant majority (almost 70 percent) of
those interviewed in Old Europe see the United States as playing a negative role.
vii.

Conclusions
The results of the statistical analysis based on variables from the Eurobarometer 62 –
2004 survey/database are summarized below in Table 3.2.7.
TABLE 3.2.7: Anti-Americanism in Old Europe vs. New Europe as measured by variables
from the Eurobarometer 62 -2004 survey/database (codebook in Appendix 6)
Region
EU foreign U.S. role U.S. role
U.S. role
U.S. role
U.S. role in
policy
in world in fighting in
in fighting protecting
independent peace
terrorism economic
poverty
the
of USA
growth
worldwide environment
worldwide
1.10*
2.43***
2.11***
2.05***
2.45***
2.55 ***
Old
(.30)
(.81)
(.91)
(.89)
(.76)
(.73)
Europe
1.09*
2.15***
1.78***
1.75***
2.01***
1.99 ***
New
(.29)
(.87)
(.88)
(.82)
(.82)
(.85)
Europe
Notes: a) Old Europe – New Europe difference is significant at p ≤ .05.
b) p ≤ .05 *, p ≤ .01**, p ≤ .001***, ns = not significant
Western Europe, comprising the initial EU members, is more inclined to see the
American policies as having a negative impact on five major areas of current international
relations: peace in the world, fighting terrorism, promoting economic growth and trying to
alleviate poverty worldwide, as well as protecting the environment. New Europe nations –
formerly Communist countries recently admitted into the European Union – have much more
positive views of the role played by the United States in world affairs. Considering that the study
was conducted shortly after the 2003 Iraq invasion, we could safely speculate that this war,
extremely unpopular at the time in Europe, seems to have fueled a radicalization of antiAmericanism in Old European countries, where, for example, more than half of the respondents
believe that the U.S. is actually hurting the chances of eliminating terrorism in the world.
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It is interesting to note that the ―Old vs. New Europe‖ divide maintains its statistical
significance when it comes to views not only on America‘s role in the world, but on the EU‘s
impact on international politics as well. You can see below in Table 3.2.8 the results of
crosstabulations in which the independent variables stayed the same (Old Europe = 0, New
Europe = 1), and the dependent variable examines opinions regarding the EU‘s role in the world.
TABLE 3.2.8: Views on European Union’s role in world politics in Old Europe vs. New
Europe, as measured by variables from the Eurobarometer 62 -2004 survey /database
Variable
Region
EU tends to play EU tends to play EU tends to play
a __role
a __role
a __ role
regarding X?
regarding X?
regarding X?
Positive
1
63.2%
77.7%

Neither nor
2
25.3%
17.4%

Negative
3
11.5%
4.9%

WORLD
PEACE

Old Europe
New
Europe

FIGHTING
TERRORISM

Old Europe
New
Europe

61.2%
75.5%

27.1%
19.5%

11.8%
5.0%

ECONOMIC
GROWTH

Old Europe
New
Europe

56.2%
71.6%

29.3%
22.2%

14.5%
6.2%

FIGHTING
POVERTY

Old Europe
New
Europe

49.3%
62.2%

32.2%
30.1%

18.4%
7.6%

Old Europe
61.0%
23%
16.0%
New
77.1%
17.9%
5.0%
Europe
An independent samples t-test was used for comparing the means between Old and New
Europe in all five cases, and the results were statistically significant (p ˂ .001***). Those
interviewed in New Europe countries are not only more pro-American, but they are also more
pro-EU than their counterparts in Old Europe. They also believe that the EU has a more positive
impact in world politics than the United States. In almost every instance, three out of four
respondents see the impact of the European Union on the world as a positive one, percentages
both higher than in Western Europe, and also higher than in the case of the previous questions,
regarding America‘s role in the world.
ENVIRONMENT
PROTECTION

Overall, the results of the statistical analysis using variables from the 2004
Eurobarometer confirmed that two years after the PEW 2002 survey, signs of a “divided”
anti-Americanism in the European Union appeared again, with Europeans feelings towards
the United States clearly falling along the lines of “Old” vs. “New” Europe.
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3.3 . EUROBAROMETER 63.4 – 2005
Six main variables from this database were used as dependent variables to test the
difference in means between levels of anti-Americanism in Old vs. New Europe. These variables
operationalize answers to questions regarding the America‘s role in world politics, as well as the
future of European Union‘s foreign and defense policy. The results of the statistical analysis are
summarized in Table 3.3.14 and they are preceded by a detailed description of each test.
All six are ordinal variables, and for the first a statistical tool was used in the form of a
chi-square test, while for the other five, an independent-samples t-test was employed. The results
of these tests, as well as the crosstabulation and wording of the questions in each case, are
presented below. The independent variable, Old Europe vs. New Europe, was coded 0 for Old
Europe and 1 for New Europe. ―Don‘t know‖ and ―neither nor‖ answers were re-coded to
represent a middle value for all the dependent variables that did not already have such a value.
For example, the majority of the answers were coded 1 = positive, 2 = negative, and 3 = neither
nor. They were re-coded as 1 = positive, 2 = neither nor and 3 = negative. An alpha level of .05
was used as the threshold in all statistical analyses.
I have added to these initial six dependent variables a battery of 12 variables asking
Europeans to compare the United States and the European Union on several dimensions, such as
medical and scientific research, fighting discrimination, innovation technology, etc. Independentgroups t-tests were used to measure the means between Old and New Europe, and the results are
presented at the end of this section. Results of the statistical analysis for each dependent variable
are presented below, starting with the ―EU foreign policy independent of U.S. – 2005‖ variable.
i.

Crosstabulation results for ―EU foreign policy independent of U.S. – 2005‖ dependent
variable are presented below in Table 3.3.1.
TABLE 3.3.1: EU foreign policy should be independent of U.S. foreign policy
Do you tend to agree or tend to disagree with the following statement?
EU foreign policy should be independent of U.S. foreign policy
Tend to agree
1

Old Europe

82.3%

Neither nor (don’t
know)
2
8.5%

Tend to disagree
3
9.2%

81.9%
10.4%
7.7%
New Europe
A t- test of independence was performed to examine the relationship between the region
where the interview was conducted (Old Europe (M = 1.27, SD = .61) vs. New Europe (M =
1.26, SD = .58) and the respondents‘ views on a European Union foreign policy more
independent of the United States. The relationship between these variables was not significant, t
(25816) = 1.59, p = .11 ns, which does not support the idea of a divided anti-Americanism in the
European Union, even if respondents in Old Europe are slightly less likely than their New
Europe counterparts to advocate a European Union foreign policy more independent of United
States.

28

ii.

Table 3.3.2 contains crosstabulation results for the “U.S. role in world peace – 2005”
dependent variable.
TABLE 3.3.2: U.S. Role in World Peace - 2005
United States tend to play a positive role, a negative role or neither
a positive nor a negative role regarding peace in the world?

Positive
Neither nor
Negative
1
2
3
23.4%
15.9%
60.8%
Old Europe
New Europe
36.3%
19.5%
44.2%
The results of an independent-samples t-test confirmed that the differences in means
between groups of respondents from Old Europe (M = 2.3, SD = .83) and New Europe (M =
2.08, SD = .89) are statistically significant (t (24482) = 26.06, p ˂ .001***). Although the
percentage of those seeing the role of the U.S. in world peace as a negative one has decreased
compared to the 2004 Eurobarometer responses the difference between Old and New Europe
remains significant. More than half the respondents from Western Europe are still pessimistic
about America‘s impact on international peace.
iii.

Crosstabulation results for the “U.S. Role in Fighting Terrorism – 2005” dependent
variable are presented below in Table 3.3.3.
TABLE 3.3.3: U.S. Role in Fighting Terrorism - 2005
United States tend to play a positive role, a negative role or neither a
positive nor a negative role regarding fighting terrorism?

Positive
Neither nor
Negative
1
2
3
39.9%
14.6%
45.5%
Old Europe
New Europe
55.9%
15.3%
28.8%
An independent-groups t-test showed that views of the United States policies toward
fighting terrorism in Old Europe (M = 2.06, SD = .92) are significantly different from those in
New Europe (M = 1.73, SD = .88), as predicted, t (24350) = 27.95, p ˂ .001***). The direction
of the hypothesis is also confirmed, with Old Europe holding a more negative view of how
American policies affect efforts to eradicate world terrorism.
iv.

Table 3.3.4 presents crosstabulation results for the “U.S. Role in Economic Growth –
2005” dependent variable.
TABLE 3.3.4: U.S. Role in Economic Growth Worldwide - 2005
United States tend to play a positive role, a negative role or neither a
positive nor a negative role regarding economic growth worldwide?

Old Europe
New Europe

Positive
1
39.3%
56.0%

Neither nor
2
19.7%
23.8%
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Negative
3
41.0%
20.2%

Results of an independent-samples t-test showed that opinions on the United States‘ role
in economic growth worldwide in Old Europe (M = 2.02, SD = .89) and New Europe (M = 1.64,
SD = .79) are significantly different (t (23234) = 33.46, p ˂ .001***). Twice as many
respondents in Old Europe as in New Europe believe that America has a negative impact on
economic growth worldwide.
v.

Crosstabulation results for the “U.S. Role in Fighting Poverty Worldwide – 2005”
dependent variable are shown below in Table 3.3.5.
TABLE 3.3.5: U.S. Role in Fighting Poverty Worldwide - 2005
In your opinion, would you say that the United States tend to play a
positive role, a negative role or neither a positive nor a negative role
regarding fighting poverty worldwide?

Old Europe

Positive
1
18.2%

Neither nor
2
20.9%

Negative
3
60.9%

37.9%
30.9%
31.2%
New Europe
An independent-groups t-test revealed that the role played by the United States in
fighting poverty worldwide is seen as being significantly more negative (t (23732) = 46.78, p ˂
.001***) in Old Europe (M = 2.43, SD = .78) than in New Europe (M = 1.93, SD = .82). More
than half of respondents in Old Europe believe that America‘s impact on the fight to alleviate
world poverty is a negative one, while opinions in New Europe are divided between the positive,
the negative and the ―no impact‖ views.
vi.

Table 3.3.6 presents crosstabulation results for the “U.S. Role in Environment
Protection – 2005” dependent variable.
TABLE 3.3.6: U.S. Role in Environment Protection
United States role regarding environment protection

Old Europe

Positive
1
13.5%

Neither nor
2
15.4%

Negative
3
71.0%

39.2%
25.1%
35.7%
New Europe
Results of an independent-samples t-test confirmed that the differences in means between
groups of respondents from Old Europe (M = 2.57, SD = .71) and New Europe (M = 1.96, SD =
.86) are statistically significant (t (23391) = 56.74, p ˂ .001***). The percentage of those seeing
the role of the U.S. in environmental protection as a negative one has slightly increased in Old
Europe compared to the 2004 Eurobarometer responses, which widens the gap between the two
regions even further. In 2005, over 70 percent of the respondents from Western Europe were
pessimistic about America‘s impact on the environment, while only one in three of those
interviewed in countries from New Europe agreed with them.

30

vii.

The next 12 dependent variables are helpful in understanding how Europeans see
themselves compared to the United States. As pertaining to my analysis, I argue that
levels of anti-Americanism can be estimated from feelings of superiority towards the
United States. Old Europe respondents will perceive that the EU is ahead of the U.S.
in several or most of the societal dimensions measured by the 2005 Eurobarometer,
while New Europe will see the EU behind or at the same level as the U.S.

Tables 3.3.7 and 3.3.8 present crosstabulation results for two dependent variables
measuring views on how United States and the European Union compare to each other when it
comes to overall economic performance and life quality.
TABLE 3.3.7: European Economy Compared to U.S.
Would you say that the European economy is performing better,
performing worse or performing as well as the American economy?

Old Europe
New Europe

Performing better
1
31.0%
20.0%

Performing as well as
2
31.2%
33.0%

Performing worse
3
37.8%
46.9%

TABLE 3.3.8: European Quality of Life Compared to U.S.
In general, would you say that the standard of the quality of life in Europe
at the moment is better or less good than in the United States?
Much better
1

Somewhat better
2

Somewhat less
Definitely less
good
good
3
4
13.5%
44.0%
18.4%
3.8%
Old Europe
New Europe
5.7%
23.3%
35.2%
9.4%
T-test results for these two dependent variables, presented below in Table 3.3.9, confirm
the initial argument, that Old Europe will perceive the EU as being ahead of the U.S., while
New Europe will see the EU behind or at the same level as the U.S. on overall economic
performance as well as general quality of life. Twice as many respondents in Old Europe as new
Europe believe that the quality of life in the European Union is either ―much better‖ or
―somewhat better‖ than in the United States. The relationship holds in the case of the perceived
economic performance comparison, although the difference in raw numbers between Old and
New Europe is smaller than in the previous case.
TABLE 3.3.9: T-Test Results for Variables Measuring Perceived Differences between EU
and U.S. Economy and Life Quality
T-Test
df
Region
Mean
Standard
Variable
Deviation
-18.36***
21749
Old Europe
2.07
.82
Overall Economic
Performance
New Europe
2.27
.77
-30.90***
25816
Old Europe
2.84
1.53
Overall Standard of the
Quality of Life
New Europe
3.44
1.49
31

Notes: a) Old Europe – New Europe difference is significant at p ≤ .05. b) p ≤ .05
*, p ≤ .01**, p ≤ .001***, ns = not significant.
Crosstabulation results for 10 dependent variables comparing perceived differences
between EU and U.S. are presented below in Table 3.3.10.
TABLE 3.3.10: Crosstabulation Results for Variables Measuring Perceived Differences
between EU and U.S.
For each of the following, please tell me
Region
Answer
Answer
Answer
whether in your opinion the EU is
(%)
(%)
(%)
Ahead
At the
Behind
ahead, behind or at the same level as the
1
same
3
U.S.
level
2
Old Europe
14.5
26.8
58.7
Scientific Research
New Europe
16.1
34.1
49.8
Old Europe
18.4
28.3
53.3
Medical Research
New Europe
18.6
35.2
46.2
Old Europe
68.8
17.2
14.0
Protection of the Environment
New Europe
46.5
32.4
21.1
Old Europe
19.8
28.5
51.7
Innovation Technology
New Europe
16.9
31.4
48.9
Old
Europe
62.9
15.9
21.2
The Healthcare System
New Europe
30.9
33.6
35.6
Old Europe
48.2
28.3
23.5
Education
New Europe
43.5
32.2
24.3
Old Europe
67.6
18.2
14.2
Fighting Social Disparities
New Europe
39.5
35.0
25.4
Old Europe
47.6
27.6
24.8
Fighting Unemployment
New Europe
29.6
39.1
32.3
Fighting Discrimination
Old Europe
57.1
25.0
17.8
New Europe
37.1
36.3
26.6
Old Europe
19.9
26.6
53.3
Creation of Companies
New Europe
19.1
36.0
44.9
Independent-samples T-test results (presented below in Table 3.3.11) comparing means
between respondents in Old Europe and New Europe reveal that there are statistically
significant differences between these two groups when it comes to the way they perceive the
differences between the European Union and the United States. The picture we get is a more
nuanced one than my initial hypothesis suggested. Old Europe‘s levels of self-satisfaction with
the state of the European Union when compared to the United States in general – but not in every
case – are higher than in New Europe. Exceptions are questions related to the field of scientific
and technological development (levels of scientific and medical research, as well as innovation
and technology). Old Europe more than New Europe sees the United States as being ahead of the
European Union when it comes to these areas, and in the case of innovation/technology, the
differences between the two regions are statistically insignificant. At the same time, more than
half of the respondents from Western Europe perceive the EU as being ahead of the U.S. in
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fighting against discrimination, promoting environmental protection measures, developing a
better healthcare system and trying to alleviate social disparities. Twice as many of those
interviewed in Old Europe as in New Europe see America lagging behind Europe in fighting
unemployment, but better at creating private companies (which might represent a reflection of a
more social-democratic outlook on the labor-government-private section relationship).
TABLE 3.3.11: T-Test Results for Variables Measuring Perceived Differences between EU
and U.S.
For each of the following, please
T-Test
Degrees
Region
Mean Standard
tell me whether in your opinion
of
Deviation
the EU is ahead, behind or at the
Freedom
same level as the U.S.
Scientific Research

Medical Research

Protection of the Environment

Innovation Technology

The Healthcare System

Education

10.47***

7.71***

-28.22***

-.10 ns

22514

22630

22419

21550

-41.37**

-4.93***
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22232

22070

Old
Europe
New
Europe

2.44

.73

2.34

.73

Old
Europe
New
Europe

2.35

.77

2.28

.75

Old
Europe
New
Europe

1.45

.72

1.75

.78

Old
Europe
New
Europe

2.32

.78

2.32

.74

Old
Europe
New
Europe

1.58

.81

2.05

.81

Old
Europe
New
Europe

1.75

.81

1.81

.80

Table continued.
For each of the following, please
tell me whether in your opinion
the EU is ahead, behind or at the
same level as the U.S.

T-Test

Degrees
of
Freedom

-36.69***

21643

Region

Mean

Standard
Deviation

Old
1.47
.73
Europe
New
1.86
.79
Europe
-23.88***
21402
Old
1.77
.82
Fighting Unemployment
Europe
New
2.04
.78
Europe
Fighting Discrimination
-26.40***
21633
Old
1.61
.77
Europe
New
1.89
.79
Europe
6.99***
20251
Old
2.34
.78
Creation of Companies
Europe
New
2.26
.75
Europe
Notes: a) Old Europe – New Europe difference is significant at p ≤ .05. b) p ≤ .05
*, p ≤ .01**, p ≤ .001***, ns = not significant

Fighting Social Disparities

Staying in the realm of perceived differences between Europe and America, it is
interesting to see how the role of the European Union in world politics is seen in comparison to
the United States. Independent-samples t-tests were conducted for five dependent variables
looking at the role the EU plays on the international stage and the results show that there are
significant differences between Old Europe and New Europe not only when it comes to antiAmericanism, but also pro-European Union feelings (results in Table 3.3.12). Crosstabulation
results are presented below in Table 3.3.13 alongside results for the main 5 dependent variables
used at the beginning of this section to measure anti-Americanism in Old vs. New Europe.
TABLE 3.3.12: T-Test Results for Variables Measuring Perceptions of EU’s Role in World
Politics
In your opinion, does the
T-Test
Degrees
Region
Mean Standard
European Union tend to play a
of
Deviation
positive role, a negative role or
Freedom
neither positive nor negative role
regarding…?
Peace in the world

24.95***

34

24423

Old Europe
New
Europe

1.43
1.25

.65
.51

Table continued.
In your opinion, does the
European Union tend to play a
positive role, a negative role or
neither positive nor negative role
regarding…?

T-Test

Degrees
of
Freedom

25.82***

24156

Region

Mean

Old Europe
1.48
New
1.28
Europe
29.78***
23390
Old Europe
1.59
The growth of world economy
New
1.33
Europe
22.93**
23787
Old Europe
1.66
The fight against poverty in the
world
New
1.45
Europe
23979
Old Europe
1.51
The Protection of the environment 32.32**
New
1.25
Europe
Notes: a) Old Europe – New Europe difference is significant at p ≤ .05.
The fight against terrorism

Standard
Deviation

.68
.53
.72
.57
.76
.64
.73
.52

b) p ≤ .05 *, p ≤ .01**, p ≤ .001***, ns = not significant

TABLE 3.3.13: How Europeans Perceive the International Role Played by the European
Union and the United States – crosstabulation results
The EU / US
Region Answer Answer Answer Answer Answer Answer
tend to play a
EU
U.S.
EU
U.S.
EU
U.S.
__ role
(%)
(%)
(%)
(%)
(%)
(%)
Positive Positive Neither Neither Negative Negative
regarding __?
positive positive
nor
nor
negative negative
Old
65.9
23.4
24.7
15.9
9.4
60.8
Peace in the
Europe
world
New
79.0
36.3
17.3
19.5
3.8
44.2
Europe
Old
62.2
39.9
27.0
14.6
10.7
45.5
The fight
Europe
against
terrorism
New
76.1
55.9
19.7
15.3
4.3
28.8
Europe
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Table continued.
The EU / US
tend to play a
__ role
regarding __?

Region

Answer Answer Answer Answer Answer Answer
EU
U.S.
EU
U.S.
EU
U.S.
(%)
(%)
(%)
(%)
(%)
(%)
Positive Positive Neither Neither Negative Negative
positive positive
nor
nor
negative negative
55.4
39.3
30.4
19.7
14.2
41.0

Old
Europe
New
72.2
56.0
22.3
23.8
5.6
20.2
Europe
Old
52.2
18.2
29.7
20.9
18.1
60.9
The fight
against poverty Europe
in the world
New
63.5
37.9
28.2
30.9
8.3
32.1
Europe
Old
63.7
13.5
21.6
15.4
14.8
71.0
The Protection
Europe
of the
environment
New
79.8
39.2
15.7
25.1
4.5
35.7
Europe
The picture emerging from these results is one of a European Union that perceives its role
on the international stage as more positive than the one played by the United States. At the same
time, it is interesting to notice that significantly more respondents from New Europe than Old
Europe share this point of view.
The growth of
world economy

viii.

Conclusions
T-test results for five main dependent variables are summarized below in Table 3.3.14.

TABLE 3.3.14: Anti-Americanism in Old Europe vs. New Europe as measured by
variables from the Eurobarometer 63 -2005 survey/database (codebook in Appendix 7)
Region
EU foreign U.S. role U.S. role
U.S. role
U.S. role
U.S. role in
policy
in world in fighting in
in fighting protecting
independent peace
terrorism economic
poverty
the
of USA
growth
worldwide environment
worldwide
1.27 ns
2.37***
2.06***
1.80***
2.02***
2.43 ***
Old
(.61)
(.83)
(.92)
(.89)
(.78)
(.71)
Europe
1.26 ns
2.08***
1.73***
1.68***
1.64***
1.93***
New
(.58)
(.89)
(.88)
(.79)
(.82)
(.86)
Europe
Measures of anti-Americanism from the 2005 Eurobarometer show a divided European
Union, along the Old Europe – New Europe line. Respondents from Western Europe are
significantly more likely to see the United States as playing a negative role in promoting
international peace and economic growth, fighting terrorism, trying to eradicate world poverty
and protecting the environment. In the last two cases, twice as many of those interviewed in Old
Europe as in New Europe perceive America as having a negative impact on efforts to alleviate
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poverty worldwide and protecting the environment. Thanks to the battery of questions presented
in the previous section, we can also get a more nuanced picture of European anti-Americanism,
directed mostly at areas of social and economic equality, as well as foreign policies. While
America is still admired for its technological prowess, it is also criticized for its conduct on the
international stage, as well as for its domestic policies regarding the healthcare system, the
environment and unemployment. Directly related to the focus of this dissertation on tolerance, it
is worth pointing out that Old Europe is especially critical of the way United States deal with
discrimination at home and abroad (only 17 percent of respondents believe that the U.S. is ahead
of the EU on this dimension).
Overall, the results of the statistical analysis using variables from the 2005
Eurobarometer confirmed the findings from both the 2002 PEW and 2004 Eurobarometer
surveys: a “divided” anti-Americanism in the European Union, with Europeans feelings
towards the United States falling along the lines of “Old” vs. “New” Europe. Old Europe is
significantly more anti-American than in New Europe.
3.4 . PEW 2007
Seven variables from this database were used as dependent variables to test the difference
in means between levels of anti-Americanism in Old vs. New Europe. These variables provide
answers to questions regarding feelings towards the United States, President George W. Bush,
and the American people and culture broadly defined. The results of the statistical analysis are
summarized in Table 3.4.10 and are preceded by a detailed description of each test.
All nine are ordinal variables, and the statistical tool used for four of them was a chisquare test, while for the other five, I used an independent-samples t-test. The results of these
tests, as well as the crosstabulation and the wording of the questions in each case, are presented
below. The independent variable, Old Europe vs. New Europe, was coded 0 for Old Europe, and
1 for New Europe. ―No answer‖ and ―don‘t know‖ answers were eliminated when they did not
provide any relevant information. An alpha level of .05 was used in all statistical analyses.
Results of the statistical analysis for each dependent variable are presented below, starting with
the ―Opinion of United States - 2007‖ variable.
i.

Crosstabulation results for the “Opinion of United States - 2007” are presented below in
Table 3.4.1.

Old Europe

TABLE 3.4.1: Opinion of the United States - 2007
Please tell me if you have a very favorable, somewhat favorable,
somewhat unfavorable or very unfavorable opinion of the United
States?
Very favorable
Somewhat
Somewhat
Very unfavorable
1
favorable
unfavorable
4
2
3
6.1%
38.0%
39.3%
16.7%

7.7%
43.2%
35.5%
13.6%
New Europe
Results from an independent-samples t-test showed that there are significant
differences (t (7393) = 5.82, p ˂ .001***) between opinions of the United States in Old Europe
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(M = 2.67, SD = .82) and New Europe (M = 3.55, SD = .82). Western European respondents are
more likely have ―somewhat unfavorable‖ and ―very unfavorable‖ views of the United States
than those interviewed in New Europe.
Table 3.4.2 contains crosstabulation results for the “Opinion of Americans – 2007”
dependent variable.

ii.

TABLE 3.4.2: Opinion of Americans - 2007
Please tell me if you have a very favorable, somewhat favorable,
somewhat unfavorable or very unfavorable opinion of Americans?
Very favorable
1
Old Europe

12.7%

Somewhat
favorable
2
56.1%

Somewhat
unfavorable
3
24.0%

Very unfavorable
4
7.2%

8.2%
54.8%
28.7%
8.3%
New Europe
An independent-groups t-test confirmed that there are significant differences (t (7181)
= -6.12, p ˂ .001***) between opinions of the United States in Old Europe (M = 2.26, SD = .76)
and New Europe (M = 2.37, SD = .75), although not in the direction predicted by my hypothesis.
Although they have a mostly negative view of the United States, over half of the respondents
from Old Europe (more than New Europe, which goes against my hypothesis about higher levels
of anti-Americanism in OE compared to NE) perceive the American people in a positive light.
Europeans seem to be able to differentiate between the U.S. government and the U.S. citizens
when it comes to the target of their antipathy.
iii.

Crosstabulation results for the “U.S. World Politics – 2007” dependent variable are
presented below in Table 3.4.3.

Old Europe

TABLE 3.4.3: U.S. World Politics - 2007
In making international policy decisions, to what extent do you think
the United States takes into account the interests of countries like our
country – a great deal, a fair amount, not too much, or not at all?
Great deal
Fair amount
Not too much
Not at all
1
2
3
4
3.0%
18.1%
46.2%
32.7%

2.1%
18.9%
46.8%
32.2%
New Europe
Results from an independent-samples t-test showed that there are no significant
differences (t (4664) = -.19, p = .84 ns) between Old Europe and New Europe when it comes to
the beliefs about the amount of attention paid by the United States to other countries when it
makes its foreign policy decision. One in five of the respondents in both regions believe that the
U.S. doesn‘t take into account the interests of their countries ―at all‖, or if it does, it is ―not too
much.‖
iv.

Table 3.4.4 presents crosstabulation results for the “U.S. World Poverty – 2007”
dependent variable.
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TABLE 3.4.4: U.S. World Poverty - 2007
Do United States policies increase or lessen the gap between rich and
poor countries, or do United States policies have no effect on the gap
between rich and poor countries?
Increase gap between
No effect
Lessen gap between
rich and poor
2
rich and poor
1
3
71.7%
16.8%
11.5%
Old Europe
New Europe
57.1%
28.6%
14.4%
An independent-samples t-test revealed that there are significant differences (t (4417) =
-7.64, p ˂ .001***) between Old Europe (M = 1.40, SD = .68) and New Europe (M = 1.57, SD =
.73) regarding the role played by the United States on the gap between rich and poor countries.
Over 70 percent of respondents in Western Europe and 57 percent in New Europe believe that
the impact America has on alleviating world poverty is a negative one.
v.

Crosstabulation results and question wording for the “U.S. Culture – 2007” dependent
variable are presented below in Table 3.4.5.
TABLE 3.4.5: U.S. Culture - 2007
Which of the following phrases comes closer to your view?
It's good that American ideas and
It's bad that American ideas and
customs are spreading here
customs are spreading here
1
2
23.0%
77.0%
Old Europe
New Europe
25.6%
74.4%
A chi-square test of independence was performed to examine the relationship between the
country where the interview was conducted (Old Europe vs. New Europe) and the respondents‘
views on the Americanization of their national culture. The relationship between these variables
was significant, but weak, X² (1, N = 5440) = 3.82, p ˂ .01**. Despite the small difference in
the overall percentages (77 vs. 74 percent), respondents in Old Europe are more likely than their
New Europe counterparts to argue that it is bad that American ideas and customs are spreading in
their countries.

vi.

Table 3.4.6 contains crosstabulation results for the “Trust in President George W.
Bush” dependent variable.

Old Europe
New Europe

TABLE 3.4.6: Trust in President George W. Bush
How much confidence you have in U.S. President George W. to do
the right thing regarding world affairs?
A lot of
Some
Not too much No confidence at
confidence
confidence
confidence
all
1
2
3
4
2.4%
17.9%
30.5%
49.2%
4.6%
26.0%
36.8%
32.6%
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Results from an independent-samples t-test showed that there are significant
differences (t (4617) = 11.14, p ˂ .001***) between Old Europe (M = 3.27, SD = .83) and New
Europe (M = 2.97, SD = .87) when it comes to their feelings towards American leader George
W. Bush. Almost 80 percent of respondents in Old Europe have little or no confidence at all in
President Bush‘s involvement in international politics. It seems that President Bush is more
distrusted and dislike by the Europeans than the American government or the American people
as a whole.
Crosstabulation results for the ―U.S. Promotes Democracy” dependent variable are
presented below in Table 3.4.7.

vii.

TABLE 3.4.7: U.S. Promotes Democracy
Which statement comes closer to describing your view?
The United States promotes
democracy wherever it can
1

The United States promotes
democracy mostly where it serves its
interests
2
7.7%
92.3%
Old Europe
New Europe
13.2%
86.8%
A chi-square test of independence showed that there are significant differences - X² (1,
N = 5330) = 35.66, p ˂ .001*** - between Old and New Europe‘s views on America‘s
democratization efforts. Most Europeans believe that the U.S. promotes democracy only when it
serves its interests, but more respondents from Old Europe than New Europe share this point of
view.
viii.

Conclusions

Table 3.4.8 summarizes the results of the analysis comparing anti-Americanism in Old
vs. New Europe using variables from the PEW 2007 database/survey.
TABLE 3.4.8: Anti-Americanism in Old Europe vs. New Europe as measured by variables
from the PEW 2007 survey/database (codebook in Appendix 5)
Region
U.S.
U.S.
Trust in
U.S.
U.S. and
Opinio Opinion of
world
world
Pres
culture
democracy
n of
Americans
politics
poverty
Bush
U.S.
2.67** 2.26 ***
*
(.76)
(.82)
3.09 ns
1.57***
2.58***
X²=3.82** X²=35.66** 2.55** 2.37 ***
New
(.73)
(.87)
*
*
(.75)
Europe (.76)
(.82)
Notes: a) Old Europe – New Europe difference is significant at p ≤ .05. b) p ≤ .01 *, p ≤
.05**, p ≤ .001***, ns = not significant
Old
Europe

3.09 ns
(.78)

1.40***
(.68)

3.27***
(.83)

X²=3.82** X²=35.66**
*
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Data from the PEW 2007 survey confirms the existence of a divided antiAmericanism in the European Union, along the Old Europe – New Europe lines. Old
Europe is more anti-American than New Europe. Respondents from Western Europe (more than
their New Europe counterparts) hold unfavorable views of the United States government and
President George W. Bush, believe that the U.S. has a negative impact on efforts to alleviate
world poverty and that the spread of American culture is bad for their own countries. They deem
America‘s efforts to spread democracy in the world as self-serving, but they also make a clear
distinction between the American people (70 percent positive responses) and the American
government (40 percent positive responses).
3.5 . CONCLUSIONS – DIVIDED ANTI-AMERICANISM IN THE EUROPEAN UNION
The results of the statistical analyses presented above are summarized in Tables 3.5.1 to
3.5.4 and they confirm the initial theory: there is a relationship between the Old Europe –
New Europe divide and levels of anti-Americanism.
TABLE 3.5.1: Anti-Americanism in Old Europe vs. New Europe as measured by variables
from the PEW 2002 survey/database (codebook in Appendix 3)
Region
U.S.
U.S.
U.S. world U.S.
Opinion
Opinion on
world
world
problems
culture
on the
Americans
politics
poverty
U.S.
1.51***
2.39***
1.68***
2.33***
2.10 ns
Old Europe 2.66***
(0.84)
(0.81)
(1.05)
(.46)
(.90)
(.68)
1.64***
2.58***
1.61***
2.18***
2.12 ns
New Europe 2.94***
(0.78)
(0.85)
(1.21)
(.48)
(.91)
(.67)
TABLE 3.5.2: Anti-Americanism in Old Europe vs. New Europe as measured by variables
from the Eurobarometer 62 -2004 survey/database (codebook in Appendix 6)
Region
EU foreign U.S. role U.S. role
U.S. role
U.S. role
U.S. role in
policy
in world in fighting in
in fighting protecting
independent peace
terrorism economic
poverty
the
of USA
growth
worldwide environment
worldwide
1.10*
2.43***
2.11***
2.05***
2.45***
2.55 ***
Old
(.30)
(.81)
(.91)
(.89)
(.76)
(.73)
Europe
1.09*
2.15***
1.78***
1.75***
2.01***
1.99 ***
New
(.29)
(.87)
(.88)
(.82)
(.82)
(.85)
Europe
TABLE 3.5.3: Anti-Americanism in Old Europe vs. New Europe as measured by variables
from the Eurobarometer 63 -2005 survey/database (codebook in Appendix 7)
Region
EU foreign U.S. role U.S. role
U.S. role
U.S. role
U.S. role in
policy
in world in fighting in
in fighting protecting
independent peace
terrorism economic
poverty
the
of USA
growth
worldwide environment
worldwide
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Table continued.
Region

EU foreign U.S. role
policy
in world
independent peace
of USA

U.S. role
in fighting
terrorism

Old
Europe
New
Europe

1.27 ns
(.61)
1.26 ns
(.58)

2.06***
(.92)
1.73***
(.88)

2.37***
(.83)
2.08***
(.89)

U.S. role
in
economic
growth
worldwide
1.80***
(.89)
1.68***
(.79)

U.S. role
in fighting
poverty
worldwide

U.S. role in
protecting
the
environment

2.02***
(.78)
1.64***
(.82)

2.43 ***
(.71)
1.93***
(.86)

TABLE 3.5.4: Anti-Americanism in Old Europe vs. New Europe as measured by variables
from the PEW 2007 survey/database (codebook in Appendix 5)
Region
U.S.
U.S.
Trust in
U.S.
U.S. and
Opinio Opinion of
world
world
Pres
culture
democracy
n of
Americans
politics
poverty
Bush
U.S.
3.09 ns
1.40***
3.27***
X²=3.82** X²=35.66** 2.67** 2.26 ***
Old
(.68)
(.83)
*
*
(.76)
Europe (.78)
(.82)
3.09 ns
1.57***
2.58***
X²=3.82** X²=35.66** 2.55** 2.37 ***
New
(.73)
(.87)
*
*
(.75)
Europe (.76)
(.82)
Old Europe is more anti-American than New Europe, more inclined to see the American
government, President Bush and the overall international politics involvement of the United
States in a negative light. Respondents from Western Europe are more likely than those in New
Europe to disapprove of America‘s social and environmental policies, admiring at the same time
its technological and scientific prowess. They are also more critical of the Americanization of
their societies and of the war on terrorism. It is interesting to notice that Europeans in general
make a distinction between the U.S. government and the American people, the former being the
actual target of more virulent anti-American feelings, while the latter seems to be merely
disliked.
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CHAPTER 4 – EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS: TOLERANCE
TOWARDS WOMEN IN OLD EUROPE, NEW EUROPE AND
THE UNITED STATES
My second and third theories predict levels of tolerance towards women in Old Europe,
New Europe and the United States. The core argument of this research is that Old Europe and the
United States are less culturally similar than New Europe and the US, which explains why Old
Europe experiences relatively higher levels of anti-Americanism than New Europe. In order to
test this theory, three dummy variables were created for each of the databases presented below in
Chapter 4, measuring differences in cultural indicators (tolerance towards women, immigrants
and homosexuals, and levels of religiosity) for three regional pairings: Old Europe and New
Europe, New Europe and the United States, and Old Europe and the United States.
Unfortunately, due to time and space restrictions, only the results of the statistical tests involving
the Old Europe/New Europe, and New Europe/United States comparisons are presented below in
detail. Details of statistical analysis involving an independent variable coded 0 for Old Europe
and 1 for the United States are presented in the text only when they show no significant
differences between the two regions, as such contradicting the main hypothesis of this research,
according to which we expect to find statistically significant differences in levels of tolerance
towards women between Old Europe and New Europe, as well as between Old Europe and the
United States (reflecting their comparably lower cultural similarity), but no such differences
between New Europe and the United States due to their higher cultural similarity.
Hypothesis 2: There is a statistically significant difference between levels of tolerance
towards women in Old Europe vs. New Europe (OE ˃ NE) and in Old Europe vs. the United
States.
Hypothesis 3: There is no statistically significant difference between levels of tolerance
towards women in New Europe vs. the United States.
To test these two hypotheses, mean averages of attitudes towards women rights, as well
as the overall status of women in a society, were compared across nations from Old Europe, New
Europe and the United States, using independent-samples t-tests and chi-square tests of
independence. The results of this analysis are presented below individually per database used.
4.1 . WORLD VALUES SURVEY
Eight dependent variables from the World Values Survey database were used to measure
levels of tolerance towards women in Old Europe, New Europe and the United States. These
variables were based on answers to questions regarding views on the role and position of women
in the society (women as political leaders, women without children), as well as certain
social/economic issues (marriage, abortion, divorce). The overall results of the statistical analysis
are summarized in Table 4.1.7 which is preceded by a detailed description of each test.
All eight are ordinal variables, and the statistical tool used for one of them was a chisquare test, while for the other seven, I used an independent-samples t-test. The results of these
tests, as well as the crosstabulation and the wording of the questions in each case, are presented
below. This analysis contains two main independent variables. The first one, “Old Europe vs.
New Europe”, was coded 0 for Old Europe and 1 for New Europe, while the second one, “New
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Europe vs. United States”, was coded 0 for New Europe and 1 for the United States).
Crosstabulation results are presented based on variable named “Region” and coded 0 for Old
Europe, 1 for New Europe and 2 for United States. Two t-tests were conducted for each
independent variable, measuring the difference in means between Old and New Europe, and
New Europe and United States. ―No answer‖ and ―don‘t know‖ answers were eliminated when
they did not provide any relevant information. An alpha level of .05 was used in all statistical
analyses.
Results of the statistical analysis for each dependent variable are presented below,
beginning with the ―Women Right to a Job‖ variable.
i.

Crosstabulation results for “Women Right to a Job” dependent variable are presented
below in Table 4.1.1.
TABLE 4.1.1: Women’s equal right to a job even when jobs are scarce
Jobs scarce: Men should have more right to a job than women
Agree
1

Neither agree nor
Disagree
disagree
3
2
13.8%
9.8%
76.5%
Old Europe
New Europe
27.1%
20.2%
52.7%
U.S.
8.2%
17.1%
74.6%
The first independent-samples t-test conducted for this dependent variable revealed that
for respondents in Old Europe (M = 2.63, SD = .71) and New Europe (M = 2.26, SD = .85) there
was a strong relationship (t (17084) = 26.32, p ˂ .01**) between the region where the interview
was conducted and the answers regarding the equal rights for women to a job, even when jobs
are scarce.
The second t-test showed significant differences (t (7051) = -22.89, p ˂ .001***)
between New Europe (M = 2.26, SD = .62) and United States (M = 2.66, SD = .62) regarding the
equal right of women to have a job even when jobs are scarce. A third t-test showed weaker
dissimilarities (t (14881) = -2.59, p ≤ .01**) in gender equality opinions between Old Europe and
the United States.
To summarize, hypothesis 2 was confirmed: levels of tolerance in Old Europe are
significantly higher than those in New Europe. They are however much closer than expected to
those in the United States, which does not support the assumption behind hypothesis #3. Levels
of tolerance towards women are significantly higher in the United States than in New Europe.
Overall, America and Old Europe are more culturally similar in this respect than New Europe
and the U.S. 76 percent of respondents from Old Europe and 74 percent from the United States
disagreed with the statement that men should have more right to a job than women when jobs are
scarce, while only 52 percent of those interviewed in New Europe agreed with this point of view.
ii.

Crosstabulation results for the “Marriage out-dated” dependent variable are presented
in Table 4.1.2.
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TABLE 4.1.2: Marriage out-dated
Marriage is an out-dated institution
Disagree
1

Agree
2

77.7%
22.3%
Old Europe
New Europe
82.2%
17.8%
U.S.
88.9%
11.1%
Two chi-square tests of independence showed that there are significant differences
between views on marriage as an out-dated institution in Old Europe compared to New Europe
(X² (1, N = 13564) = 36.24, p ˂ .001***) and in New Europe compared to the United States (X²
(1, N = 6887) = 54.37, p ˂ .001***). Hypothesis 2 is confirmed by these results, while
hypothesis 3 is not. However, because Old Europe has a larger percentage of respondents who
believe that marriage is an out-dated institution (22 percent) than New Europe (17 percent) and
United States (11 percent), a valid argument can be made that in the case of the institution of
marriage, there is a higher degree of cultural similarity between U.S. and NE than between U.S.
and Old Europe (see Chart 4.1.1).
Chart 4.1.1 – Is Marriage an Out-Dated Institution? Cultural Similarity
between Old Europe, New Europe and the United States
100.00%
88.90%

90.00%
80.00%

82.20%
77.70%

70.00%
60.00%
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50.00%

New Europe
40.00%

United States

30.00%

22.30%
17.80%

20.00%

11.10%
10.00%
0.00%
Disagree that marriage is an out-dated
institution

Agree that marriage is an out-dated
institution

Crosstabulation results for the “Woman as single parent” dependent variable are
presented below in Table 4.2.3.
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TABLE 4.2.3: Woman as single parent
Woman as a single parent

Old Europe
New Europe
U.S.

Disapprove
0
30.0%
33.5%
46.9%

Depends
1
20.2%
23.8%
6.7%

Approve
2
49.8%
42.7%
46.4%

A first independent-samples t-test showed that there are significant differences (t
(16791) = 7.00, p ≤ .001***) between views on women as single parents in Old Europe (M =
1.20, SD = .87) and New Europe (M = 1.09, SD = .86). Results from a second t-test revealed that
there is a strong relationship (t (6972) = 4.11, p ˂ .001***) between where the interview was
conducted - New Europe (M = 1.09, SD = .86) vs. the United States (M = 1.00, SD = .96) - and
what the respondent‘s opinion was on single mothers. These results show that there is actually
more cultural similarity between Old and New Europe, than between New Europe and the
United States when it comes to the issue of women as single parents. As shown above in
Table 3, over 46 percent of Americans disapprove of single mothers, compared to the 30 percent
in Old Europe and 33 percent in New Europe. It is interesting also to notice the much larger
percentages of Europeans who answer ―depends‖ to this question, which suggest a willingness to
evaluate individual situations that is not shared by the American respondents.
iii.

Crosstabulation results for the ―Men better leaders than women” dependent variable
are presented in Table 4.1.4.
TABLE 4.1.4: Men better political leaders than women
Men make better political leaders than women do
Agree strongly
1

Agree
2

Disagree
3

Strongly disagree
4

3.7%
14.5%
43.3%
38.6%
Old Europe
New Europe
12.2%
33.6%
38.4%
15.8%
U.S.
4.7%
19.9%
56.3%
19.0%
Results from two independent-samples t-tests showed that there are significant
differences (t (16413) = 38.22, p ˂ .001***) between Old Europe (M = 3.17, SD = .80) and New
Europe (M = 2.58, SD = .89), and between New Europe (M = 2.58, SD = .89) and United States
(M = 2.90, SD = .75) when it comes to views on women as political leaders (t (6757) = -15.26, p
˂ .001***). Three times more respondents from New Europe than Old Europe and the United
States agree or strongly agree that men make better political leaders than women. There is no
cultural similarity between New Europe and the United States that might explain in future
analyses the former‘s lower levels of anti-Americanism as compared to Old Europe (see below
Chart 4.1.2).
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CHART 4.1.2: Do you agree or disagree with the following statement – men
make better political leaders than women do

19.00%
Strongly disagree

15.80%
38.60%

56.30%
Disagree

38.40%
43.30%
United States
New Europe
Old Europe

19.90%
Agree

33.60%
14.50%

4.70%
Agree Strongly

12.20%
3.70%

DO YOU AGREE OR DISAGREE WITH THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT: MEN MAKE BETTER
POLITICAL LEADERS THAN WOMEN DO

Crosstabulation results for the “University more important for boys than girls‖
dependent variable are presented below in Table 4.1.5.
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TABLE 4.1.5: University more important for boys than girls
University is more important for a boy than for a girl
Agree strongly
1

Agree
2

Disagree
3

Strongly disagree
4

2.2%
6.5%
38.3%
53.0%
Old Europe
New Europe
4.0%
11.0%
45.3%
39.7%
U.S.
1.9%
6.0%
55.1%
37.0%
Two independent-samples t-tests showed that there is a strong relationship – t1 (16799)
= 15.93, p ˂ .001***) and t2 (6883) = -3.60, p ˂ .001*** - between the region where the
interview was conducted – Old Europe (M = 3.42, SD = .71), New Europe (M = 3.21, SD = .79)
and the United States (M = 3.27, SD = .65) - and the respondents‘ views on higher education for
boys and girls. While the majority of Europeans and Americans disagree or strongly disagree
with the idea that university education is more important for boys than girls, the percentages are
higher in Old Europe and United States than in New Europe. These results show there is more
cultural similarity on this issue between the United States and Western Europe than between the
U.S. and New Europe (see Chart 4.1.3).
CHART 4.1.3: Do you agree or disagree with the following statement –
university education is more important for boys than girls
37.0%
39.7%

Strongly disagree

53.0%
55.1%
Disagree

45.3%
38.3%
United States
New Europe

6.0%
Agree

11.0%

Old Europe

6.5%

Agree Strongly

1.9%
4.0%
2.2%
DO YOU AGREE OR DISAGREE WITH THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT: UNIVERSITY
EDUCATION IS MORE IMPORTANT FOR BOYS THAN GIRLS

iv.

This section starts with crosstabulation results for the last three dependent variables from
the WVS database (―Prostitution justifiable‖, ―Abortion Justifiable‖ and ―Divorce
Justifiable‖). The question wording for all three dependent variables was: ―Please tell me
for each of the following statements whether you think it can always be justified, never is
justified, or something in between, using this card.‖ These dependent variables are coded
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on a scale from 1 (Never justifiable) to 10 (always justifiable); the two extreme values are
presented below in Table 4.1.6.
TABLE 4.1.6: Prostitution, Abortion and Divorce: Justifiable or Not?
Justifiable: prostitution Justifiable: abortion
Justifiable: divorce
Never
justifiable
1

Always
justifiable
10

Never
justifiable
1

Always
justifiable
10

Never
justifiable
1

Always
justifiable
10

31.2%
6.2%
16.4%
15.8%
7.1%
24.1%
Old Europe
53.9%
3.3%
35.3%
10.5%
22.0%
15.9%
New Europe
3.0%
28.0%
7.5%
6.6%
12.1%
United States 46.1%
Results of four independent-samples t-tests revealed that there is a strong relationship
between the regions where the interview was conducted – Old Europe, New Europe and the
United States – and the respondents‘ opinions on the justifiability of prostitution (t1 (15630) =
23.86, p ˂ .001*** and t2 (6833) = -3.75, p ˂ .001***) and divorce (t1 (16826) = 26.47, p ˂
.001*** and t2 (6882) = -7.09, p ˂ .001***). A larger percentage of those interviewed in New
Europe (M = 2.86, SD = 2.59) and United States (M = 3.10, SD = 2.51) than Old Europe (M =
3.98, SD = 2.80) believe that prostitution is never justifiable.
Results of the analysis on divorce are more mixed. At one of the extremes, New Europe
(M = 5.37, SD = 3.19) has a significantly larger percentage of respondents who argue that
divorce is never justifiable than Old Europe (M = 6.79, SD = 2.73) and the United States (M =
5.87, SD = 2.48). At the other end of the spectrum, ―divorce is always justifiable‖, New Europe
(20 percent) is positioned between Old Europe (24 percent) and the United States (12 percent).
An independent-samples t-test comparing means between groups of respondents in Old
Europe (M = 5.68, SD = 3.04) and New Europe (M = 4.35, SD = 3.21) confirmed the existence
of significant differences (t (16707) = 24.00, p ˂ .001***) in their views on the justifiability of
abortion. When New Europe is compared to the United States (M = 4.41, SD = .2.91), these
differences become insignificant (t (6847) = -.81, p = .41 ns). Overall, opinions on abortion
confirm both hypothesis 2 (OE has more tolerant views than NE) and hypothesis 3 (there are no
significant differences in levels of tolerance between NE and the U.S.).
v.

Conclusions
Results of the statistical analysis of variables from the World Values Survey database are
summarized below in Table 4.1.7.
TABLE 4.1.7: Tolerance towards women as measured by variables from the World Values
Survey database (codebook in Appendix 1)

Old
Europe

Women
right to
job
1.96**
(.48)

Marriage
out-dated

Single
mothers

X²=36.24*
**
(OE – NE)

1.20***
(.87)

Women
political
leaders
3.17***
(.80)
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University
education
for girls
3.42***
(.71)

Prostitution
justifiable

Abortion
justifiable

Divorce
justifiable

3.98***
(2.80)

5.68***
(3.04)

6.79***
(2.73)

Table continued.

New
Europe
United
States

Women
right to
job
1.93**/**
*
(.68)
2.09***
(.49)

Marriage
out-dated

Single
mothers

University
education
for girls
3.21***
(.79)

Prostitution
justifiable

Abortion
justifiable

Divorce
justifiable

1.09***
(.86)

Women
political
leaders
2.58***
(.89)

X²=54.37*
**
(NE – US)
X²=54.37*
**
(NE – US)

2.86***
(2.59)

4.35***/ns
(3.21)

5.37***
(3.19)

1.00***
(.96)

2.90***
(.75)

3.27***
(.65)

3.10***
(2.51)

4.41 ns
(2.91)

5.87***
(2.48)

Notes: a) Old Europe – New Europe, and New Europe – United States differences are
significant at p ≤ .05. For ―New Europe‖ entry, first significance level refers to OE-NE
relationship, second one to NE-U.S, for the cases in which they are different. b) p ≤ .05 *, p ≤
.01**, p ≤ .001***, ns = not significant
Analysis based on data from the World Values Survey has produced a nuanced picture of
tolerance towards women in Old Europe, New Europe and the United States. In general, there is
a relationship between the region where the interview was conducted and the answers given by
the respondents. Old Europe and the United States share similar views on: 1) the right of women
to have a job even when jobs are scarce, 2) importance of higher education for girls, 3) women as
political leaders and 4) divorce. There is a stronger cultural similarity between New Europe and
the U.S. when the respondents were asked to express their views on marriage as an out-dated
institution, prostitution and abortion, and between Old Europe and New Europe on single
motherhood. To summarize, although there are certain areas in which more intolerant views on
women and their role in the society are matched by lower levels of anti-Americanism (in New
Europe), data from the World Values Survey does not support the argument that there is an
overall stronger cultural similarity between New Europe and the United States than between
Old Europe and the United States
4.2 . VOICE OF THE PEOPLE – MILLENIUM EDITION
Six dependent variables from the Voice of the People – Millennium Edition database
were used to measure levels of tolerance towards women in Old Europe, New Europe and the
United States. These variables were based on answers to questions regarding views on the role
and position of women in the society (women as political leaders, women without children), as
well as certain social/economic issues (household income, education for girls, marriage, rape,
etc.). The overall results of the statistical analysis are summarized in Table 4.2.7 which is
preceded by a detailed description of each test. The core argument at the basis of this section
states that New Europe is less anti-American than Old Europe because New Europe and the U.S.
are more culturally similar when it comes to their views on women than Old Europe and the U.S.
All six are ordinal variables, and the statistical tool used for all of them was a chi-square
test. The results of these tests, as well as the crosstabulation and the wording of the questions in
each case, are presented below. This analysis contains two main independent variables. The first
one, “Old Europe vs. New Europe”, was coded 0 for Old Europe and 1 for New Europe, while
the second one, “New Europe vs. United States”, was coded 0 for New Europe and 1 for the
United States). Crosstabulation results are presented based on variable named “Region” and
coded 0 for Old Europe, 1 for New Europe and 2 for United States. ―No answer‖ and ―don‘t
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know‖ answers were eliminated when they did not provide any relevant information. An alpha
level of .05 was used in all statistical analyses. Results of the statistical analysis for each
dependent variable are presented below, starting with the ―Education for girls‖ variable.
i.

Crosstabulation results for the “Education for girls” dependent variable are presented
below in Table 4.2.1.
TABLE 4.2.1: Tolerance towards women as measured by variables from the World
Values Survey database
Do you agree or disagree with the statement: Education is more
important for boys than for girls?
Agree
1

Disagree
2

7.3%
92.7%
Old Europe
New Europe
19.0%
81.0%
U.S.
6.8%
93.2%
Two chi-square tests of independence showed that there are significant differences
between views the importance of education for boys and girls in Old Europe compared to New
Europe (X² (1, N = 19629) = 605.21, p ˂ .001***) and in New Europe compared to the United
States (X² (1, N = 8544) = 91.33, p ˂ .001***). A third chi-square also revealed that there are no
statistically significant differences in gender equality opinions between Old Europe and the
United States, regarding the importance of education for both genders (X² (1, N = 13091) = .439,
p = .566 ns). These results confirmed the existence of a divide between Old Europe and New
Europe, but also between New Europe and the United States. Moreover, more respondents from
New Europe than Old Europe and United States combined believe that education is more
important for boys than girls, which shows that gender equality issues related to education are
viewed more positively in Old Europe and the United States than in New Europe. Overall, there
is more cultural similarity between Old Europe and the United States than between United States
and New Europe regarding this particular aspect of tolerance towards women.
ii.

Crosstabulation results for the “Equal contributions to household income” dependent
variable are presented below in Table 4.2.2.
TABLE 4.2.2: Equal contributions to household income
Do you agree or disagree with the statement: Both the husband
and the wife should contribute to the household income?
Agree
1

Disagree
2
85.9%
89.6%
76.9%

Old Europe
New Europe
U.S.

14.1%
10.4%
23.1%

Results from two chi-square tests of independence revealed that there are significant
differences between opinions on equal contributions to household income by both spouses in
Old Europe compared to New Europe (X² (1, N = 19375) = 57.53, p ˂ .001***) and in New
Europe compared to the United States (X² (1, N = 8616) = 133.40, p ˂ .001***). These results
confirmed the existence of a split between Old Europe and New Europe, but also between New
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Europe and the United States. Almost 90 percent of respondents from New Europe agree that
both the husband and the wife should contribute to the household income, compared to lower
percentages in Old Europe (86 percent) and United States (77 percent). In conclusion, for this
second variable, there is more cultural similarity between Old Europe and the New Europe than
between United States and New Europe regarding this economic/social aspect of tolerance
towards women.
iii.

Table 4.2.3 presents crosstabulation results for the ―Men better political leaders”
dependent variable.
TABLE 4.2.3: Men better political leaders
Do you agree or disagree with the statement: On the whole,
men make better political leaders than women do?
Agree
1

Disagree
2

17.0%
83.0%
Old Europe
New Europe
52.8%
47.2%
U.S.
21.6%
78.4%
Two chi-square tests of independence showed that there are significant distinctions
between views the women as political leaders in Old Europe compared to New Europe (X² (1, N
= 18609) = 2647.30, p ˂ .001***) and in New Europe compared to the United States (X² (1, N =
8028) = 332.80, p ˂ .001***). These results confirmed the existence of a schism between Old
Europe and New Europe, but also between New Europe and the United States. Moreover, a
significantly larger percentage of respondents from New Europe than from Old Europe and
United States combined believe that men make better political leaders than women. Overall,
there is more cultural similarity between Old Europe and the United States than between United
States and New Europe regarding women‘s involvement in politics and their role as political
leaders.
iv.

Crosstabulation results for “Women right to a job when jobs scarce” dependent
variable are presented below in Table 4.2.4.
TABLE 4.2.4: Women right to a job when jobs scarce
Do you agree or disagree with the statement: When jobs are
scarce, men should have more rights to a job than women?
Agree
1

Disagree
2

22.8%
77.2%
Old Europe
New Europe
40.0%
60.0%
U.S.
16.2%
83.8%
Results from two chi-square tests of independence showed that there are significant
differences between views the women as political leaders in Old Europe compared to New
Europe (X² (1, N = 19100) = 644.93, p ˂ .001***) and in New Europe compared to the United
States (X² (1, N = 8293) = 209.84, p ˂ .001***). These results confirmed the existence of a
division between Old Europe and New Europe, but also between New Europe and the United
52

States. Moreover, a larger percentage of respondents from New Europe than from Old Europe
and United States combined believe that when jobs are scarce, men should have more rights to a
job than women. There is more cultural similarity between Old Europe and the United States
than between United States and New Europe on the issue of women‘s right to a job even when
jobs are scarce.
v.

Table 4.2.5 contains crosstabulation results for the “Women without children” variable.
TABLE 4.2.5: Women without children
Do you agree or disagree with the statement: A woman needs to
have children in order to be really fulfilled?
Agree
1

Disagree
2

29.2%
70.8%
Old Europe
New Europe
73.2%
26.8%
U.S.
15.0%
85.0%
Two chi-square tests of independence revealed that there are significant distinctions
between opinions on women as mothers in Old Europe compared to New Europe (X² (1, N =
18230) = 3389.96, p ˂ .001***) and in New Europe compared to the United States (X² (1, N =
8178) = 1273.20, p ˂ .001***). These results confirmed the existence of a rift between Old
Europe and New Europe, but also between New Europe and the United States. Moreover, a
significantly larger percentage of respondents from New Europe (73 percent) than from Old
Europe (29 percent) and United States (15 percent) consider a woman without children to be
unfulfilled. There is much more cultural similarity between Old Europe and the United States
than between United States and New Europe regarding motherhood and what that means in a
woman‘s life.
vi.

Crosstabulation results for the “Woman says no to sex” dependent variable are
presented below in Table 4.2.6.
TABLE 4.2.6: Woman says no to sex
Do you agree or disagree with the statement: Sometimes when a
woman says no to sex, she doesn't always mean it?
Agree
1

Disagree
2

38.0%
62.0%
Old Europe
New Europe
63.1%
36.9%
U.S.
30.2%
69.8%
Results from two chi-square tests of independence showed that there are significant
differences between views women saying no to sex in Old Europe compared to New Europe (X²
(1, N = 15902) = 933.45, p ˂ .001***) and in New Europe compared to the United States (X² (1,
N = 6700) = 361.25, p ˂ .001***). The analysis confirmed the existence of a tolerance divide
between Old Europe and New Europe, but also between New Europe and the United States.
Moreover, a larger percentage of respondents from New Europe (63 percent) than from Old
Europe (38 percent) and United States (30 percent) believe that sometimes when a woman says
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no to sex, she doesn't always mean it. There is more cultural similarity between Old Europe and
the United States than between United States and New Europe regarding a woman‘s right to say
no to sex. On a personal note, I believe that all these numbers are extremely high and very
disturbing.
vii.

Conclusions
Table 4.2.7 summarizes the results of the statistical analyses measuring levels of
tolerance towards women in Old Europe, New Europe and the United States based on variables
from the Voice of the People survey – Millennium Edition database.
TABLE 4.2.7: Tolerance towards women as measured by variables from the Voice of the
People – Millennium Edition survey database (codebook in Appendix 2)

Old
Europe
New
Europe
United
States

University
education for
girls

Women and
household
income

Women
political
leaders

Women right
to a job when
jobs scarce

X²=605.21***
OE - NE
X²=91.33***
NE-US
X²=.439 ns
US-OE

X²=57.33***
OE-NE
X²=133.40***
NE-US
X²=133.40***
NE-US

X²=2647***
OE-NE
X²=332***
NE-US
X²=332***
NE-US

X²=644.93***
OE-NE
X²=209.84***
NE-US
X²=209.84***
NE-US

Women
without
children fulfilled?
X²=3389***
OE-NE
X²=1273***
NE-US
X²=1273***
NE-US

Women say
no to sex

X²=933.4***
OE-NE
X²=361.2***
NE-US
X²=361.2***
NE-US

Notes: a) Old Europe – New Europe, and New Europe – United States differences are
significant at p ≤ .05. b) p ≤ .05 *, p ≤ .01**, p ≤ .001***, ns = not significant.
Results of the chi-square tests on variables from the Voice of the People –
Millennium Edition measuring levels of tolerance towards women in Old Europe, New
Europe and the United States have shown that levels of tolerance towards women are much
more similar in Old Europe and United States than in United States and the pro-American
and apparently quite intolerant New Europe.
In every instance, a significantly higher percentage of respondents from New Europe than
from Old Europe and the U.S. think that women need children to be fulfilled and that they don‘t
always mean it when they say no to sex, education is more important for boys than girls, men
make better political leaders than women and they also should be given preference over women
in hiring when jobs are scarce. Data from the Voice of the People – Millennium Edition did not
support the existence of a connection between cultural similarity and levels of tolerance.
4.3 . PEW 2007
Two dependent variables from the PEW 2007 Survey database were used to measure views
on women in Old Europe, New Europe and the United States. These variables were based on
answers to questions regarding the importance of education for boys and girls, and women as
political leaders. The overall results of the statistical analysis are summarized in Table 4.3.3
which is preceded by a detailed description of each test.
The core theory at the basis of this section states that New Europe is less anti-American than
Old Europe because New Europe and the U.S. are more culturally similar when it comes to their
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views on women than Old Europe and the U.S. These two variables are ordinal, and the
statistical tool used in both cases was an independent-samples t-test. The results of these tests, as
well as the crosstabulation and the wording of the questions in each case, are presented below.
This analysis contains two main independent variables. The first one, “Old Europe vs. New
Europe”, was coded 0 for Old Europe and 1 for New Europe, while the second one, “New
Europe vs. United States”, was coded 0 for New Europe and 1 for the United States.
Crosstabulation results are presented based on variable named “Region” and coded 0 for Old
Europe, 1 for New Europe and 2 for United States. Two t-tests were conducted for each
independent variable, measuring the difference in means between Old and New Europe, and
New Europe and United States. ―No answer‖ and ―don‘t know‖ answers were eliminated when
they did not provide any relevant information. An alpha level of .05 was used in all statistical
analyses. Results of the statistical analysis for each dependent variable are presented below,
beginning with the “Education for boys and girls” variable.
i.

Crosstabulation results for the “Education for boys and girls” dependent variable are
presented below in Table 4.3.1.
TABLE 4.3.1: Education for boys and girls
Which one of the following statements comes closest to your opinion
about educating children?
It is more important for
boys than for girls
1

It is equally important
for girls and for boys
2

It is more important for
girls than for boys
3

1.4%
98.0%
.6%
Old Europe
New Europe
2.5%
96.7%
.8%
United States
.7%
98.7%
.6%
A first t-test revealed the existence of only slightly significant differences in views on the
importance of education for boys and girls (t (7778) = 2.34, p ≤ .05*) between respondents in
Old Europe (M = 1.99, SD = .14) and New Europe (M = 1.98, SD = .18). A second t-test showed
more significant distinctions (t (4812) = -4.06, p ≤ .001***) regarding gender equality and
education between New Europe and the United States (M = 2.00, SD = .11).
While the majority of Europeans and Americans believe that education is equally
important for boys and girls, the percentages are slightly higher in Old Europe and United States
than in New Europe. As such, these results do not support the core theory of this research:
there is more cultural similarity (and more tolerant attitudes) on this gender-equality issue
(education for men and women) between the United States and Western Europe than between the
U.S. and New Europe.
ii.

Table 4.3.2 contains crosstabulation results for the “Women political leaders” variable.
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TABLE 4.3.2: Women political leaders
Which one of the following statements comes closest to your opinion
about men and women as political leaders?
Men generally make
In general, women and Women generally make
better political leaders men make equally good
better political leaders
than women
political leaders
than men
1
2
3
9.3%
83.8%
6.9%
Old Europe
New Europe
19.2%
70.8%
10.0%
United States
16.2%
77.9%
6.0%
Results from a first t-test showed that there are significant differences (t (7652) = 5.75, p
≤ .001***) between Old Europe (M = 1.98, SD = .40) and New Europe (M = 1.91, SD = .53)
regarding views on women as political leaders. A second t-test revealed no statistically
significant distinctions (t (4683) = .70, p = .48 ns) between New Europe and the United States
(M = 1.90, SD = .46). While over 70 percent of Europeans and Americans believe that in
general, women and men make equally good political leaders, percentages of respondents who
consider men as better political leaders than women are higher in the United States and New
Europe than Old Europe. As such, these results do support my theory: there is more cultural
similarity on this issue between the United States and New Europe than between the U.S. and
Old Europe.
iii.

Conclusions

Results of the statistical analysis of views on women based on variables from the PEW
2007 survey database are summarized below in Table 4.3.3.
TABLE 4.3.3: Tolerance towards women as measured by variables from the
PEW 2007 Survey database (codebook in Appendix 5)
Education for boys and girls
Women political leaders
2.97***
1.98***
(.24)
(.40)
2.94***
1.91***/ ns
New Europe
(.32)
(..53)
2.98***
1.90 ns
United States
(.180
(.46)
Notes: a) Old Europe – New Europe, and New Europe – United States differences are
significant at p ≤ .05. When the levels of significance for two t-tests conducted using the same
dependent variable are different, the first one presented in the table refers to the Old Europe –
New Europe comparison, while the second one to the differences between New Europe and the
United States. b) p ≤ .05 *, p ≤ .01**, p ≤ .001***, ns = not significant
Old Europe

The existence of a relationship between cultural similarity and anti-Americanism was
confirmed by the second dependent variable from the PEW 2007 survey database used in this
section, measuring views on women as political leaders –New Europe and the United States
share similar opinions about men as better political leaders than women. The first dependent
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variable, looking at the importance of education for boys and girls, did not confirm my theory:
Old Europe and the U.S. are more culturally similar than New Europe and the United States.
4.4 . CONCLUSIONS
The overall results comparing differences between tolerance towards women in Old
Europe, New Europe and the United States are summarized below in Tables 4.4.1 to 4.4.3.
They have offered moderate support for the cultural similarity – anti-Americanism
connection theory.
TABLE 4.4.1: Tolerance towards women as measured by variables from the World Values
Survey database (codebook in Appendix 1)

Old
Europe
New
Europe
United
States

Women
right to
job
1.96**
(.48)
1.93**/**
*
(.68)
2.09***
(.49)

Marriage
out-dated

Single
mothers

N=9095**
*
N=4469**
*

.90 ns
(.70)
.90
ns/***
(.75)
.60***
(.61)

N=2418**
*

Women
political
leaders
3.17***
(.80)
2.58***
(.89)

University
education
for girls
3.42***
(.71)
3.21***
(.79)

Prostitution
justifiable

Abortion
justifiable

Divorce
justifiable

3.98***
(2.80)
2.86***
(2.59)

6.79***
(2.73)
5.37***
(3.19)

2.90***
(.75)

3.27***
(.65)

3.10***
(2.51)

5.68***
(3.04)
4.35***/n
s
(3.21)
4.41 ns
(2.91)

5.87***
(2.48)

TABLE 4.4.2: Tolerance towards women as measured by variables from the Voice of the
People – Millennium Edition survey database (codebook in Appendix 2)

Old
Europe
New
Europe
United
States

University
education for
girls

Women and
household
income

Women
political
leaders

Women right
to a job when
jobs scarce

X²=605.21***
OE - NE
X²=91.33***
NE-US
X²=.439 ns
US-OE

X²=57.33***
OE-NE
X²=133.40***
NE-US
X²=133.40***
NE-US

X²=2647***
OE-NE
X²=332***
NE-US
X²=332***
NE-US

X²=644.93***
OE-NE
X²=209.84***
NE-US
X²=209.84***
NE-US

Women
without
children fulfilled?
X²=3389***
OE-NE
X²=1273***
NE-US
X²=1273***
NE-US

Women say
no to sex

X²=933.4***
OE-NE
X²=361.2***
NE-US
X²=361.2***
NE-US

TABLE 4.4.3: Tolerance towards women as measured by variables from the
PEW 2007 Survey database (codebook in Appendix 5)
Education for boys and
Women political leaders
girls
Old Europe
New Europe
United States

2.97***
(.24)
2.94***
(.32)
2.98***
(.180

1.98***
(.40)
1.91***/ ns
(..53)
1.90 ns
(.46)
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Notes: a) Old Europe – New Europe, and New Europe – United States differences are
significant at p ≤ .05. b) p ≤ .05 *, p ≤ .01**, p ≤ .001***, ns = not significant
Old Europe and the United States have shown higher levels of tolerance towards women
on issues such as the right of women to jobs even when jobs are scarce, the importance of
education for boys and girls, the equal potential of men and women to become good political
leaders. They also share similar views on a woman‘s right to say no to sex and to have a fully
fulfilled life even without children. Europeans in general approve of single mothers and believe
that both the wife and the husband should contribute to the household income. The topics where
there was a clear connection between similar levels of tolerance towards women – cultural
similarity – and anti-Americanism were marriage as an out-dated institution, prostitution, divorce
and abortion. United States and New Europe judged abortion, prostitution and abortion to
never be justifiable and the institution of marriage as not out-dated. What is interesting
about these results is that cultural similarity between New Europe and the U.S. is strongest when
it comes to topics heavily influenced by religious views, while in the cases of secular issues, such
as education or jobs, there are more similarities between Old Europe and the Americans than
between New Europe and the United States.
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CHAPTER 5 – EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS: TOLERANCE
TOWARDS IMMIGRANTS AND FOREIGN WORKERS IN OLD
EUROPE, NEW EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES
My fourth and fifth hypotheses predict levels of tolerance towards foreigners/immigrants
in Old Europe, New Europe and the United States. The core argument of this research is that Old
Europe and the United States are less culturally similar than New Europe and the US, which
explains why Old Europe experiences relatively higher levels of anti-Americanism than New
Europe. In order to test this theory, three dummy variables were created for each of the databases
presented below in Chapter 5, measuring differences in cultural indicators for three regional
pairings: Old Europe and New Europe, New Europe and the United States, and Old Europe and
the United States. Unfortunately, due to time and space restrictions, only the results of the
statistical tests involving the Old Europe/New Europe, and New Europe/United States
comparisons are presented below in detail. Details of statistical analysis involving an
independent variable coded 0 for Old Europe and 1 for the United States are presented in the text
only when they show no significant differences between the two regions, as such contradicting
the main hypothesis of this research, according to which we expect to find statistically significant
differences in levels of tolerance towards immigrants/foreign workers between Old Europe and
New Europe, as well as between Old Europe and the United States (reflecting their comparably
lower cultural similarity), but no such differences between New Europe and the United States
due to their higher cultural similarity.
Hypothesis 4: There is a statistically significant difference between levels of tolerance
towards immigrants/foreigners in Old Europe vs. New Europe (OE ˃ NE), and in Old Europe vs.
the United States (OE ˃ US).
Hypothesis 5: There is no statistically significant difference between levels of tolerance
towards immigrants/foreigners in New Europe vs. the United States.
To test these two hypotheses, mean averages of attitudes towards foreigners/ immigrants
were compared across nations from Old Europe, New Europe and the United States, using
independent-samples t-tests and chi-square tests of independence. The results of this analysis,
presented below individually per database used, have offered moderate support for the
cultural similarity – anti-Americanism theory.
5.1 . WORLD VALUES SURVEY
Three dependent variables from the World Values Survey database were used to measure
views on immigrants/foreigners in Old Europe, New Europe and the United States. These
variables were based on answers to questions regarding people‘s views on having
immigrants/foreign workers in their neighborhoods, how a good immigration policy should look
like and the right of immigrants/foreign workers to a job when jobs are scarce. The overall
results of the statistical analysis are summarized in Table 5.1.4 which is preceded by a detailed
description of each test. The core theory at the basis of this section states that New Europe is less
anti-American than Old Europe because New Europe and the U.S. are more culturally similar
when it comes to their views on immigrants/foreign workers (more intolerant) than Old Europe
and the U.S..
59

These three variables are ordinal, and the statistical tool used for the first one was a chisquare test of independence, while for the other two, I used an independent-samples t-test. The
results of these tests, as well as the crosstabulation and the wording of the questions in each case,
are presented below. This analysis contains two main independent variables. The first one, “Old
Europe vs. New Europe”, was coded 0 for Old Europe and 1 for New Europe, while the second
one, “New Europe vs. United States”, was coded 0 for New Europe and 1 for the United States.
Crosstabulation results are presented based on variable named “Region” and coded 0 for Old
Europe, 1 for New Europe and 2 for United States. Two t-tests or two chi-square tests were
conducted for each independent variable, measuring the difference in means between Old and
New Europe, and New Europe and United States. An alpha level of .05 was used in all statistical
analyses.
Results of the statistical analysis for each dependent variable are presented below,
beginning with the “Neighbors immigrants” variable.
i.

Crosstabulation results for the “Neighbors immigrants” dependent variable are
presented below in Table 5.1.1.
TABLE 5.1.1: Neighbors immigrants
On this list are various groups of people. Could you please sort
out any that you would not like to have as neighbors?
Immigrants/foreign workers
Not mentioned
1

Mentioned
2

87.7%
12.3%
Old Europe
New Europe
83.5%
16.5%
U.S.
88.0%
12.0%
Results from two chi-square tests of independence showed that there are significant
differences between views on having immigrants/foreign workers as neighbors in Old Europe
compared to New Europe (X² (1, N = 17177) = 53.15, p ˂ .001***) and in New Europe
compared to the United States (X² (1, N = 7190) = 26.08, p ˂ .001***). The analysis confirmed
the existence of a divide in attitudes towards immigrants/foreign workers between Old Europe
and New Europe, but also between New Europe and the United States.
A third chi-square test comparing views on immigrants as neighbors in Old Europe and
the United States showed that there are no significant differences between these two regions
regarding this particular aspect of tolerance towards immigrants/foreign workers (X² (1, N =
14867) = .16, p = .708 ns). A slightly higher percentage of respondents from New Europe (17
percent) than from Old Europe and United States (both at 12 percent) mentioned immigrants
among those groups unwelcome in their neighborhoods. There is more cultural similarity
between Old Europe (where levels of anti-Americanism are comparatively higher than in New
Europe) and the United States than between United States and New Europe regarding tolerance
towards immigrants/foreign workers.
ii.

Crosstabulation results for the “Jobs for immigrants” dependent variable are presented
below in Table 5.1.2.
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TABLE 5.1.2: Jobs for immigrants when jobs are scarce
Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: When jobs
are scarce, employers should give priority to (nation) people than
immigrants
Agree
1

Neither agree nor
Disagree
disagree
3
2
45.3%
12.3%
42.3%
Old Europe
New Europe
72.8%
13.8%
13.5%
U.S.
54.1%
16.8%
29.1%
Results from two independent-samples t-tests showed that there are significant
dissimilarities – t1 (16937) = 41.82, p ˂ .001***) and t2 (7043) = -16.57, p ˂ .001*** - between
Old Europe (M = 1.97, SD = .93), New Europe (M = 1.41, SD = .71) and the United States (M =
1.75, SD = .87) regarding hiring immigrants/foreign workers when jobs are scarce. While over
70 percent of respondents from New Europe believe that when jobs are scarce, employers should
give priority to their nation‘s citizens instead of immigrants, only 54 percent of Americans and
45 percent of respondents from Old Europe agree with this view. As such, these results do not
support my theory: there is more cultural similarity on this issue between the United States and
Old Europe than between the U.S. and New Europe.
iii.

Table 5.1.3 contains crosstabulation results for the “Immigration policy” dependent
variable.
TABLE 5.1.3: Immigration policy
How about people from other countries coming here to work. Which
one of the following do you think the government should do?
Let anyone
come
1

As long as jobs
available
2

Strict limits
3

Prohibit people
from coming
4

10.3%
49.3%
37.2%
3.2%
Old Europe
New Europe
15.5%
46.5%
29.5%
8.6%
U.S.
9.4%
39.9%
45.6%
5.1%
Results from two independent-samples t-tests showed that there are no significant
differences – t1 (13663) = 1.48, p = .13 ns) – between Old Europe (M = 2.33, SD = .70) and
New Europe (M = 2.31, SD = .83) regarding the nature of a good immigration policy in their
respective regions. There are however important distinctions (t (6840) = -7.81, p ≤ .001***)
between New Europe and the United States (M = 2.49, SD = .73) on the same issue. Larger
percentages of respondents from United States (47 percent) than from Old Europe (37 percent)
and New Europe (29 percent) would like to see a stricter immigration policy. There is more
cultural similarity between Old Europe and New Europe, than between New Europe (where
levels of anti-Americanism are comparatively higher than those in Old Europe) and the United
States regarding the influx of foreign workers on their domestic job markets.
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iv.

Conclusions
Results of the statistical analysis of attitudes towards immigrants/foreign workers based
on variables from the World Values Survey database are summarized below in Table 5.1.4.
TABLE 5.1.3: Attitudes towards immigrants/foreign workers based on
variables from the World Values Survey database (codebook in Appendix 1)
Immigrants neighbors Jobs for immigrants Immigration policy
X²=53.15***
1.61***
2.33 ns
OE - NE
(.68)
(.70)
X²=26.08***
1.41***
2.31 ns / ***
New Europe
NE - US
(.71)
(.83)
X²=.16 ns
1.63***
2.46***
United States
US - OE
(.75)
(.73)
Notes: a) Old Europe – New Europe, and New Europe – United States differences are
significant at p ≤ .05. For ―New Europe‖ entry, when we have two different significance levels
for an analysis using the same dependent variable, the first significance level refers to OE-NE
relationships while the second one to NE-U.S comparison. b) p ≤ .05 *, p ≤ .01**, p ≤ .001***,
ns = not significant
Old Europe

Overall, these results do not support a cultural explanation for anti-Americanism
based on levels of tolerance towards immigrants/foreign workers. United States and Old
Europe (where anti-Americanism is relatively stronger than in New Europe) share similar, more
tolerant, views on having immigrants as neighbors and on the hiring of foreign vis-à-vis
domestic workers when jobs are scarce. In the case of stricter immigration policies, there are
strong cultural similarities between Old and New Europe, while the United States stands alone in
its desire to place stricter limits on who is allowed to enter its territory.
5.2 . PEW 2002
Four dependent variables from the PEW 2002 database were used to measure levels of
tolerance towards immigrants/foreigners in Old Europe, New Europe and the United States.
These variables were based on answers to questions regarding people‘s views on the overall
influence of immigrants in a society, their impact on the domestic way of life and culture, and on
stricter immigration policies. The overall results of the statistical analysis are summarized in
Table 5.2.5, which is preceded by a detailed description of each test. The core theory at the basis
of this section argues that New Europe is less anti-American than Old Europe because New
Europe and the U.S. are more culturally similar to each other when it comes to their attitudes
towards immigrants/foreign workers (more intolerant) than to Old Europe and the United States
are.
These four variables are ordinal, and the statistical tool used for all four was
independent-samples t-test. The results of these tests, as well as the crosstabulation and the
wording of the questions in each case, are presented below. This analysis contains two main
independent variables. The first one, “Old Europe vs. New Europe”, was coded 0 for Old
Europe and 1 for New Europe, while the second one, “New Europe vs. United States”, was
coded 0 for New Europe and 1 for the United States. Crosstabulation results are presented based
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on variable named “Region” and coded 0 for Old Europe, 1 for New Europe and 2 for United
States. Two t-tests were conducted for each independent variable, measuring first the difference
in means between Old and New Europe, and then between New Europe and United States. ―No
answer‖ responses were eliminated because they did not provide any information.‖ Don‘t know‖
answers were kept in the database, but they were re-coded to fit the middle of the answer scale.
An alpha level of .05 was used in all statistical analyses. Results of the statistical analysis for
each dependent variable are presented below, beginning with the “Immigrants influence”
variable.
i.

Crosstabulation results for the “Immigrants influence” dependent variable are presented
below in Table 5.2.1.
TABLE 5.2.1: Immigrants influence
Is the influence of immigrants very good, somewhat good, somewhat bad or
very bad in our country?
Very good
1

Somewhat good
2

Don't know
3

Somewhat bad
4

Very bad
5

3.1%
33.1%
5.6%
43.8%
14.4%
Old Europe
New Europe 1.4%
25.7%
18.5%
45.2%
9.1%
United States 7.9%
41.7%
6.7%
31.4%
12.3%
Results from a first independent-samples t-test revealed that there are no significant
differences (t (480) = -.53, p = .59 ns) between Old Europe (M = 3.33, SD = 1.16) and New
Europe (M = 3.35, SD = 1.00) regarding views on the influence of immigrants on the way things
are going in their countries. A second t-test showed that there are important distinctions on the
same topic (t (3490) = 9.30, p ≤ .001***) between New Europe and the United States (M =
2.98, SD = 1.24). Lower percentages of respondents from the United States (31 percent) see the
influence of immigrants as somewhat bad, compared to the Europeans (45 percent in New
Europe and 44 percent in Old Europe). It is also interesting to notice the fairly large percentage
of respondents from New Europe, 18.5%, answering ―don‘t know‖ to this question, suggesting
both lack of knowledge and lack of interest in the issue of immigrant influence in their societies.
New Europe (where anti-Americanism is relatively stronger than in Old Europe) shows stronger
cultural parallels with Old Europe than with the United States.
ii.

Crosstabulation results for the “Superior national culture” dependent variable are
presented below in Table 5.2.2.
TABLE 5.2.2: Superior national culture
Our people are not perfect, but our culture is superior to others.

Old Europe
New Europe
United States

Completely
agree
1
10.0%
19.1%
22.7%

Mostly agree
2

Don't know
3

31.3%
39.8%
37.5%

2.2%
6.1%
2.9%
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Mostly
disagree
4
30.9%
26.5%
23.5%

Completely
disagree
5
25.6%
8.5%
13.4%

An independent-samples t-test measuring views on a country‘s national culture in Old
Europe (M = 3.31, SD = 1.39) and New Europe (M = 2.65, SD = 1.28) reveled the existence of
significant differences (t (4492) = 16.32, p ≤ .001***). A second t-test on the same issue in
New Europe and the United States (M = 2.67, SD = 1.39) showed that there are no important
distinctions (t (3489) = -.40, p = .68 ns) when respondents from these two areas were asked if
their national cultures were superior to others.
Almost 60 percent of those interviewed in New Europe and the U.S. (compared to only
40 percent in Old Europe) ―agree‖ or ―mostly agree‖ with the fact that their cultures are superior
to others. United States and the New Europe (where anti-Americanism is relatively weaker
compared to Old Europe) share the same nationalistic views of their own national cultures
compared to Old Europe, where most people tend to see all world cultures as equal.
iii.

Table 5.2.3 contains crosstabulation results for the “Protecting domestic way of life
against foreign influences” dependent variable.
TABLE 5.2.3: Protecting domestic way of life against foreign influences
Here is a list of statements. For each one, please tell me whether you
completely agree, mostly agree, mostly disagree or completely disagree.
Our way of life needs to be protected against foreign influence.
Completely
agree
1

Mostly
agree
2

Don't know
3

Mostly
disagree
4

Completely
disagree
5

21.0%
33.5%
1.8%
26.7%
16.9%
Old Europe
New Europe
25.8%
40.0%
4.2%
23.1%
6.8%
United States
29.7%
34.5%
2.9%
24.6%
8.4%
An initial independent-samples t-test measuring attitudes towards foreign influences on
domestic way of life in Old Europe (M = 2.85, SD = 1.44) and New Europe (M = 2.45, SD =
1.27) reveled the existence of significant dissimilarities (t (4509) = 9.81, p ≤ .001***). A
second t-test using the same dependent variable compared New Europe and the United States (M
= 2.47, SD = 1.35) showed that there are no important distinctions (t (3491) = -.52, p = .60 ns)
when respondents from these two areas were asked about the need to protect their domestic way
of life against foreign influences.
Almost 70 percent of those interviewed in New Europe and the U.S. (compared to a little
over 50 percent in Old Europe) ―agree‖ or ―mostly agree‖ with the fact that their national way of
life must be protected against external influences. United States and New Europe (where levels
of anti-Americanism are comparatively lower than those in Old Europe) share the same
nationalistic views of domestic way of life compared to Old Europe, where more people tend to
perceive the outside influences as innocuous for their national customs and traditions.
iv.

Crosstabulation results for the “Stricter immigration laws” dependent variable are listed
below in Table 5.2.4.
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TABLE 5.2.4: Stricter immigration laws
Here is a list of statements. For each one, please tell me whether you
completely agree, mostly agree, mostly disagree or completely disagree. We
should restrict and control entry of people into our country more than we
do now.
Completely
Mostly agree Don't know
Mostly
Completely
agree
2
3
disagree
disagree
1
4
5
38.6%
35.3%
1.8%
15.4%
8.9%
Old Europe
New Europe
28.8%
37.0%
7.7%
19.3%
7.1%
United States 46.1%
34.8%
2.3%
12.5%
4.3%
Two independent-samples t-test revealed that there are significant differences (t (4512)
= -4.59, p ≤ .001***) regarding stricter immigration laws between Old Europe (M = 2.21, SD =
1.33) and New Europe (M = 2.39, SD = 1.27) as well as between United States (M = 1.94, SD =
1.17) and New Europe (t (3504) = 10.76, p ≤ .001***). A smaller percentage of respondents
from New Europe (29 percent) than from Old Europe (39 percent) and the United States (46
percent) completely agree with the idea that their governments should control and restrict the
entry of people in their countries more than they currently do. United States shares more cultural
parallels with Old Europe than with New Europe (where anti-Americanism is comparatively
weaker than in OE).
v.

Conclusions
Results of the statistical analysis of attitudes towards immigrants/foreign workers based
on variables from the PEW 2002 survey database are summarized below in Table 5.2.5.
TABLE 5.2.5: Attitudes towards immigrants/foreign workers based on
variables from the PEW 2002 survey database (codebook in Appendix 3)
Immigrants
National
Foreign influences on
Stricter
influence
culture
domestic way of life
immigration
superior
laws
3.33 ns
3.31***
2.85***
2.21***
Old Europe
(1.16)
(1.39)
(1.44)
(1.33)
3.35 ns / *** 2.65***/ns
2.45***/ns
2.39***
New Europe
(1.00)
(1.28)
(1.27)
(1.27)
2.98***
2.67 ns
2.47 ns
1.94***
United States
(1.24)
(1.39)
(1.35)
(1.17)
Notes: a) Old Europe – New Europe, and New Europe – United States differences are
significant at p ≤ .05. For ―New Europe‖ entry, first significance level refers to OE-NE
relationship, second one to NE-U.S, when they are different. b) p ≤ .05 *, p ≤ .01**, p ≤ .001***,
ns = not significant
Overall, these results offered mixed support a cultural explanation for antiAmericanism based on levels of tolerance towards immigrants/foreign workers. United
States and Old Europe share similar, more intolerant, views on restricting the access of
immigrants/ foreign workers to their economies. In the case of the immigrants who are already
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here and their influence on their host countries, there are stronger cultural similarities between
Old and New Europe (more positive views on this issue), then between New Europe and the U.S.
When the questions turn to nationalistic beliefs (national culture is superior to others) and
xenophobic attitudes (domestic way of life is threatened by foreign influences), results of
statistical analyses based on dependent variables from the PEW 2002 survey database showed
that there are strong cultural similarities between New Europe and the United States, while
Old Europe displays lower levels of nationalism and xenophobia.
5.3 . U.S. 2006 CITIZENSHIP, INVOLVEMENT AND DEMOCRACY SURVEY
Nine dependent variables from the U.S. 2006 Citizenship, Involvement and
Democracy/2002 ESS surveys were used to determine levels of tolerance towards
immigrants/foreigners in Old Europe, New Europe and the United States. These variables were
based on answers to questions regarding people‘s opinions on qualifications for immigration, the
impact immigrants have on a country‘s cultural life, crime problems and tax system, as well as
the pros and cons of cultural homogeneity. The overall results of the statistical analysis are
summarized in Table 5.3.10, which is preceded by a detailed description of each test. The core
argument at the foundation of this section states that New Europe is less anti-American than Old
Europe because New Europe and the U.S. are more culturally similar to each other when it
comes to their attitudes towards immigrants/foreign workers (more intolerant) than Old Europe
and the United States are.
These nine variables are ordinal, and the statistical tool used for all of them was
independent-samples t-test. The results of these tests, as well as the crosstabulation and the
wording of the questions in each case, are presented below. This analysis contains two main
independent variables. The first one, “Old Europe vs. New Europe”, was coded 0 for Old
Europe and 1 for New Europe, while the second one, “New Europe vs. United States”, was
coded 0 for New Europe and 1 for the United States. Crosstabulation results are presented based
on variable named “Region” and coded 0 for Old Europe, 1 for New Europe and 2 for United
States. Two t-tests were conducted for each independent variable, measuring first the difference
in means between Old and New Europe, and then between New Europe and United States. An
alpha level of .05 was used in all statistical analyses.
Crosstabulation results, as well as the t-test results for all nine dependent variables are
presented below, staring with the “Education – qualification for immigration” variable.
i.

Crosstabulation results for the “Education – qualification for immigration” dependent
variable are presented in Table 5.3.1.
TABLE 5.3.1: Education – qualification for immigration
Qualification for immigration: good educational qualifications
Extremely unimportant
1
Old Europe
New Europe
United States

Neither nor
5

5.2%
5.7%
1.7%

Extremely important
10
16.0%
16.4%
13.2%
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11.9%
16.3%
18.3%

Two independent-samples t-tests showed that there are significant differences (t
(41352) = -6.64, p ≤ .001***) between Old Europe (M = 6.22, SD = 2.75) and New Europe (M =
6.47, SD = 2.78), and between United States (M = 6.92, SD = 2.44) and the New Europe (t
(7417) = -5.22, p ≤ .001***) regarding the importance of good education as a qualification for
immigration. New Europe is more culturally similar to United States than Old Europe is (the
mean response from NE is positioned between the means of OE – the lowest value - and U.S. –
the highest and more intolerant value).
Crosstabulation results for the “Family living in host country – qualification for
immigration” dependent variable are presented in Table 5.3.2.

ii.

TABLE 5.3.2: Close family living in host country – qualification for immigration
Qualification for immigration: close family living here
Extremely unimportant
Neither nor
Extremely important
1
5
10
9.2%
15.5%
6.7%
Old Europe
New Europe
8.6%
14.7%
13.0%
United States
2.4%
15.1%
11.3%
A first independent-samples t-test measuring differences between Old Europe (M = 5.35,
SD = 2.94) and New Europe (M = 5.91, SD = 3.03) regarding views on close family living in the
host country as a qualification for immigration has produced statistically significant results (t
(41274) = -13.67, p ≤ .001***). A second t-test showed that there are no important distinctions
(t (7424) = -1.69, p=.09 ns) between New Europe and the United States (M = 6.06, SD = 2.58).
Respondents from the more pro-American New Europe and the United States view the presence
of close family living in the host country as a more important qualification for immigration than
Old Europe.
iii.

Crosstabulation results for the “Speak national language – qualification for
immigration” dependent variable are presented in Table 5.3.2.
TABLE 5.3.3: Speak national language – qualification for immigration
Qualification for immigration: speak country's official language
Extremely unimportant
1

Neither nor
5

Extremely important
10

5.6%
9.6%
21.7%
Old Europe
New Europe
4.1%
12.3%
26.9%
United States
1.5%
8.8%
34.2%
Two independent-samples t-tests showed that there are significant differences (t
(41666) = -10.59, p ≤ .001***) between Old Europe (M = 6.67, SD = 3.02) and New Europe (M
= 7.08, SD = 2.81), and between United States (M = 7.69, SD = 2.45) and the New Europe (t
(7505) = -7.15, p ≤ .001***) regarding the importance of speaking the official language of the
host country as a qualification for immigration. New Europe is more culturally similar to United
States than Old Europe is (the mean response from NE is positioned between the means of OE –
the lowest value - and U.S. – the highest and more intolerant value). For example, 22 percent of
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respondents from Old Europe, 27 percent from New Europe and 34 percent from United States
believe that it is extremely important for an individual to speak the official language of his/her
host country before he/she is granted the right to immigrate to that country.
iv.

Crosstabulation results for the “Christian – qualification for immigration” dependent
variable are presented in Table 5.3.4.
TABLE 5.3.4: Christian – immigrant qualification
Qualification for immigration: Christian background
Extremely unimportant
1

Neither nor
5

Extremely important
10

30.1%
13.5%
4.2%
Old Europe
New Europe
22.1%
15.8%
9.2%
United States
13.5%
20.2%
6.4%
A first independent-samples t-test measuring differences between Old Europe (M = 3.60,
SD = 3.28) and New Europe (M = 4.25, SD = 3.36) regarding views on having a Christian
background as a qualification for immigration has produced statistically significant results (t
(41320) = -14.17, p ≤ .001***). A second t-test showed that there are no important distinctions
(t (7398) = 1.08, p=.27 ns) between New Europe and the United States (M = 4.14, SD = 2.93).
Respondents from New Europe and the United States view a religious element – having a
Christian background - as a more important qualification for immigration than Old Europe.
v.

Crosstabulation results for the “Race – qualification for immigration” dependent
variable are presented in Table 5.3.5.
TABLE 5.3.5: Race – qualification for immigration
Qualification for immigration: be white
Extremely unimportant
1

Neither nor
5

Extremely important
10

46.1%
10.2%
2.1%
Old Europe
New Europe
34.4%
14.0%
7.4%
United States
29.8%
12.0%
1.7%
Two independent-samples t-tests showed that there are significant differences (t
(41447) = -26.31, p ≤ .001***) between Old Europe (M = 2.17, SD = 2.76) and New Europe (M
= 3.34, SD = 3.36), and between United States (M = 2.45, SD = 2.48) and the New Europe (t
(7409) = 9.99, p ≤ .001***) regarding the importance of being white as a qualification for
immigration. Overall, the anti-American Old Europe is slightly more culturally similar to United
States than New Europe is (the mean response from U.S. is positioned closer to the means of OE
– the lowest value - than NE – the highest and more intolerant value). At the same time, for one
particular answer, a higher percentage of respondents from Old Europe (46 percent) than New
Europe (34 percent) and United States (30 percent) stated that being white was extremely
unimportant as a qualification for immigration, which would suggest a closer cultural similarity
on this particular issue between NE and U.S. than between OE and U.S.
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vi.

Crosstabulation results for the “Immigrants and taxes” dependent variable are presented
in Table 5.3.6.
TABLE 5.3.6: Immigrants and taxes
Taxes and services: immigrants take out more than they put in or less
Generally take out
Generally they take out just Generally put in more
more
as much as they put in
10
1
5
7.0%
29.3%
1.6%
Old Europe
New Europe
7.0%
34.6%
.8%
United States
5.3%
19.6%
2.0%
Results from the two independent-samples t-tests showed that there are significant
differences (t (39549) = 10.78, p ≤ .001***) between Old Europe (M = 4.23, SD = 2.28) and
New Europe (M = 3.91, SD = 2.05), and between United States (M = 4.36, SD = 2.50) and New
Europe (t (6866) = -5.24, p ≤ .001***) regarding the relationship between immigrants and the
taxation system in their host countries. A third t-test revealed that there are no statistically
significant differences between Old Europe and the United States regarding the economic
impact of immigrants on a country‘s tax system (t (32283) = -1.71, p = .087 ns). Old Europe is
more culturally similar to United States than New Europe. Respondents from Old Europe and the
United States are more inclined than those from New Europe are to see immigrants as putting
more into the taxes and services system than they take out.

vii.

Crosstabulation results for the “National cultural life and immigrants” -dependent
variable are presented in Table 5.3.7.
TABLE 5.3.7: National cultural life and immigrants
Country's cultural life undermined or enriched by immigrants
Cultural life undermined
1

Neither nor
5

Cultural life enriched
10

3.5%
20.7%
6.4%
Old Europe
New Europe
3.3%
30.7%
4.3%
United States
1.7%
18.0%
8.7%
Two independent-samples t-tests revealed that there are significant differences (t
(39967) = 13.73, p ≤ .001***) between Old Europe (M = 5.83, SD = 2.49) and New Europe (M
= 5.38, SD = 2.29), and between United States (M = 6.16, SD = 2.41) and New Europe (t (6980)
= -9.35, p ≤ .001***) regarding the relationship between immigrants and the cultural life in the
countries where they currently reside. Overall, the anti-American Old Europe is more culturally
similar to United States than New Europe is (the mean response from OE is located between the
means of NE – the lowest value - and U.S. – the highest and more tolerant value). Respondents
from Old Europe and the United States are more inclined is to believe that their national cultural
lives are enriched by the presence of immigrants in their societies, while those interviewed in
New Europe are more worried that their countries‘ cultural lives are undermined by immigrants.
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viii.

Table 5.3.8 contains crosstabulation results for the “Immigrants and crime problems”
dependent variable.
TABLE 5.3.8: Immigrants and crime problems
Immigrants make country's crime problems worse or better

Crime problems made
Neither worse, nor
Crime problems made
worse
better
better
1
5
10
13.2%
19.9%
.4%
Old Europe
New Europe
12.8%
18.4%
.4%
United States
4.1%
32.4%
1.6%
Results from two independent-samples t-tests showed that there are significant
differences (t (40714) = 2.91, p ≤ .01**) between Old Europe (M = 3.11, SD = 2.05) and New
Europe (M = 3.02, SD = 2.04), and between United States (M = 4.26, SD = 2.07) and New
Europe (t (7251) = -17.33, p ≤ .001***) regarding the impact immigrants have on crime
problems in their host countries. Overall, the anti-American Old Europe is more culturally
similar to United States than New Europe is (the mean response from OE is located between the
means of NE – the lowest value - and U.S. – the highest and more tolerant value). At the same
time, Europeans from both sides of the ―anti-Americanism divide‖ are more inclined than the
Americans to see immigrants as contributing to the worsening of crime problems in their new
countries. It is also interesting to notice the extremely low percentage of respondents (less than
.5 percent in Ole Europe and New Europe and only 1.6 percent in the U.S.) who believe that
immigrants have a positive impact on crime levels in the countries where they currently reside.
ix.

Table 5.3.9 contains crosstabulation results for the “Immigrants and cultural
homogeneity” dependent variable.
TABLE 5.3.9: Immigrants and cultural homogeneity
Better for a country if almost everyone share customs and traditions
Agree strongly
1

Agree
2

Neither agree nor Disagree
Disagree
disagree
4
strongly
3
5
14.5%
34.8%
21.0%
25.4%
4.2%
Old Europe
New Europe
20.7%
45.9%
19.0%
13.0%
1.4%
United States
3.7%
26.9%
8.1%
53.2%
8.1%
Two independent-samples t-tests revealed that there are significant distinctions (t
(41636) = 29.62, p ≤ .001***) between Old Europe (M = 2.69, SD = 1.12) and New Europe (M
= 2.29, SD = .98), and between United States (M = 3.35, SD = 1.07) and New Europe (t (7520) =
-29.48, p ≤ .001***) regarding the benefits for a country of having everyone sharing same
customs and traditions.
Overall, the anti-American Old Europe is more culturally similar to United States than
New Europe is (the mean response from OE is located between the means of NE – the lowest
value - and U.S. – the highest and more tolerant value). Data also shows Old Europe and New
Europe sharing similar high levels of cultural nationalism. While over half of the respondents
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from United States – the original ―melting pot‖ - disagree with the statement that it is better for a
country if everyone shared the same customs and traditions, the opposite is true for Europe,
where cultural homogeneity is seen as more beneficial for a society than a diversity of customs
and traditions.
x.

Conclusions
Results for the statistical analysis of attitudes towards immigrants/foreign workers based
on variables from the U.S. Citizenship, Involvement and Democracy survey database are
summarized below in Tables 5.3.10 (Qualifications for immigration batch of questions) and
5.3.11 (the rest of the dependent variables).
TABLE 5.3.10: Attitudes towards immigrants/foreign workers based on variables from the
U.S. 2006 CID survey database – Qualifications for immigration dependent variables batch
Qualification Qualification Qualification Qualification Qualification
for
for
for
for
for
immigration
immigration
immigration
immigration
immigration
Education
Family ties
Language
Christian
Race
6.22***
5.35***
6.67***
3.60***
2.17***
Old Europe
(2.75)
(2.94)
(3.02)
(3.28)
(2.76)
5.91*** / ns
7.08***
4.25*** /ns
3.34***
New Europe 6.47***
(2.78
(3.03)
(2.81)
(3.36)
(3.36)
6.06 ns
7.69***
4.14 ns
2.45***
United States 6.92***
(2.44)
(2.58)
(2.45)
(2.93)
(2.48)
Notes: a) Old Europe – New Europe, and New Europe – United States differences are
significant at p ≤ .05. For ―New Europe‖ entry, first significance level refers to OE-NE
relationship, second one to NE-U.S. b) p ≤ .05 *, p ≤ .01**, p ≤ .001***, ns = not significant
Statistical analysis results presented above confirmed that New Europe (where
levels of anti-Americanism are in general lower than those in Old Europe) and the United
States are more culturally similar than Old Europe and the U.S. are, on matters of
tolerance towards immigrants. As a side note, none of the survey data I use in this research
makes a distinction between legal and illegal immigration. It would be interesting, for future
research, to investigate if there are any significant differences in attitudes towards these two
categories of immigrants.
In 2006 U.S. Citizenship, Involvement and Democracy Survey (as well as the 2002 –
2006 European Social Survey data incorporated in this database), people were asked about
certain characteristics that they would consider important in potential immigrants, from race,
religion to the knowledge of the national language in the country where they intent to relocate
and work. On average, New Europe (where levels of anti-Americanism are lower compared to
Old Europe) and United States respondents showed to have more similar opinions on the issue of
qualification for immigration than Old Europe and the U.S. They are more likely than Western
Europeans to argue in favor of an immigrant‘s need to learn the official language of their host
countries, to have a good education and close family already living in the country where they
intend to immigrate. When it comes to race, 46 percent of those interviewed in Old Europe,
compared to 30 percent in the U.S. and 34 percent in New Europe believe that being white is
extremely unimportant as a qualification for immigration, which does suggest that NE and U.S.
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tend to share a comparable cultural – and preferential - outlook on white vs. non-white
immigrants. The results of the t-test for the last four of the dependent variables from the U.S.
2006 CID database used to measure attitudes towards immigrants/foreign workers are presented
below in Table 5.3.11.
TABLE 5.3.11: Attitudes towards immigrants/foreign workers based on variables from the
U.S. 2006 CID survey database – Taxes, cultural life, crime problem and immigration
Immigration and Immigrants and
Immigrants and
Immigrants and
taxes
domestic cultural crime problems
cultural
life
homogeneity
4.23***
5.83***
3.11***
2.69***
Old Europe
(2.28)
(2.49)
(2.05)
(2.76)
3.91***
5.38***
3.02** /***
2.29***
New Europe
(2.05)
(2.29)
(2.04)
(.98)
4.36***
6.16***
4.26 ***
3.35***
United States
(2.50)
(2.41)
(2.07)
(1.07)
Notes: a) Old Europe – New Europe, and New Europe – United States differences are
significant at p ≤ .05. b) p ≤ .05 *, p ≤ .01**, p ≤ .001***, ns = not significant
The core theory of this research states that there is a relationship between cultural
similarity – as manifested in tolerance and attitudes towards immigrants/foreign workers – and
levels of anti-Americanism. Results of the statistical analysis presented above in Table 5.3.11
do not support this theory. There is more cultural similarity between Old Europe and United
States, than between New Europe and the U.S. Respondents from Western Europe and the
United States are more likely than those from New Europe to argue that in general, immigrants
take out just about as much or little less than they put in a country‘s tax and services system, that
the presence of immigrants does not undermine a country‘s cultural life nor does it negatively
impact its crime problems. Americans more than Europeans also disagree with the idea that
cultural homogeneity is a positive thing (53 percent compared to Old Europe‘s 25 percent and
New Europe‘s 13 percent).
Overall, data from U.S. CID database offers indirect support for the existence of a
connection between cultural similarity and levels of anti-Americanism in Europe. United
States and New Europe (where levels of anti-Americanism are comparatively lower than in
Old Europe) share similar views on what qualifications are important for a potential
immigrant, while Old Europe and the U.S. have comparable opinions on the impact of
immigrants on the countries they now call “home.”
5.4 . PEW 2007
Two dependent variables from PEW 2007 survey database were used to determine levels of
tolerance towards immigrants/foreigners in Old Europe, New Europe and the United States.
These variables were based on answers to questions regarding people‘s opinions on the influence
of immigrants on their receiving countries. The core theory at the basis of this section argues that
New Europe is less anti-American than Old Europe because New Europe and the U.S. are more
culturally similar to each other when it comes to their attitudes towards immigrants/foreign
workers (more intolerant) than to Old Europe and the United States are. These two variables are
ordinal, and the statistical tool used for both was independent-samples t-test. The results of these
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tests, as well as the crosstabulation and the wording of the questions in each case, are presented
below. This analysis contains two main independent variables. The first one, “Old Europe vs.
New Europe”, was coded 0 for Old Europe and 1 for New Europe, while the second one, “New
Europe vs. United States”, was coded 0 for New Europe and 1 for the United States.
Crosstabulation results are presented based on variable named “Region” and coded 0 for Old
Europe, 1 for New Europe and 2 for United States. Two t-tests were conducted for each
independent variable, measuring first the difference in means between Old and New Europe, and
then between New Europe and United States. An alpha level of .05 was used in all statistical
analyses. Crosstabulation results, as well as the t-test results for both dependent variables are
presented below, staring with the “Immigration problem” variable.
i.

Crosstabulation results for the “Immigration problem” dependent variable are presented
below in Table 5.4.1.
TABLE 5.4.1: Immigration problem
Please tell me if you think it is a very big problem, a moderately big
problem, a small problem or not a problem at all. Immigration.
Very big problem
1

Moderately big
Small
Not a problem
problem
problem
at all
2
3
4
37.0%
32.8%
20.7%
9.6%
Old Europe
New Europe
13.2%
28.9%
38.1%
19.8%
United States
40.2%
33.8%
19.1%
6.9%
Two independent-samples t-tests revealed that there are significant distinctions (t
(4753) = -21.39, p ≤ .001***) between Old Europe (M = 2.03, SD = .97) and New Europe (M =
2.65, SD = .94), and between United States (M = 1.93, SD = .93) and New Europe (t (2777) =
19.35, p ≤ .001***) regarding the magnitude of the immigration problem in their countries.
Overall, the anti-American Old Europe is more culturally similar to United States than New
Europe is (the mean response from OE is located between the means of U.S. – the lowest value and NE – the highest and more tolerant value). While two out of three respondents in Old
Europe and United States view immigration as a very big or moderately big problem, less than
half of those interviewed in New Europe agree with this assessment.
ii.

Crosstabulation results for the “Immigrants influence – 2007” dependent variable are
presented below in Table 5.4.2.
TABLE 5.4.2: Immigrants influence - 2007
Is the influence of immigrants very good, somewhat good, somewhat bad
or very bad in our country?
Very good
1
Old Europe
New Europe
United States

5.4%
1.9%
6.7%

Somewhat
good
2
40.5%
27.9%
44.2%

Don't know
3
5.0%
17.4%
7.0%
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Somewhat
bad
4
35.2%
42.0%
25.5%

Very bad
5
14.0%
10.8%
16.7%

Two independent-samples t-tests revealed that there are significant differences (t
(4836) = -5.97, p ≤ .001***) between Old Europe (M = 3.12, SD = 1.23) and New Europe (M =
3.32, SD = 1.05), and between United States (M = 3.01, SD = 1.27) and New Europe (t (2882) =
6.46, p ≤ .001***) regarding the influence of immigrants on their countries. Old Europe is more
culturally similar to United States than New Europe is (the mean response from OE is located
between the means of U.S. – the lowest value - and NE – the highest and more intolerant value).
Almost half of the respondents from Old Europe and the United States tend to see the influence
of immigrants on their countries as ―very good‖ or ―somewhat good‖, compared to less than 30
percent in New Europe. Again, it is interesting to notice the relatively large percentage of those
interviewed in New Europe – 17 percent – who ―don‘t know‖ if immigrants have a positive or a
negative impact on their societies.
iii.

Conclusions

The PEW 2007 survey data showed that Old Europe and the U.S. are more culturally
similar (they believe that even with immigration being a serious problem, the influence of
immigrants in their societies is actually a positive one) than New Europe and the United States.
Respondents from New Europe seems also less informed and/or less interested in the problem of
immigration than their European and American counterparts, as shown by the large percentage of
―don‘t know‖ answers.
5.5 . CONCLUSIONS
Information from the World Values Survey, Pew 2002 and 2007 surveys, as well as
2006 U.S. CID databases, is summarized below in Table 5.5.1 to 5.5.4.
TABLE 5.5.1: Attitudes towards immigrants/foreign workers based on variables from the
World Values Survey database (codebook in Appendix 1)
Immigrants neighbors Jobs for immigrants Immigration policy
X²=53.15***
1.61***
2.33 ns
Old Europe
OE - NE
(.68)
(.70)
X²=26.08***
1.41***
2.31 ns / ***
New Europe
NE - US
(.71)
(.83)
X²=.16 ns
1.63***
2.46***
United States
US - OE
(.75)
(.73)
TABLE 5.5.2: Attitudes towards immigrants/foreign workers based on variables from the
PEW 2002 survey database (codebook in Appendix 3)
Immigrants National culture Foreign influences on
Stricter
influence
superior
domestic way of life
immigration laws
3.33 ns
3.31***
2.85***
2.21***
Old Europe
(1.16)
(1.39)
(1.44)
(1.33)
3.35 ns / *** 2.65***/ns
2.45***/ns
2.39***
New Europe
(1.00)
(1.28)
(1.27)
(1.27)
2.98***
2.67 ns
2.47 ns
1.94***
United States
(1.24)
(1.39)
(1.35)
(1.17)
74

TABLE 5.5.3: Attitudes towards immigrants/foreign workers based on variables from the
U.S. 2006 CID survey database – Qualifications for immigration dependent variables batch
Qualification Qualification Qualification Qualification Qualification
for
for
for
for
for
immigration
immigration
immigration
immigration
immigration
Education
Family ties
Language
Christian
Race
6.22***
5.35***
6.67***
3.60***
2.17***
Old Europe
(2.75)
(2.94)
(3.02)
(3.28)
(2.76)
5.91*** / ns
7.08***
4.25*** /ns
3.34***
New Europe 6.47***
(2.78
(3.03)
(2.81)
(3.36)
(3.36)
6.06 ns
7.69***
4.14 ns
2.45***
United States 6.92***
(2.44)
(2.58)
(2.45)
(2.93)
(2.48)
TABLE 5.5.4: Attitudes towards immigrants/foreign workers based on variables from the
U.S. 2006 CID survey database – Taxes, cultural life, crime problem and immigration
(codebook in Appendix 4)
Immigration and Immigrants and
Immigrants and
Immigrants and
taxes
domestic cultural crime problems
cultural
life
homogeneity
4.23***
5.83***
3.11***
2.69***
Old Europe
(2.28)
(2.49)
(2.05)
(2.76)
3.91***
5.38***
3.02** /***
2.29***
New Europe
(2.05)
(2.29)
(2.04)
(.98)
4.36***
6.16***
4.26 ***
3.35***
United States
(2.50)
(2.41)
(2.07)
(1.07)
Notes: a) Old Europe – New Europe, and New Europe – United States differences are
significant at p ≤ .05. b) p ≤ .05 *, p ≤ .01**, p ≤ .001***, ns = not significant
Old Europe (where anti-American feelings are stronger than in New Europe) and the
United States share similar views on several (but not all) issues regarding immigration. Those
interviewed in OE and the U.S. are more likely than those in New Europe to see the influence of
immigrants as positive even if immigration is believed to be a relatively big problem in their
societies. They also advocate equal rights for immigrants and domestic workers to have a job
even when jobs are scarce, but they would also like stricter immigration policies than those
currently in place.
Strong cultural similarities between New Europe and the United States appear in the
analysis of nationalistic (i.e. ―our culture is superior to others‖) and slightly xenophobic (i.e. ―our
national way of life is under attack by foreign influences‖) negative attitudes towards
immigrants/foreign workers. Data regarding beliefs on what characteristics of potential
immigrants are important and which ones are not showed that respondents from New Europe
(compared to Old Europe) and the U.S. are more likely to see race, religion and the knowledge of
the national language as important issues when evaluating prospective immigrants. Two
interesting aspects of this analysis that could be explored in the future are: 1) the relatively large
number of those interviewed in New Europe not knowing if the influence of immigrants in their
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societies was a positive or a negative thing, and 2) the fact that no distinction was made between
legal and illegal immigration.
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CHAPTER 6 – EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS: TOLERANCE
TOWARDS HOMOSEXUALS IN OLD EUROPE, NEW EUROPE
AND THE UNITED STATES
My sixth and seventh hypotheses predict levels of tolerance towards homosexuals in Old
Europe, New Europe and the United States. The core argument of this research is that Old
Europe and the United States are less culturally similar than New Europe and the US, which
explains why Old Europe experiences relatively higher levels of anti-Americanism than New
Europe. In order to test this theory, three dummy variables were created for each of the databases
presented below in Chapter 6, measuring differences in cultural indicators for three regional
pairings: Old Europe and New Europe, New Europe and the United States, and Old Europe and
the United States. Unfortunately, due to time and space restrictions, only the results of the
statistical tests involving the Old Europe/New Europe, and New Europe/United States
comparisons are presented below in detail. Details of statistical analysis involving an
independent variable coded 0 for Old Europe and 1 for the United States are presented in the text
only when they show no significant differences between the two regions, as such contradicting
the main hypothesis of this research, according to which we expect to find statistically significant
differences in levels of tolerance towards homosexuals between Old Europe and New Europe, as
well as between Old Europe and the United States (reflecting their comparably lower cultural
similarity), but no such differences between New Europe and the United States due to their
higher cultural similarity.
Hypothesis 6: There is a statistically significant difference between levels of tolerance
towards homosexuals in Old Europe vs. New Europe (OE ˃ NE) and in Old Europe vs. the
United States (OE ˃ US).
Hypothesis 7: There is no statistically significant difference between levels of tolerance
towards homosexuals in New Europe vs. the United States.
To test these two hypotheses, mean averages of attitudes towards homosexuals were
compared across nations from Old Europe, New Europe and the United States, using t-test and
chi-square tests. The results of this analysis, presented below individually per database used,
have offered a nuanced support for the theory on cultural similarity and antiAmericanism.
6.1 . WORLD VALUES SURVEY
Three dependent variables from the World Values Survey database were used to measure
views on homosexuals in Old Europe, New Europe and the United States. These variables were
based on answers to questions regarding the overall importance of teaching children tolerance
and respect for others, the justifiability of homosexuality and people‘s views on having
homosexuals as neighbors. The overall results of the statistical analysis are summarized in Table
6.1.4 which is preceded by a detailed description of each test. The core theory at the basis of this
section states that New Europe is less anti-American than Old Europe because New Europe and
the U.S. are more culturally similar when it comes to their views on homosexuals (more
intolerant) than Old Europe and the U.S. These three variables are ordinal, and the statistical tool
used for the first two cases was a chi-square test of independence, while for the third one, I used
an independent-samples t-test. The results of these tests, as well as the crosstabulation and the
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wording of the questions in each case, are presented below. This analysis contains two main
independent variables. The first one, “Old Europe vs. New Europe”, was coded 0 for Old
Europe and 1 for New Europe, while the second one, “New Europe vs. United States”, was
coded 0 for New Europe and 1 for the United States. Crosstabulation results are presented based
on variable named “Region” and coded 0 for Old Europe, 1 for New Europe and 2 for United
States. Two t-tests or two chi-square tests were conducted for each independent variable,
measuring the difference in means between Old and New Europe, and New Europe and United
States. An alpha level of .05 was used in all statistical analyses.
i.

Crosstabulation results for the “Tolerance in children” variable are presented below in
Table 6.1.1.
TABLE 6.1.1: Tolerance and respect for other people in children
Important child qualities: tolerance and respect for other people
Not mentioned
1

Important
2

17.7%
82.3%
Old Europe
New Europe
33.7%
66.3%
U.S.
20.6%
79.4%
Results from two chi-square tests of independence showed that there are significant
differences between views on teaching children tolerance in Old Europe compared to New
Europe (X² (1, N = 17448) = 514.18, p ˂ .001***) and in New Europe compared to the United
States (X² (1, N = 7263) = 133.95, p ˂ .001***). The analysis confirmed the existence of a
tolerance divide between Old Europe and New Europe, but also between New Europe and the
United States. Moreover, a smaller percentage of respondents from New Europe (66 percent)
than from Old Europe (82 percent) and United States (79 percent) mentioned tolerance and
respect for others as an important quality in a child. There is more cultural similarity between
Old Europe and the United States than between United States and New Europe regarding
tolerance in children.
ii.

Crosstabulation results for the “Homosexuals as neighbors” dependent variable are
presented below in Table 6.1.2.
TABLE 6.1.2: Homosexuals as neighbors
On this list are various groups of people. Could you please sort out
any that you would not like to have as neighbors?
Homosexuals.
Not mentioned
Mentioned
1
2
86.3%
13.7%
Old Europe
New Europe
49.0%
51.0%
U.S.
75.4%
24.6%
Two chi-square tests of independence showed that there are significant distinctions
between attitudes towards homosexuals in Old Europe compared to New Europe (X² (1, N =
17190) = 2620.04, p ˂ .001***) and in New Europe compared to the United States (X² (1, N =
7195) = 460.06, p ˂ .001***). The analysis confirmed the existence of a tolerance divide
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between Old Europe and New Europe, but also between New Europe and the United States.
Crosstabulation results show that larger percentage of respondents from New Europe (51
percent) and United States (25 percent) than from Old Europe (14) percent) named homosexuals
as one of the groups they would not like to have as neighbors. There is slightly more cultural
similarity between New Europe and the United States than between United States and Old
Europe regarding attitudes towards homosexuals.
iii.

Crosstabulation results for the “Homosexuality justifiable” dependent variable are
presented below in Table 6.1.3.
TABLE 6.1.3: Homosexuality justifiable
Homosexuality can always be justified, never be justified, or
something in between?
Never justifiable
1

Something in between
5

Always justifiable
10

15.5%
13.5%
31.8%
Old Europe
New Europe
50.4%
9.4%
8.9%
U.S.
32.4%
19.8%
14.2%
A first independent-samples t-test revealed that there are significant differences (t
(16356) = 54.15, p ˂ .001***) between Old Europe (M = 6.49, SD = 3.30) and New Europe (M
= 3.45, SD = 3.11) in opinions on the justifiability of homosexuality. A second t-test showed that
there are also significant distinctions (t (6661) = -14.53, p ˂ .001***) between New Europe
(M = 3.45, SD = 3.11) and United States (M = 4.64, SD = 3.24). The analysis confirmed the
existence of a tolerance divide between Old Europe and New Europe, and also between New
Europe and the United States. Crosstabulation results show that larger percentage of respondents
from New Europe (50 percent) and United States (32 percent) than from Old Europe (115)
percent) believe that homosexuality is never justifiable. There is more cultural similarity
between New Europe and the United States than between United States and Old Europe when
tolerance towards homosexuality is taken into account.
iv.

Conclusions
Table 6.1.4 summarizes the results of the statistical analysis of tolerance towards
homosexuals as measured by variables from the World Values Survey database.
TABLE 6.1.4: Tolerance towards homosexuals as measured by variables from the World
Values Survey database (codebook in Appendix 1)

Old Europe
New Europe
United States

Teaching children
tolerance
X²=514.18***
OE-NE
X²=133.95***
NE-US
X²=133.95***
NE-US

Homosexuals as
neighbors
X²=2620.04***
OE-NE
X²=460.06***
NE-US
X²=460.06***
NE-US
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Homosexuality
justifiable
6.49***
(3.30)
3.45***
(3.11)
4.64***
(3.24)

Notes: a) Old Europe – New Europe, and New Europe – United States differences are
significant at p ≤ .05. b) p ≤ .05 *, p ≤ .01**, p ≤ .001***, ns = not significant
United States and New Europe share similar – fairly intolerant – views on homosexuality
compared to Old Europe, especially in the case of the justifiability of homosexuality (a lot of the
opposition to homosexuality comes from viewing it as a choice individuals make).
6.2 . PEW 2002
One dependent variable from the PEW 2002 survey database was used to measure views
on homosexual life style in Old Europe, New Europe and the United States. The core theory at
the basis of this section states that New Europe is less anti-American than Old Europe because
New Europe and the U.S. are more culturally similar when it comes to their views on
homosexuals (more intolerant) than Old Europe and the U.S..
This analysis contains two main independent variables. The first one, “Old Europe vs.
New Europe”, was coded 0 for Old Europe and 1 for New Europe, while the second one, “New
Europe vs. United States”, was coded 0 for New Europe and 1 for the United States.
Crosstabulation results are presented below in Table 1 and they are based on variable labeled
“Region” and coded 0 for Old Europe, 1 for New Europe and 2 for United States. Two chisquare tests of independence were also conducted for each independent variable, measuring the
difference in means between Old and New Europe, and New Europe and United States. An alpha
level of .05 was used in all statistical analyses. Crosstabulation results for the “Homosexuality
way of life” dependent variable can be seen below in Table 6.2.1, followed by a description of
the chi-square test results.
TABLE 6.2.1: Tolerance towards homosexuals as measured by the “Homosexuality way of
life” from the PEW 2002 database
Which one of these statements about homosexuality comes
closer to your opinion?
Homosexuality-way of life
Homosexuality-way of life society
society should accept
should not accept
1
2
81.0%
19.0%
Old Europe
New Europe
63.6%
36.4%
United States
54.4%
45.6%
Two chi-square tests of independence showed that there are significant differences between
attitudes towards homosexuals in Old Europe compared to New Europe (X² (1, N = 4224) =
160.38, p ˂ .001***) and in New Europe compared to the United States (X² (1, N = 3196) =
27.59, p ˂ .001***). The analysis confirmed the existence of a tolerance divide between Old
Europe and New Europe, but also between New Europe and the United States. Crosstabulation
results show that significantly smaller percentages of respondents from New Europe (63 percent)
and United States (54 percent) than from Old Europe (81 percent) believe homosexuality is a
way of life society should accept. There is significantly more cultural similarity between the
pro-American New Europe and the United States than between United States and anti-American
Old Europe regarding attitudes towards homosexuals.
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6.3 . U.S. 2006 CITIZENSHIP, INVOLVEMENT AND DEMOCRACY SURVEY
One dependent variable from the U.S. 2006 Citizenship, Involvement and Democracy
Survey database was used to measure views on homosexuality in Old Europe, New Europe and
the United States. The core theory at the basis of this section states that New Europe is less antiAmerican than Old Europe because New Europe and the U.S. are more culturally similar when it
comes to their views on homosexuals (more intolerant) than Old Europe and the U.S..
This analysis contains two main independent variables. The first one, “Old Europe vs.
New Europe”, was coded 0 for Old Europe and 1 for New Europe, while the second one, “New
Europe vs. United States‖, was coded 0 for New Europe and 1 for the United States.
Crosstabulation results are presented below in Table 1 and they are based on variable labeled
“Region” and coded 0 for Old Europe, 1 for New Europe and 2 for United States. Two
independent-samples t-test were also conducted for each independent variable, measuring the
difference in means between Old and New Europe, and New Europe and United States. An alpha
level of .05 was used in all statistical analyses.
Crosstabulation results for the “Homosexuals free to live as they wish” dependent
variable are presented below in Table 6.3.1, followed by a description of the t- test results.
TABLE 6.3.1: Tolerance towards homosexuals as measured by the “Gays and lesbians free
to live as they wish” from the U.S. 2006 CID database
Gays and lesbians free to live life as they whish
Agree strongly
1

Agree
2

Neither agree Disagree
Disagree
nor disagree
4
strongly
3
5
31.6%
43.9%
12.7%
7.3%
4.5%
Old Europe
New Europe
15.2%
35.2%
23.2%
15.6%
10.8%
United States
18.4%
47.5%
6.5%
18.4%
9.2%
A first independent-samples t-test revealed that there are significant differences (t (40688)
= -36.27, p ˂ .001***) between Old Europe (M = 2.12, SD = 1.08) and New Europe (M = 2.72,
SD = 1.21) in opinions on the justifiability of homosexuality. A second t-test showed that there
are also significant distinctions (t (7116) = 4.53, p ˂ .001***) between New Europe (M = 2.72,
SD = 1.21) and United States (M = 2.52, SD = 1.24). The analysis confirmed the existence of a
tolerance divide between Old Europe and New Europe, and also between New Europe and the
United States. Crosstabulation results show that larger percentages of respondents from New
Europe (28 percent) and United States (27 percent) than from Old Europe (11 percent) do not
think that gays and lesbians should be free to live their lives as they wish. There is more cultural
similarity between the pro-American (and more intolerant) New Europe and the United States
than between United States and anti-American Old Europe regarding tolerance towards
homosexuals.
6.4 . PEW 2007
One dependent variable from the PEW 2007 survey database was used to measure views
on homosexual life style in Old Europe, New Europe and the United States. The core theory at
the basis of this section states that New Europe is less anti-American than Old Europe because
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New Europe and the U.S. are more culturally similar when it comes to their views on
homosexuals (more intolerant) than Old Europe and the U.S..
This analysis contains two main independent variables. The first one, “Old Europe vs.
New Europe”, was coded 0 for Old Europe and 1 for New Europe, while the second one, “New
Europe vs. United States”, was coded 0 for New Europe and 1 for the United States.
Crosstabulation results are presented below in Table 1 and they are based on variable labeled
“Region” and coded 0 for Old Europe, 1 for New Europe and 2 for United States. Two chisquare tests of independence were also conducted for each independent variable, measuring the
difference in means between Old and New Europe, and New Europe and United States. ―No
answer‖ and ―don‘t know‖ answers were eliminated when they did not provide any relevant
information. An alpha level of .05 was used in all statistical analyses.
Crosstabulation results for the “Homosexuality way of life – 2007” dependent variable
are presented below in Table 6.4.1, followed by a description of the chi-square test results.
TABLE 6.4.1: Tolerance towards homosexuals as measured by the “Homosexuality way of
life - 2007” from the PEW 2007 database
And which one of these comes closer to your opinion, number 1 or
number 2?
Number 1 – Homosexuality is a
way of life that should be
accepted by society
1

Number 2 – Homosexuality is a way
of life that should not be accepted by
society
2

82.9%
17.1%
Old Europe
New Europe
64.5%
35.5%
United States
54.2%
45.8%
Two chi-square tests of independence showed that there are significant differences between
attitudes towards homosexual way of life in Old Europe compared to New Europe (X² (1, N =
4523) = 196.61, p ˂ .001***) and in New Europe compared to the United States (X² (1, N =
2615) = 26.75, p ˂ .001***). The analysis confirmed the existence of a tolerance divide
between Old Europe and New Europe, but also between New Europe and the United States.
Crosstabulation results show that significantly larger percentages of respondents from New
Europe (36 percent) and United States (46 percent) than from Old Europe (17 percent) do not
believe homosexuality is a way of life society should accept. There is significantly more cultural
similarity between the pro-American (and more intolerant) New Europe and the United States
than between United States and anti-American Old Europe regarding attitudes towards
homosexuals.
6.5 . CONCLUSIONS
Statistical results of analyses (independent-samples t-tests as well as chi-square tests
of independence) using dependent variables measuring levels of tolerance towards
homosexuals in Old Europe, New Europe and the United States are presented below in
Tables 6.5.1 to 6.5.4.
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TABLE 6.5.1: Tolerance towards homosexuals as measured by variables from the World
Values Survey database
Teaching children
Homosexuals as
Homosexuality
tolerance
neighbors
justifiable
Old Europe

X²=160.38***
OE-NE

X²=196.61***
OE-NE

6.49***
(3.30)

New Europe

X²=27.59***
NE-US

X²=26.75***
NE-US

3.45***
(3.11)

United States

X²=27.59***
NE-US

X²=26.75***
NE-US

4.64***
(3.24)

TABLE 6.5.2: Tolerance towards homosexuals as measured by the “Homosexuality way of
life” variable from the PEW 2002 database
Which one of these statements about homosexuality comes
closer to your opinion?
Homosexuality-way of life
society should accept
1

Homosexuality-way of life society
should not accept
2

81.0%
63.6%
54.4%

Old Europe
New Europe
United States

19.0%
36.4%
45.6%

TABLE 6.5.3: Tolerance towards homosexuals as measured by the “Gays and lesbians free
to live as they wish” variable from the U.S. 2006 CID database
Gays and lesbians free to live life as they whish
Agree strongly
1

Old Europe
New Europe
United States

31.6%
15.2%
18.4%

Agree
2

43.9%
35.2%
47.5%
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Neither agree
nor disagree
3
12.7%
23.2%
6.5%

Disagree
4

7.3%
15.6%
18.4%

Disagree
strongly
5
4.5%
10.8%
9.2%

TABLE 6.5.4: Tolerance towards homosexuals as measured by the “Homosexuality way of
life - 2007” variable from the PEW 2007 database
And which one of these comes closer to your opinion, number 1 or
number 2?
Number 1 – Homosexuality is a
Number 2 – Homosexuality is a way
way of life that should be
of life that should not be accepted by
accepted by society
society
1
2
82.9%
17.1%
Old Europe
New Europe
64.5%
35.5%
United States
54.2%
45.8%
Notes: a) Old Europe – New Europe, and New Europe – United States differences are
significant at p ≤ .05. b) p ≤ .05 *, p ≤ .01**, p ≤ .001***, ns = not significant
New Europe and the United States share similar negative and quite intolerant attitudes
towards homosexual way of life, while on all measurements Old Europe appears fairly tolerant
and open-minded on the matter of homosexuality.
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CHAPTER 7 – EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS: LEVELS OF RELIGIOSITY IN
OLD EUROPE, NEW EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES
My eighth and ninth hypotheses predict levels of religiosity in Old Europe, New Europe
and the United States. The core argument of this research is that Old Europe and the United
States are less culturally similar than New Europe and the US, which explains why Old Europe
experiences relatively higher levels of anti-Americanism than New Europe. In order to test this
theory, three dummy variables were created for each of the databases presented below in Chapter
7, measuring differences in cultural indicators for three regional pairings: Old Europe and New
Europe, New Europe and the United States, and Old Europe and the United States. Due to time
and space restrictions, only the results of the statistical tests involving the Old Europe/New
Europe, and New Europe/United States comparisons are presented below in detail. Details of
statistical analysis involving an independent variable coded 0 for Old Europe and 1 for the
United States are presented in the text only when they show no significant differences between
the two regions, as such contradicting the main hypothesis of this research, according to which
we expect to find statistically significant differences in levels of religiosity between a more
secular Old Europe and a more religious New Europe, as well as between Old Europe and the
United States (reflecting their comparably lower cultural similarity), but no such differences
between New Europe and the United States due to their higher cultural similarity.
Hypothesis 8: There is a statistically significant difference between levels of religiosity in
Old Europe and New Europe (OE ˂ NE) and in Old Europe and the United States (OE ˂ US).
Hypothesis 9: There is no statistically significant difference between levels of religiosity in
New Europe and the United States.
To test these two hypotheses, mean averages of attitudes towards faith, as well as the role
of religion in a society, were compared across nations from Old Europe, New Europe and the
United States, using independent-samples t-tests and chi-square tests of independence.
7.1 . WORLD VALUES SURVEY
Seven dependent variables from the World Values Survey database were used to
determine levels of religiosity in Old Europe, New Europe and the United States. These variables
were based on answers to questions regarding people‘s views on church and social problems, the
importance of teaching children about religion, separation of church and state, as well as
personal religious rituals (such as the frequency of attending religious services). The overall
results of the statistical analysis are summarized in Table 7.1.8, which is preceded by a detailed
description of each test. The core theory at the basis of this section argues that New Europe is
less anti-American than Old Europe because New Europe and the U.S. are more culturally
similar to each other when it comes to their faith (more religious) than to the secular Old Europe.
These seven variables are ordinal, and the statistical tools used were independentsamples t-tests (for five of them) and chi-square tests of independence (for two of them).The
results of these tests, as well as the crosstabulation and the wording of the questions in each case,
are presented below. This analysis contains two main independent variables. The first one, “Old
Europe vs. New Europe”, was coded 0 for Old Europe and 1 for New Europe, while the second
one, “New Europe vs. United States”, was coded 0 for New Europe and 1 for the United States.
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Crosstabulation results are presented based on variable named “Region” and coded 0 for Old
Europe, 1 for New Europe and 2 for United States. Two t-tests or chi-square tests were
conducted for each independent variable, measuring first the difference in means between Old
and New Europe, and then between New Europe and United States. An alpha level of .05 was
used in all statistical analyses. Crosstabulation results, as well as the t-test results for all eight
dependent variables are presented below, staring with the “Confidence in churches” variable.
i.

Crosstabulation results for the “Confidence in churches” dependent variable are
presented below in Table 7.1.1.
TABLE 7.1.1: Confidence in churches
I am going to name a number of organizations. For each one, could you tell
me how much confidence you have in them: is it a great deal of confidence,
quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence or none at all?
The churches
A great deal
1

Quite a lot
2

Not very much
3

None at all
4

11.6%
35.2%
35.4%
17.9%
Old Europe
New Europe
35.2%
32.4%
22.4%
9.9%
U.S.
31.7%
39.4%
22.4%
6.4%
A first independent-samples t-test showed that there are significant differences (t
(16929) = 32.82, p ≤ .001**) in levels of confidence in churches between Old Europe (M = 2.60,
SD = .91) and New Europe (M = 2.07, SD = .98). A second t-test revealed that there are no
statistically significant distinctions (t (7126) = 1.51, p = .13 ns) on this topic between New
Europe and the United States (M = 2.04, SD = .89). New Europe (where anti-Americanism is
weaker than in Old Europe) and the United States share similar high levels of religiosity.
Almost 70 percent of respondents from New Europe and the United States (compared to less
than half of those interviewed in Old Europe) trust their churches ―a great deal‖ or ―quite a lot.‖
ii.

Crosstabulation results for the “Religious services attendance” dependent variable are
presented below in Table 7.1.2.
TABLE 7.1.2: Religious services attendance
How often do you attend religious services?

Old Europe
New Europe
U.S.

More than
once a
week
1

Once
a week
2

2.9%
4.2%
14.5%

9.3%
23.2%
27.0%

Once a
month
3

8.6%
14.6%
12.9%
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Only on special
holy
days/Christmas/
Easter days
4
15.3%
28.7%
9.7%

Once a
year
5

9.9%
4.8%
5.6%

Less
often
6

12.4%
10.4%
9.8%

Never
practically
never
7
41.6%
14.1%
20.5%

Results from an independent-samples t-test, comparing religious services attendance in
Old Europe (M = 5.88, SD = 2.31) and New Europe (M = 4.24, SD = 2.18) revealed that these
two groups are rather dissimilar in their church-going habits (t (17205) = 43.30, p ≤ .001***). A
second t-test showed that on the same issue, there were no significant differences (t (7148) =
1.81, p = .07 ns) between New Europe and the United States (M = 4.12, SD = 2.62). New
Europe (where antipathy towards Americans is comparatively weak) and the United States are
more culturally similar on the issue on church attendance than the United States and the secular
and anti-American Old Europe. For example, over 40 percent of respondents from Old Europe
never go to church, compared to 14 percent of those interviewed in New Europe and 20 percent
in the U.S.
iii.

Crosstabulation results for the “Religious person” dependent variable are presented
below in Table 7.1.3.
TABLE 7.1.3: Religious person
Independently of whether you go to church or not, would you say
you are…

A religious person
Not a religious person
A convinced atheist
1
2
3
51.0%
39.0%
10.0%
Old Europe
New Europe
83.4%
13.0%
3.6%
U.S.
78.9%
19.0%
2.1%
An independent-samples t-test revealed that there are significant differences (t (16670)
= 41.33, p ≤ .001***) in the way people qualify themselves as religious or not in Old Europe (M
= 1.59, SD = .66) and New Europe (M = 1.20, SD = .48). A second t-test, comparing New
Europe and the United States (M = 1.23, SD = .46) on the same dimension showed a weaker
relationship (t (6901) = -2.48, p ≤ .05*) between the region where the interview was conducted
and the respondent‘s religiosity levels. Overall, these results confirm the existence of a
connection between cultural similarity and anti-Americanism. The more anti-American and
secular Old Europe and the United States are less culturally similar on the issue of religiosity
than New Europe and the U.S. Almost half of the respondents from Old Europe are either
―atheists‖ or ―not a religious person‖, compared to only 17 percent in New Europe and 20
percent in the United States.
iv.

Table 7.1.4 contains crosstabulation results for the “Church answers social problems”
dependent variable.
TABLE 7.1.4: Church answers social problems
Generally speaking, do you think that the churches in your country are
giving adequate answers to the social problems facing our country today?
No (1)
Old Europe
New Europe
U.S.

Yes (2)
72.0%
63.3%
56.1%
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28.0%
36.7%
43.9%

Two chi-square tests of independence showed that there are significant differences
between views of the involvement of churches in social problems in Old Europe compared to
New Europe (X² (1, N = 12326) = 96.01, p ˂ .001***) and in New Europe compared to the
United States (X² (1, N = 6287) = 31.23, p ˂ .001***).
The analysis confirmed the existence of a religiosity divide between Old Europe and New
Europe, but also between New Europe and the United States. Crosstabulation results show that
larger percentages of respondents from New Europe (37 percent) and United States (44 percent)
than from Old Europe (28 percent) believe that Churches are giving adequate answers to the
social problems facing their countries (instead of the secular authorities).
There is significantly more cultural similarity between the pro-American (and more
religious) New Europe and the United States, than between United States and Old Europe
regarding the involvement of organized religions in a country‘s social problems.
v.

Crosstabulation results for the “Religious faith in children” dependent variable are
presented below in Table 7.1.5.
TABLE 7.1.5: Religious faith in children
Here is a list of qualities that children can be encouraged to learn at home.
Which, if any, do you consider to be especially important? Please choose up
to five.
Religious faith.
Not mentioned
1

Important
2

87.1%
12.9%
Old Europe
New Europe
60.1%
39.9%
U.S.
48.0%
52.0%
Results from two chi-square tests of independence revealed that there are significant
distinctions between views of the importance of children learning religious doctrines and rites
in Old Europe compared to New Europe (X² (1, N = 17448) = 1576.30, p ˂ .001***) and in New
Europe compared to the United States (X² (1, N = 7623) = 95.74, p ˂ .001***). The analysis
confirmed the existence of a religiosity divide between Old Europe and New Europe, but also
between New Europe and the United States.
Crosstabulation results show that significantly larger percentages of respondents from
New Europe (40 percent) and United States (52 percent) than from Old Europe (13 percent)
believe that having a strong religious education is important for children starting at an early age,
at home with their parents. There is significantly more cultural similarity between New Europe
and the United States, than between United States and Old Europe regarding the importance to
teach children about faith, religious ideas, beliefs and rites.
vi.

Table 7.1.6 presents crosstabulation results for the “Secular politicians” dependent
variable.
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TABLE 7.1.6: Secular politicians
Politicians who don´t believe in God are unfit for public office
Agree strongly
1

Neither agree
Disagree
Strongly
or disagree
4
disagree
3
5
2.2%
6.7%
16.4%
33.9%
40.9%
Old Europe
New Europe
14.3%
15.3%
24.5%
28.1%
17.8%
U.S.
17.0%
18.6%
13.0%
36.7%
14.8%
Two independent-samples t-test showed that there are significant differences (t (13573)
= 38.08, p ≤ .001***) in their opinions on secular politicians between Old Europe (M = 4.05,
SD = 1.01) and New Europe (M = 3.20, SD = 1.28), but not between United States (M = 3.14,
SD = 1.34) and New Europe (t (6781) = 1.83, p = .06). New Europe (where anti-Americanism
levels are comparatively lower than in Old Europe) and the United States share more cultural
similarities regarding views on secular politicians than Old Europe and the U.S. A larger
percentage of respondents from more pro-American New Europe (30 percent) and United States
(35 percent) than from Old Europe (9 percent) ―agree‖ or ―strongly agree‖ that politicians who
don‘t believe in God are unfit for public office.
vii.

Agree
2

Table 7.1.7 contains crosstabulation results for the “Separation church and state”
dependent variable.
TABLE 7.1.7: Separation church and state
Religious leaders should not influence government
Agree strongly
1

Agree
2

Neither agree
Disagree
Strongly
or disagree
4
disagree
3
5
37.3%
30.7%
16.6%
11.7%
3.7%
Old Europe
New Europe
42.6%
32.8%
14.0%
7.1%
3.6%
U.S.
22.1%
28.6%
10.1%
29.1%
10.1%
Results from two independent-samples t-tests showed that there are significant
differences (t (13585) = 8.65, p ≤ .001***) between opinions on the separation of Church and
State in Old Europe (M = 2.14, SD = 1.15) and New Europe (M = 1.96, SD = 1.08), as well as
between United States (M = 2.77, SD = 1.34) and New Europe (t (6795) = -25.07, p ≤
.001***). Old Europe (where anti-American feelings are comparatively stronger than in New
Europe) and the United States are more culturally similar than New Europe and the United
States, when cultural similarity is measured by views on the relationship between national
governments and religious leaders. The mean response from OE is situated between the mean
responses from NE (lowest on the scale, which means the most inclined to agree that religious
leaders should not influence the government) and U.S. (highest on the scale). There is also a
clear distinction on this issue between Europe as a whole and the United States, where the former
is advocating a stricter separation of Church and States than the latter. Over 75 percent of
Europeans, compared to 50 percent of Americans ―agree‖ or ―strongly agree‖ that religious
leaders should not try to influence the government.
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viii.

Conclusions

Results of the empirical analysis of levels of religiosity in Old Europe, New Europe and
the United States as measured by variables from the World Values Survey are summarized below
in Table 7.1.8.
TABLE 7.1.8: Levels of religiosity in Old Europe, New Europe and the United States as
measured by variables from the World Values Survey (codebook in Appendix 1)
Confidence
in churches
Old
Europe
New
Europe
United
States

2.60***
(.91)
2.07***/ns
(.98)
2.04 ns
(.89)

Religious
services
attendance
5.88***
(2.31)
4.24***/ns
(2.18)
4.12 ns
(2.62)

Church
answers social
problems
X²=96.01***
OE-NE
X²=31.23***
NE-US
X²=31.23***
NE-US

Religious faith
in children
X²=1576***
OE-NE
X²=95.74***
NE-US
X²=95.74***
NE-US

Secular
politicians

Religious
person

4.05***
(1.01)
3.20***/ns
(1.29)
3.14 ns
(1.34)

1.59***
(.66)
1.20***/*
(.48)
1.23*
(.46)

Church
and State
separation
2.14***
(1.15)
1.96***
(1.08)
2.77***
(1.34)

Notes: a) Old Europe – New Europe, and New Europe – United States differences are
significant at p ≤ .05. For ―New Europe‖ entry, first significance level refers to OE-NE
relationship, second one to NE-U.S comparison when the two are different. b) p ≤ .05 *, p ≤
.01**, p ≤ .001***, ns = not significant
New Europe (where levels of anti-Americanism are relatively lower than in Old Europe)
and the United States share similar, high levels of religiosity, while Western Europe is much
more secular. Americans and New Europeans are more inclined than Old Europeans to see
themselves as religious people, trust their churches and ask them for answers to social problems,
attend religious services fairly often and offer their children a religious education. It is also
interesting to notice that although those interviewed in New Europe tend to agree with the
Americans that politicians who do not believe in God are unfit for public office, they parallel
their fellow Western European when it comes to views on the separation between Church and
State. A significantly larger percentage of European than American respondents agrees that
religious leaders should not try to influence the national government‘s policies.
7.2 . VOICE OF THE PEOPLE – MILLENNIUM EDITION
Four dependent variables from the Voice of the People – Millennium Edition database
were used to determine levels of religiosity in Old Europe, New Europe and the United States.
These variables were based on answers to questions regarding people‘s faith (importance of God
in personal life, the existence of one true religion and one true God) and religious behaviors
(moments of prayers and church attendance). The overall results of the statistical analysis are
summarized in Table 7.2.5, which is preceded by a detailed description of each test. The core
theory at the basis of this section argues that New Europe is less anti-American than Old Europe
because New Europe and the U.S. are more culturally similar to each other when it comes to
their levels of religiosity (more religious) than to a secular Old Europe.
These four variables are ordinal, and the statistical tool used for all of them was
independent-samples t-test. The results of these tests, as well as the crosstabulation and the
wording of the questions in each case, are presented below. This analysis contains two main
independent variables. The first one, “Old Europe vs. New Europe”, was coded 0 for Old
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Europe and 1 for New Europe, while the second one, “New Europe vs. United States”, was
coded 0 for New Europe and 1 for the United States. Crosstabulation results are presented based
on variable named “Region” and coded 0 for Old Europe, 1 for New Europe and 2 for United
States. Two t-tests were conducted for each independent variable, measuring first the difference
in means between Old and New Europe, and then between New Europe and United States. An
alpha level of .05 was used in all statistical analyses. Crosstabulation results, as well as the t-test
results for all four dependent variables are presented below, starting with the “Moments of
prayer” variable.
i.

Crosstabulation results for the “Moments of prayer” dependent variable are presented
below in Table 7.2.1.
TABLE 7.2.1: Moments of prayer
Do you take some moments of prayer, meditation or something
like that?
Yes
Don’t know
No
1
2
3
55.4%
2.1%
42.5%
Old Europe
New Europe
60.4%
3.3%
36.3%
U.S.
86.9%
.2%
12.9%
Two independent-samples t-test revealed that there are significant differences (t
(19725) = -7.72, p ≤ .001***) in how much people pray between Old Europe (M = 1.50, SD =
.61) and New Europe (M = 1.59, SD = .82), as well as between United States (M = 1.14, SD =
.37) and New Europe (t (8919) = 29.61, p ≤ .001***). The t-test results showed New Europe and
the United States to be culturally less similar than Old Europe and the United States (the mean
value for the OE population is placed between the NE and the US ones). There are also a
significantly larger percentage of respondents from United States (87 percent) than from Old
Europe (55 percent) and New Europe (60 percent) take moments during their regular day-to-day
lives to pray or meditate, which suggest the existence of a ―prayer divide‖ between Europe and
the United States.

ii.

Crosstabulation results for the “Religious beliefs” dependent variable are presented
below in Table 7.2.2.
TABLE 7.2.2: Religious beliefs
Which of these statements comes closest to your beliefs?
There is a
personal God
1

There is some sort
I don't know I don't really think there
of spirit or life
what to think is any sort of spirit, God
force
3
or life force
2
4
34.2%
37.5%
14.2%
14.0%
Old Europe
New Europe
41.6%
34.1%
14.7%
9.7%
U.S.
64.6%
28.0%
5.4%
2.0%
Results from two independent-samples t-test confirmed the existence of significant
differences (t (19036) = 10.64, p ≤ .001***) in religious beliefs between Old Europe (M = 2.08,
SD = 1.02) and New Europe (M = 1.92, SD = .97), as well as between United States (M = 1.45,
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SD = .69) and New Europe (t (8557) = 19.37, p ≤ .001***). The t-test results show that New
Europe and the United States to be culturally more similar than Old Europe and the United
States. At the same time, over 90 percent of American respondents (compared to a little over 70
percent of Europeans) believe that there is a personal God or some sort of spirit or life force,
which suggests an overall closer similarity of religiosity levels between Old Europe and New
Europe, than between New Europe and the United States.
iii.

Table 7.2.3 contains crosstabulation results for the “One true religion” dependent
variable. ―Don‘t know‖ answers were re-coded to express an opinion close to the middle
of the scale.

TABLE 7.2.3: One true religion
Would you say that there exists one and only one true religion, that
there is truth in many religions or that there is no essential truth in
any religion?
One and only one
Many true
Don't know
No true
true religion
religions
3
religion
1
2
4
17.0%
56.6%
9.1%
17.3%
Old Europe
New Europe
36.2%
39.0%
13.4%
11.5%
U.S.
21.1%
72.2%
1.6%
5.1%
Two independent-samples t-test showed that there are significant differences (t (18768) =
18.43, p ≤ .001***) in opinions about one true religion between respondents in Old Europe (M =
2.27, SD = .93) and New Europe (M = 2.00, SD = .97), as well as between those in the U.S. (M
= 1.91, SD = .65) and New Europe (t (8311) = 3.96, p ≤ .001***). There are stronger similarities
in levels of religiosity between United States and New Europe (where anti-Americanism is
relatively weak) than between U.S. and Old Europe (where anti-American feelings are
comparatively more intense). The picture emerging is more complicated than this though.
Americans, by a larger percentage (72 percent) than both New Europe (39 percent) and Old
Europe (57 percent) believe that there is truth in many religions, which is a direct reflection of
the diversity of religious beliefs in the American society and the religious homogeneity in
Europe. In 2008, the largest religious denomination in the U.S. was ―Catholic‖ with 25 percent
of the respondents, followed by ―Baptist‖ with 16 percent and ―Methodist‖ with 5 percent
(Kosmin and Keysar 2009). By contrast, the majority of Romanians – 86 percent of the
population – identified themselves as Eastern Orthodox, followed by Roman Catholicism with
4.7 percent and Greek Catholicism, with less than one percent (Centrul de Resurse pentru
Diversitate Etnoculturala 2002). In France, an officially secular country, 51 percent of the
population identified themselves as Catholics, 4 percent as Muslims, 3 percent as Protestant, and
31 percent as agnostics or atheists (Tager Djenane 2004).
It is also interesting to note that almost 10 percent of respondents in Old Europe and 13
percent in New Europe ―didn‘t know‖ what to think about the existence of a one true religion, or
of multiple true religions, or no true religion, which could indicate both a lack of knowledge and
a lack of interest in spiritual matters.
iv.

Crosstabulation results for the “Religious services attendance” dependent variable are
presented below in Table 7.2.4.
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TABLE 7.2.4: Religious services attendance
Apart from weddings, funerals and christenings, about how often do you
attend religious services these days?
More than
Once a
Once a
Only on
Once a
Less
Never,
once a week
week
month
special
year
often practically
1
2
3
holy days
5
6
never
4
7
3.3%
15.4%
8.7%
14.0%
8.6%
9.7%
40.3%
Old Europe
New Europe
5.1%
17.2%
11.9%
26.2%
6.9% 10.3%
22.3%
U.S.
14.5%
36.4%
13.0%
11.0%
6.9%
9.1%
9.1%
Two independent-samples t-test revealed that there are significant differences (t
(19414) = 23.21, p ≤ .001) in religious services attendance between Old Europe (M = 4.99, SD =
2.02) and New Europe (M = 4.33, SD = 1.91), as well as between United States (M = 3.23, SD =
1.88) and New Europe (t (8635) = 15.93, p ≤ .001***). New Europe and the United States are
more culturally similar than Old Europe and the United States. These results also show that in
general Americans attend church services much more frequently than Europeans do. Over 50
percent of U.S. respondents go church at least once a week, apart from weddings, christenings
and funerals, while 40 percent of those interviewed in Old Europe and 22 percent in New Europe
practically never go to church.
v.

Conclusions
Empirical analysis results measuring levels of religiosity with data from the Voice of the
People – Millennium Edition survey are summarized below in Table 7.2.5.
TABLE 7.2.5: Levels of religiosity as measured by variables from the Voice of the People –
Millennium Edition (codebook in Appendix 2)
Moments of
prayer

Religious beliefs

One true
religion

Religious
services
attendance

1.47***
2.08***
2.18***
4.99***
(.53)
(1.02)
(.81)
(2.02)
1.43***
1.92***
2.02***
4.33***
New Europe
(.55)
(.97)
(1.00)
(1.91)
1.13***
1.45***
1.87***
3.23***
United States
(.34)
(.69)
(.55)
(1.88)
Notes: a) Old Europe – New Europe, and New Europe – United States differences are
significant at p ≤ .05. For ―New Europe‖ entry, first significance level refers to OE-NE
relationship, second one to NE-U.S. (when those two are different). b) p ≤ .05 *, p ≤ .01**, p ≤
.001***, ns = not significant
Old Europe

Results of the empirical analysis of levels of religiosity in Old Europe, New Europe
and the United States revealed the existence of a “faith Grand Canyon” between Europe
and America, and of a smaller “religion divide” within Europe itself. Old Europe is by far
the most secular of the three regions under investigation, with highest percentage of respondents
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who do not go to church, do not take time in their days to pray and do not believe in the
existence of one true religion or one personal God. United States is at the opposite end of the
spectrum as the most devout of the three. Americans pray a lot, attend religious services
regularly, believe in the existence of a personal God and identify themselves with a large array of
religious beliefs. New Europe falls somewhere in between these two extremes; this could provide
an explanation for why its levels of anti-Americanism are lower than those in Old Europe.
7.3 . PEW 2002
Four dependent variables from the PEW 2002 survey database were used to determine
levels of religiosity in Old Europe, New Europe and the United States. These variables were
based on answers to questions regarding people‘s opinions on the separation between Church
and State, relationship between religion and morality, God‘s place in their own lives and other
religious rites and customs. The overall results of the statistical analysis are summarized in Table
7.3.5, which is preceded by a detailed description of each test. The core theory at the basis of this
section argues that New Europe is less anti-American than Old Europe because New Europe and
the U.S. are more culturally similar to each other when it comes to their levels of religiosity
(more religious) than Old Europe and the United States are.
These four variables are ordinal, and the statistical tool used for three of them was
independent-samples t-test, while for the fourth one, I used a chi-square test of independence.
The results of these tests, as well as the crosstabulation and the wording of the questions in each
case, are presented below. This analysis contains two main independent variables. The first one,
“Old Europe vs. New Europe”, was coded 0 for Old Europe and 1 for New Europe, while the
second one, “New Europe vs. United States”, was coded 0 for New Europe and 1 for the
United States. Crosstabulation results are presented based on variable named “Region” and
coded 0 for Old Europe, 1 for New Europe and 2 for United States. Two t-tests or two chisquare test were conducted for each independent variable, measuring first the difference in
means between Old and New Europe, and then between New Europe and United States. An
alpha level of .05 was used in all statistical analyses.
Crosstabulation results, as well as the t-test results for all five dependent variables are
presented below, starting with the “Religion and morality” variable.
i.

Crosstabulation results for the “Religion and morality” dependent variable are presented
below in Table 7.3.1.
TABLE 7.3.1: Religion and morality
Which one of these statements about belief in God comes closest
to your opinion?
Not necessary to believe in God Necessary to believe in God to be
to be moral/have good values
moral/have good values
1
2
73.5%
26.5%
Old Europe
New Europe
66.5%
33.5%
United States
41.2%
58.8%
Results from two chi-square tests of independence revealed that there are significant
distinctions between opinions on religion and morality in Old Europe compared to New Europe
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(X² (1, N = 4429) = 26.07, p ˂ .001***) and in New Europe compared to the United States (X²
(1, N = 3418) = 217.40, p ˂ .001***). The analysis confirmed the existence of a religiosity
divide between Old Europe and New Europe, but also between New Europe and the United
States. Crosstabulation results show that larger percentages of respondents from New Europe (34
percent) and United States (59 percent) than from Old Europe (27 percent) believe that it is
necessary to believe in God to have good, moral values. There is significantly more cultural
similarity between the pro-American (and more religious) New Europe and the United States,
than between United States and anti-American Old Europe regarding the relationship between
faith and morality.
Table 7.3.2 presents crosstabulation results for the “Importance of religion” dependent
variable.

ii.

TABLE 7.3.2: Importance of religion
How important is religion in your life?
Very important
1

Not too
Not at all
important
important
3
4
21.6%
32.3%
25.2%
20.9%
Old Europe
New Europe
22.2%
35.9%
22.8%
19.2%
United States
59.9%
25.8%
8.0%
6.3%
An independent-samples t-test discovered a significant, but weak, connection between
the region where the interview was conducted – Old Europe (M = 2.45, SD = 1.04) and New
Europe (M = 2.39, SD = 1.03) – and the how important religion was in respondent‘s personal life
(t (4218) = 2.02, p ≤ .05*). A much stronger relationship between these two variables was
revealed by a t-test comparing United States (M = 1.61, SD = .88) and New Europe (t (3433) =
23.94, p ≤ .001***). Levels of religiosity in the United States are more similar to New Europe‘s
than to those in Old Europe. It should also be pointed out that in general, Americans are much
more inclined to see religion as very important in their lives (60 percent) as compared to their
European counterparts (22 percent in both Old Europe and New Europe).
iii.

Somewhat important
2

Crosstabulation results for the “Separation between Church and State” dependent
variable are presented below in Table 7.3.3.
TABLE 7.3.3: Separation between Church and State
Religion is a matter of personal faith and should be kept separate from
government policy

Completely agree
Mostly agree Mostly disagree
Completely disagree
1
2
3
4
69.6%
22.8%
4.9%
2.7%
Old Europe
New Europe
67.8%
25.9%
4.1%
2.3%
United States
57.0%
25.3%
9.7%
7.9%
Findings from two independent-samples t-test showed no significant differences (t
(4442) = .08, p = .99 ns) between Old Europe (M = 1.41, SD = .70) and New Europe (M = 1.41,
SD = .67) regarding people‘s opinion on keeping religion and governmental policies separated.
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There is however a much stronger divide on this matter between United States (M = 1.69, SD =
.94) and New Europe (t (3408) = -9.61, p ≤ .001***). Old Europe and New Europe are
practically indistinguishable from each other on this issue. 70 percent of respondents from
Old Europe and 68 percent of those from New Europe (compared to 57 percent of Americans)
completely agree that religion is a matter of personal faith and as such it should be kept separate
from governmental policies.
iv.

Crosstabulation results for the ―Influence of religious leaders” dependent variable are
summarized below in Table 7.3.4.
TABLE 7.3.4: Influence of religious leaders
Is the influence of religious leaders very good, somewhat good, somewhat
bad or very bad in our country?
Very good
1

Somewhat good
2

Somewhat bad
3

Very bad
4

6.8%
42.3%
39.2%
11.6%
Old Europe
New Europe
7.5%
42.4%
37.0%
13.0%
United States
12.8%
52.8%
25.9%
8.4%
Results from two independent-samples t-test showed no significant differences (t (4009)
= .07, p = .94 ns) between Old Europe (M = 2.56, SD = .78) and New Europe (M = 2.55, SD =
.81) regarding people‘s opinion on what kind of influence religious leaders play in their
countries. There is however a much stronger distinction on this topic between United States (M =
2.30, SD = .79) and New Europe (t (3054) = 8.74, p ≤ .001***). Old Europe and New Europe are
practically impossible to differentiate from each other on this issue. Over 50 percent of
Europeans (compared to 33 percent of Americans) believe that religious leaders have a negative
or a very negative influence in their countries.
v.

Conclusions
Table 7.3.5 summarizes the results of the analysis comparing levels of religiosity in Old
Europe, New Europe and the United States using variables from the PEW 2002 survey database.
TABLE 7.3.5: Levels of religiosity in Old Europe, New Europe and the United States as
measured by variables from the PEW 2002 survey database (codebook in Appendix 3)
Religion and
Importance of
Church and State
Religious leaders
morality
religion in life
separation
influence
X²=26.07*** 2.45*
1.41 ns
2.56 ns
Old Europe
OE-NE
(1.04)
(.70)
(.78)
X²=217.40*** 2.39*/***
1.41 ns/***
2.55 ns/***
New Europe
NE-US
(1.03)
(.67)
(.81)
X²=217.40*** 1.61***
1.69***
2.30***
United States
NE-US
(.88)
(.94)
(.79)
Notes: a) Old Europe – New Europe, and New Europe – United States differences are
significant at p ≤ .05. For ―New Europe‖ entry, first significance level refers to OE-NE
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relationship, second one to NE-U.S. (when those two are different). b) p ≤ .05 *, p ≤ .01**, p ≤
.001***, ns = not significant
Overall, findings from the analysis measuring levels of religiosity in Old Europe,
New Europe and the United States using variables from the PEW 2002 survey have shown
that Old Europe and New Europe have almost identical levels of religiosity, even if the
intensity of anti-American feelings in those two regions is very different. Europe is more
secular, and would like to keep religion out of the political and governmental realm as much as
possible, while for Americans faith plays a major role in their personal lives, and they feel it
should do the same in their public lives.
7.4 . U.S. 2006 CITIZENSHIP, INVOLVEMENT AND DEMOCRACY
Three dependent variables from the U.S. 2006 Citizenship, Involvement and Democracy
database were used to determine levels of religiosity in Old Europe, New Europe and the United
States. These variables were based on answers to questions regarding religious homogeneity,
church attendance and the importance of religion in a person‘s life. The overall results of the
statistical analysis are summarized in Table 7.4.4, which is preceded by a detailed description of
each test. The core theory at the basis of this section argues that New Europe is less antiAmerican than Old Europe because New Europe and the U.S. are more culturally similar to each
other when it comes to their levels of religiosity (more religious) than the secular Old Europe and
the United States.
These three variables are ordinal, and the statistical tool used for all of them was
independent-samples t-test. The results of these tests, as well as the crosstabulation and the
wording of the questions in each case, are presented below. This analysis contains two main
independent variables. The first one, “Old Europe vs. New Europe”, was coded 0 for Old
Europe and 1 for New Europe, while the second one, “New Europe vs. United States”, was
coded 0 for New Europe and 1 for the United States. Crosstabulation results are presented based
on variable named “Region” and coded 0 for Old Europe, 1 for New Europe and 2 for United
States. Two t-tests were conducted for each independent variable, measuring first the difference
in means between Old and New Europe, and then between New Europe and United States. An
alpha level of .05 was used in all statistical analyses. Crosstabulation results, as well as the t-test
results for all three dependent variables are presented below, starting with the “Personal levels
of religiosity” variable.
i.

Crosstabulation results for the “Personal level of religiosity” dependent variable are
presented below in Table 7.4.1.
TABLE 7.4.1: Personal levels of religiosity
How religious are you?
Not at all religious
1
Old Europe
New Europe
United States

Moderately religious
5

11.5%
12.8%
3.9%
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17.3%
19.6%
17.4%

Very religious
10
6.1%
7.9%
9.9%

A first independent-samples t-test showed that there are no significant differences (t
(46065) = .17, p = 86 ns) between how religious people are in Old Europe (M = 4.95, SD = 2.93)
and New Europe (M = 4.94, SD = 3.04). A second t-test revealed the existence of significant
distinctions (t (7578) = -12.59, p ≤ .001***) in levels of individual religiosity between United
States (M = 6.09, SD = 2.59) and New Europe. These results showed that Old Europe and
New Europe have almost identical (low) levels of religiosity, compared to the United States.
On a scale from 1 to 10, where 1 is ―not religious at all‖ and 10 is ―extremely religious‖, there is
an almost 2 points difference between the more secular Europeans and the more faith-oriented
Americans.
Crosstabulation results for the ―Religious services attendance” dependent variable are
presented below in Table 7.4.2.

ii.

TABLE 7.4.2: Religious services attendance
How often do you attend religious services, apart from special occasions?
Every
day
1

More than
once a
week
2

Once a
week
3

At least
once a
month
4

Only on
special
holy days
5

Less
often
6

Never
7

.9%
3.0%
12.1%
10.9%
18.7% 21.5% 32.9%
Old Europe
New Europe
.5%
3.5%
22.7%
11.2%
21.3% 12.9% 27.8%
United States
.5%
8.6%
25.6%
15.5%
15.2% 20.0% 14.7%
Two independent-samples t-tests revealed that there are significant differences in
religious services attendance (t (42179) = 17.81, p ≤ .001***) between Old Europe (M = 5.38,
SD = 1.55) and New Europe (M = 4.99, SD = 1.63), as well as between United States (M = 4.55,
SD = 1.61) and New Europe (t (7642) = 8.13, p ≤ .001***).
Comparatively, respondents from New Europe and the United States share more similar
church attendance habits than those from Old Europe and the U.S. While almost half of
Americans and New Europeans go to church at least once a month, less than 25 percent of Old
Europeans do so.
iii.

Table 7.4.3 contains crosstabulation results for the “Religious homogeneity” dependent
variable.
TABLE 7.4.3: Religious homogeneity
Better for a country if a variety of different religions
Agree strongly
1

Old Europe
New Europe
United States

6.0%
4.9%
8.4%

Agree
2
33.2%
24.1%
67.5%
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Neither agree
nor disagree
3
28.4%
31.7%
10.1%

Disagree
4
25.2%
31.3%
12.2%

Disagree
strongly
5
7.2%
7.9%
1.7%

Results from two independent-samples t-test showed that there are significant
distinctions (t (40913) = -13.19, p ≤ .001***) between people‘s views on religious homogeneity
in Old Europe (M = 2.95, SD = 1.06) and New Europe (M = 3.13, SD = 1.02), and between
United States (M = 2.31, SD = .85) and New Europe (t (7275) = 27.27, p ≤ .001***). The mean
answer from Old Europe is positioned between that from New Europe (highest on the scale and
the most negative towards religious diversity) and the United States (the lowest on the scale and
the most negative towards religious homogeneity). The overall numbers also show that United
States is much more in favor of accepting a multitude of religious beliefs in their society (75
percent of respondents ―agree‖ or ―strongly agree‖ with this idea) than Europe (less than 40
percent).
iv.

Conclusions
Results of the analysis of levels of religiosity as measured by variables from the 2006
U.S. CID database are summarized below in Table 7.4.4.
TABLE 7.4.4: Analysis results for levels of religiosity as measured by variables from the
2006 U.S. CID database (codebook in Appendix 4)
Personal religiosity
Religious services
Religious
attendance
homogeneity
4.95 ns
5.38***
2.95***
Old Europe
(2.93)
(1.55)
(1.06)
4.94 ns/***
4.99***
3.13***
New Europe
(3.04)
(1.63)
(1.02)
6.09***
4.55***
2.31***
United States
(2.59)
(1.61)
(.85)
Notes: a) Old Europe – New Europe, and New Europe – United States differences are
significant at p ≤ .05. For ―New Europe‖ entry, first significance level refers to OE-NE
relationship, second one to NE-U.S. (when those two are different). b) p ≤ .05 *, p ≤ .01**, p ≤
.001***, ns = not significant
Statistical analysis results measuring levels of religiosity in Old Europe, New Europe and
the United States using variables from the 2006 U.S. New Europe is more similar to United
States than Old Europe is on only one of the three dimensions investigated in this section religious service attendance. On the other two – attitudes towards religious homogeneity and
self-reported levels of religiosity, data does not back up the core theory of this research.
Europeans see themselves as more secular, independent of which region of the continent they
inhabit, than the Americans. Respondents from Old Europe are closer than those in New Europe,
in their views of religious homogeneity, to the Americans.
7.5 . PEW 2007
Five dependent variables from the PEW 2007 survey database were used to measure
levels of religiosity in Old Europe, New Europe and the United States. These variables were
based on answers to questions regarding morality and religion, separation between Church and
State, and matters of personal faith. The overall results of the statistical analysis are summarized
in Table 7.5.6, which is preceded by a detailed description of each test. The core theory at the
basis of this section argues that New Europe is less anti-American than Old Europe because New
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Europe and the U.S. are more culturally similar to each other when it comes to their attitudes
towards faith-related issues than Old Europe and the United States are.
These five variables are ordinal, and the statistical tool used for four of them was the
independent-samples t-test, while for the fifth one I used a chi-square test of independence.
Results of these tests, as well as the crosstabulation and the wording of the questions in each
case, are presented below. This analysis contains two main independent variables. The first one,
“Old Europe vs. New Europe”, was coded 0 for Old Europe and 1 for New Europe, while the
second one, “New Europe vs. United States”, was coded 0 for New Europe and 1 for the
United States. Crosstabulation results are presented based on variable named “Region” and
coded 0 for Old Europe, 1 for New Europe and 2 for United States. Two t-tests were conducted
for each independent variable, measuring first the difference in means between Old and New
Europe, and then between New Europe and United States. An alpha level of .05 was used in all
statistical analyses.
Crosstabulation results, as well as the t-test and chi-square results for all five dependent
variables are presented below, starting with the “Religious leaders influence” variable.
i.

Crosstabulation results for the ―Religious leaders influence‖ dependent variable are
presented below in Table 7.5.1.
TABLE 7.5.1: Religious leaders influence
Is the influence of religious leaders very good, somewhat good,
somewhat bad or very bad for our country?
Very good
1

Somewhat good
2

Somewhat bad
3

Very bad
4

6.0%
37.9%
39.0%
17.1%
Old Europe
New Europe
5.8%
35.5%
40.3%
18.4%
United States
12.4%
52.2%
23.5%
11.9%
A first independent-samples t-test showed that there are no significant distinctions (t
(4359) = -1.57, p =.11 ns) between Old Europe (M = 2.67, SD = .82) and New Europe (M =
2.71, SD = .83) regarding views on the influence played by religious leaders in these societies. A
second t-test revealed that on the same issue there were important differences (t (2546) = 10.55,
p ≤ .001***) between New Europe and the United States (M = 2.35, SD = .84).
Dissimilar levels of anti-Americanism in Old Europe and New Europe are not mirrored
in their religiosity, as expressed in attitudes toward the impact spiritual leaders have on their
societies. While almost 60 percent of Europeans believe that the influence of religious leaders
has been ―bad‖ or ―very bad‖ for their countries, only 35 percent of Americans agree with this
point of view.
ii.

Crosstabulation results for the “Religion kept separate from government policy”
dependent variable are presented below in Table 7.5.2.
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TABLE 7.5.2: Religion kept separate from government policy
Please tell me whether you completely agree, mostly agree, mostly
disagree or completely disagree with it. Religion is a matter of personal
faith and should be kept separate from government policy.
Completely
agree
1

Neither
Mostly
Completely
agree, nor
disagree
disagree
disagree
4
5
3
64.1%
25.3%
1.9%
5.7%
3.0%
Old Europe
New Europe
67%
23.9%
3.1%
4.1%
1.9%
United States
55%
24.9%
1.6%
9.2%
9.3%
An initial independent-samples t-test showed that there is a moderately strong
relationship (t (4895) = 2.99, p ≤ .01**) between the region where the interview was conducted –
Old Europe (M = 1.58, SD = .99) and New Europe (M = 1.50, SD = .88) – and the respondent‘s
view on keeping religion out of governmental affairs. Region, as independent variable, gains
more explanatory power (t (2899) = -9.18, p ≤ .001***) when the interviews are conducted in
New Europe and the United States (M = 1.93, SD = 1.32). Old Europe and United States are
closer in their views on the separation between Church/religious beliefs and State/governmental
business. However, these differences are very small, with almost 90 percent of Europeans and 80
percent of Americans ―completely‖ or ―mostly‖ agreeing that religion is a matter of personal
faith and as such it should be kept separate from governmental policies.
iii.

Mostly agree
2

Crosstabulation results for the “Religion and morality” dependent variable are presented
below in Table 7.5.3.
TABLE 7.5.3: Religion and morality
Which one of these comes closest to your opinion, number 1 or number 2?

Number 1 – It is not necessary to believe
Number 2 – It is necessary to
in God in order to be moral and have
believe in God in order to be
good values
moral and have good values
1
2
76.5%
23.5%
Old Europe
New Europe
73.5%
26.5%
United States
41.8%
58.2%
Results from two chi-square tests of independence revealed that there are significant
distinctions between opinions on religion and morality in Old Europe compared to New Europe
(X² (1, N = 4759) = 5.47, p ≤ .05*) and in New Europe compared to the United States (X² (1, N
= 2847) = 278.92, p ≤ .001***). The analysis confirmed the existence of a fairly weak
religiosity divide between Old Europe and New Europe, and of a stronger one between New
Europe and the United States. Crosstabulation results show that larger percentages of
respondents from New Europe (27 percent) and United States (58 percent) than from Old Europe
(24 percent) believe that it is necessary to believe in God to have good, moral values. There is
more cultural similarity between New Europe and the United States, than between United States
and Old Europe regarding the relationship between faith and morality. It is also interesting to
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notice that compared to the PEW 2002 data, New Europe actually moved closer to Old Europe
than to the United States on this issue, with more respondents supporting the view that morality
can exist independent of religiosity.
iv.

Table 7.5.4 contains crosstabulation results for the “Prayer times” dependent variable.
TABLE 7.5.4: Prayer times
People practice their religion in different ways. Outside of attending
religious services, do you pray several times a day, once a day, a few times
a week, once a week or less, or never?
Several times a
Once a day
A few times a Once a week
Never
day
2
week
or less
5
1
3
4
6.1%
11.4%
9.1%
23.7%
49.8%
Old Europe
New Europe
8.7%
15.3%
7.5%
25.0%
43.6%
United States
36.6%
21.2%
15.1%
15.7%
11.4%
Two independent-samples t-test showed that there are significant differences (t (7589)
= 6.26, p ≤ .001***) in how often people pray in Old Europe (M = 3.99, SD = 1.26) and New
Europe (M = 3.79, SD = 1.36), as well as between United States (M = 2.44, SD = 1.40) and New
Europe (t (4648) = 32.84, p ≤ .001***). United States and New Europe are closer in their praying
habits than Old Europe and the U.S. are. However, it should also be noted that outside religious
services, Europeans pray a lot less than the Americans. 50 percent of respondents from Old
Europe and 47 percent from New Europe, compared to only 11 percent from United States, never
pray outside religious services.

v.

Crosstabulation results for the “Importance of religion” dependent variable are
presented below on Table 7.5.5.
TABLE 7.5.5: Importance of religion
How important is religion in your life – very important, somewhat
important, not too important, or not at all important?
Very important
Somewhat
Not too important
Not at all
1
important
3
important
2
4
16.8%
26.9%
24.0%
32.4%
Old Europe
New Europe
20.9%
28.8%
25.1%
25.2%
United States
56.4%
26.2%
9.0%
8.3%
Two independent-samples t-test showed that there are significant differences (t (7725)
= 6.69, p ≤ .001***) in the importance of religion for people in Old Europe (M = 2.72, SD =
1.08) and New Europe (M = 2.55, SD = 1.08), as well as between United States (M = 1.69, SD =
.94) and New Europe (t (4770) = 28.95, p ≤ .001***). New Europe and United States are closer
to each other in the how important religion is in people‘s lives than Old Europe and the U.S. are.
However, just like in the previous cases, Europeans in general are more secular than the
Americans. For example, over 50 percent of respondents from both Old and New Europe believe
that religion is ―not really important‖ or ―not important at all‖ in their lives, compared to less
than 20 percent of those from the United States.
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vi.

Conclusions
Analysis results measuring levels of religiosity in Old Europe, New Europe and the
United States using variables from the PEW 2007 survey database are summarized below in
Table 7.5.6.
TABLE 7.5.6: Levels of religiosity measured by variables from the PEW 2007 survey
database (codebook in Appendix 5)
Religious
Religion and Religion and Prayer times
Importance
leaders
government
morality
of religion
influence
kept separate
1.58**
X²=5.47*
3.99***
2.72***
Old Europe 2.67 ns
(.82)
(.99)
OE-NE
(1.26)
(1.08)
1.50**/***
X²=278.92*** 3.79***
2.55***
New Europe 2.71 ns/***
(.83)
(.88)
NE-US
(1.36)
(1.08)
1.93***
X²=278.92*** 2.44***
1.69***
United States 2.35 ***
(.84)
(1.32)
NE-US
(1.40)
(.94)
Notes: a) Old Europe – New Europe, and New Europe – United States differences are
significant at p ≤ .05. For ―New Europe‖ entry, first significance level refers to OE-NE
relationship, second one to NE-U.S. (when those two are different). b) p ≤ .05 *, p ≤ .01**, p ≤
.001***, ns = not significant
In general, Europeans are more secular than the Americans. New Europe and the United
States have closer levels of religiosity than Old Europe and the U.S. do when we measure the
importance of religion in people‘s lives, the number of times individuals pray outside religious
service and the relationship between morality and religion (although the differences between Old
and New Europe in the latter case are not extremely significant from a statistical point of view).
For 80 percent of Americans and less than 50 percent of Europeans religion is very important in
their lives. 37 percent of Americans compared to 6 percent of respondents from Old Europe and
9 percent from New Europe pray several times a day. 24 percent of those interviewed in Old
Europe, 27 from New Europe and 58 percent from the U.S. believe that it is necessary to believe
in God in order to be moral and have good values.
There are no significant distinctions between Old Europe and New Europe regarding
people‘s views on the influence of religious leaders in their societies, and in the case of the
separation between religion as a matter of personal faith and governmental policies, Old Europe
is actually closer to the U.S. than New Europe is. Less than 45 percent of Europeans compared to
65 percent of Americans see the influence of religious leaders in their societies as very good or
somewhat good. 67 percent of respondents from New Europe, 64 percent from Old Europe and
55 percent from the United States believe that religion is a matter of personal faith, and as such,
it should be kept separate from governmental policies.
7.6 . CONCLUSIONS
Findings from several statistical tests comparing means of religiosity levels in Old
Europe, New Europe and the United States are summarized below in Tables 7.6.1 to 7.6.5.
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TABLE 7.6.1: Levels of religiosity in Old Europe, New Europe and the United States as
measured by variables from the World Values Survey (codebook in Appendix 1)
Confidence
in churches
Old
Europe
New
Europe
United
States

2.60***
(.91)
2.07***/ns
(.98)
2.04 ns
(.89)

Religious
services
attendance
5.88***
(2.31)
4.24***/ns
(2.18)
4.12 ns
(2.62)

Church
answers social
problems
X²=96.01***
OE-NE
X²=31.23***
NE-US
X²=31.23***
NE-US

Religious faith
in children
X²=1576***
OE-NE
X²=95.74***
NE-US
X²=95.74***
NE-US

Secular
politicians

Religious
person

4.05***
(1.01)
3.20***/ns
(1.29)
3.14 ns
(1.34)

1.59***
(.66)
1.20***/*
(.48)
1.23*
(.46)

Church
and State
separation
2.14***
(1.15)
1.96***
(1.08)
2.77***
(1.34)

TABLE 7.6.2: Levels of religiosity as measured by variables from the Voice of the People –
Millennium Edition (codebook in Appendix 2)
Moments of
Religious beliefs
One true
Religious
prayer
religion
services
attendance
1.47***
2.08***
2.18***
4.99***
Old Europe
(.53)
(1.02)
(.81)
(2.02)
1.43***
1.92***
2.02***
4.33***
New Europe
(.55)
(.97)
(1.00)
(1.91)
1.13***
1.45***
1.87***
3.23***
United States
(.34)
(.69)
(.55)
(1.88)
TABLE 7.6.3: Levels of religiosity in Old Europe, New Europe and the United States as
measured by variables from the PEW 2002 survey database (codebook in Appendix 3)
Religion and
Importance of
Church and State
Religious leaders
morality
religion in life
separation
influence
X²=26.07*** 2.45*
1.41 ns
2.56 ns
Old Europe
OE-NE
(1.04)
(.70)
(.78)
X²=217.40*** 2.39*/***
1.41 ns/***
2.55 ns/***
New Europe
NE-US
(1.03)
(.67)
(.81)
X²=217.40*** 1.61***
1.69***
2.30***
United States
NE-US
(.88)
(.94)
(.79)
TABLE 7.6.4: Analysis results for levels of religiosity as measured by variables from the
2006 U.S. CID database (codebook in Appendix 4)
Personal religiosity
Religious services
Religious
attendance
homogeneity
4.95 ns
5.38***
2.95***
Old Europe
(2.93)
(1.55)
(1.06)
4.94 ns/***
4.99***
3.13***
New Europe
(3.04)
(1.63)
(1.02)
6.09***
4.55***
2.31***
United States
(2.59)
(1.61)
(.85)
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TABLE 7.6.5: Levels of religiosity measured by variables from the PEW 2007 survey
database (codebook in Appendix 5)
Religious
Religion and Religion and Prayer times
Importance
leaders
government
morality
of religion
influence
kept separate
1.58**
X²=5.47*
3.99***
2.72***
Old Europe 2.67 ns
(.82)
(.99)
OE-NE
(1.26)
(1.08)
1.50**/***
X²=278.92*** 3.79***
2.55***
New Europe 2.71 ns/***
(.83)
(.88)
NE-US
(1.36)
(1.08)
1.93***
X²=278.92*** 2.44***
1.69***
United States 2.35 ***
(.84)
(1.32)
NE-US
(1.40)
(.94)
Notes: a) Old Europe – New Europe, and New Europe – United States differences are
significant at p ≤ .05. For ―New Europe‖ entry, first significance level refers to OE-NE
relationship, second one to NE-U.S. (when those two are different). b) p ≤ .05 *, p ≤ .01**, p ≤
.001***, ns = not significant
Overall, Europeans are more secular than the Americans, and Old Europe is less devout
than New Europe. New Europe and the United States share several characteristics in matters of
faith and spirituality, especially when it comes to the importance of religion in people‘s lives,
how many times a person prays and/or attends church services and the role of religion and
religious leaders in governmental/political affairs.
At the beginning of the 21st century, New Europe (where levels of anti-Americanism are
relatively lower than in Old Europe) and the United States share similar, high levels of
religiosity, while Western Europe is much more secular. Americans and New Europeans are
more inclined than Old Europeans to see themselves as religious people, trust their churches and
ask them for answers to social problems, attend religious services fairly often and offer their
children a religious education. Respondents from New Europe tend to agree with the Americans
that politicians who do not believe in God are unfit for public office, but they also parallel their
Western European counterparts when it comes to views on the separation between Church and
State. A significantly larger percentage of European than American respondents agree that
religious leaders should not try to influence the national government‘s policies.
In 2000, a ―Voice of the People‖ survey finds Old Europe to be the most secular of the
three regions under investigation, with the highest percentage of respondents who do not go to
church, do not take time in their days to pray and do not believe in the existence of one true
religion or one personal God. United States is at the opposite end of the spectrum as the most
devout of the three. Americans pray a lot, attend religious services regularly, believe in the
existence of a personal God and identify themselves with a large array of religious beliefs. New
Europe falls somewhere in between these two extremes; this could provide an explanation for
why its levels of anti-Americanism are lower than those in Old Europe. Two years later, the
PEW survey discovers that Old Europe and New Europe have almost identical levels of
religiosity, even if the intensity of anti-American feelings in those two regions is very different.
Europe is more secular, and would like to keep religion out of the political and governmental
realm as much as possible, while for Americans faith plays a major role in their personal lives,
and they feel it should do the same in their public lives.
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In the second half of the first decade of the 21st century, statistical analysis results
measuring levels of religiosity in Old Europe, New Europe and the United States show that New
Europe is more similar to United States than Old Europe is terms of religious service attendance.
In other aspects of religiosity Europeans see themselves as more secular, independent of which
region of the continent they inhabit, than the Americans. Respondents from Old Europe are
closer than those in New Europe, in their positive views of religious homogeneity, to the
Americans. In 2007, another PEW surveys finds Europeans to be still more secular than the
Americans. New Europe and the United States have closer levels of religiosity than Old Europe
and the U.S. do regarding importance of religion in people‘s lives, the number of times
individuals pray outside religious service and the relationship between morality and religion.
There are however no significant distinctions between Old Europe and New Europe on the
subject of the influence of religious leaders in their societies, and in the case of the separation
between religion as a matter of personal faith and governmental policies, Old Europe is actually
closer to the U.S. than New Europe is.
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CHAPTER 8 – TRADE, TRAVEL, THE MIDDLE EAST AND THE
ENVIRONMENT: ALTERNATIVE THEORIES AND A MULTIVARIATE
REGRESSION ANALYSIS
This chapter covers the empirical analysis of the relationship between several variables
other than tolerance and religiosity variables, and anti-Americanism. My tenth hypothesis states
that besides cultural values, there are several other factors that might play a role in levels of antiAmericanism: the strength of economic ties between country X and the United States, an
individual‘s support for the Palestinians, the frequency of his/her travels to the U.S., interest in
environmental issues as well as a desire to see American troops out of Iraq and Afghanistan as
soon as possible.
Hypothesis 10 (alternative economic explanation): There is a positive correlation
between high levels of anti-Americanism and weak trade ties, low number of travels to the U.S.,
positive support for the Palestinians, interest in environmentally-friendly policies and desire to
see American troops leaving Iraq as soon as possible.
8.1 . MULTIVARIATE REGRESSION ANALYSIS: DATA AND METHODS
PEW 2002 and PEW 2007 are the two databases used for the multivariate regression
analysis, as they contain almost all the elements used in this empirical analysis: trade, travel,
U.S. foreign policies towards Israel and towards the environment, cultural similarity (tolerance
towards women, immigrants/foreign workers and homosexuals), religiosity and antiAmericanism. The 2002 survey was conducted in 44 countries, 8 of which are part of the final
database used here: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Italy, Poland, Slovak Republic
and Great Britain.
The 2007 survey was conducted in over 50 countries, including several from Old and
New Europe: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Poland, Slovakia,
Spain and Sweden. In Britain, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Slovakia, and Sweden, the
questionnaire was split into two forms, each of which was administered to approximately onehalf of the sample. In these countries, most questions were assigned to one form or another. Two
separate databases were created for each of these two forms, to minimize the risk of having
information lost during the regression analysis.
According to Hypothesis 10, the more a respondent believes U.S. foreign policies in the
Middle East favor the state of Israel, the higher his/her levels of anti-Americanism. Variables
from the PEW 2002 database used to measure Europe‘s views of America‘s involvement in the
Palestinian problem were re-coded so they would reflect a scale of pro-Palestinian feelings. For
example, one of the questions asked: ―What's your opinion of U.S. policies in the Middle East –
would you say they are fair or do they favor Israel too much or do they favor the Palestinians too
much?‖ Initially, the answers were coded: 1 (Fair), 2 (Favor Israel) and 3 (Favor Palestinians). I
re-coded them as follows: 1 (Favor Israel), 2 (Fair) and 3 (Favor Palestinians), so they would
reflect an incremental positive attitude towards the Palestinians.
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8.2 . CULTURAL SIMILARITY, RELIGION, TRADE, TRAVEL, THE MIDDLE
EAST, THE ENVIRONMENT AND ANTI-AMERICANISM: A MULTIVARIATE
ANALYSIS RESULTS
8.2.1. PEW 2002
Two standard linear regression analyses were conducted using ―Opinion of United
States‖ and ―Opinion of Americans‖ as dependent variables. Table 8.2.1.1 presents the wording
and the coding of each of the 13 independent variables from the PEW 2002 database used in
these two regression analyses, as well as the two dependent variables.
TABLE 8.2.1.1: PEW 2002 variables – wording and measurement scales
Scale
Scale
Scale
Scale
Variable

1

2

3

4

Immigration problem

Very big
problem

Moderately big
problem

Small
problem

Not a
problem at
all

Most people are
better off in a free
market economy,
even though some
people are rich and
some are poor.

Completely
agree

Mostly agree

Mostly
disagree

Completely
disagree

Religious leaders
influence

Very good

Somewhat
good

Somewhat
bad

Very bad

Immigrants influence

Very good

Somewhat
good

Somewhat
bad

Very bad

Religion is a matter
of personal faith and
should be kept
separate from
government policy?

Completely
agree

Mostly agree

Mostly
disagree

Completely
disagree

We should restrict
and control entry of
people into our
country more than we
do now.

Completely
agree

Mostly agree

Mostly
disagree

Completely
disagree
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Scale
5

Table continued.
Scale

Scale

Scale

Scale

Scale

Variable

1

2

3

4

5

What kind of
marriage do you
think is the more
satisfying way of life?

Husband
provides for
family, wife
cares for house
and kids

Both have jobs
& take care of
house and
children

Which one of these
statements about
belief in God comes
closest to your
opinion?

Not necessary
to believe in
God to be
moral/have
good values

Necessary to
believe in God
to be
moral/have
good values

Which one of these
statements about
homosexuality comes
closer to your
opinion?

Homosexuality- Homosexualityway of life
way of life
society should
society should
accept
not accept

What is your opinion
of the United States?

Very favorable

Somewhat
favorable

Somewhat
Very
unfavorable unfavorable

What is your opinion
of Americans?

Very favorable

Somewhat
favorable

Somewhat
Very
unfavorable unfavorable

Have you ever
traveled to the U.S.?

Yes

No

Outside of attending
religious services, do
you pray several
times a day, once a
day, a few times a
week, once a week or
less, or never?

Several times a
day

Once a day

A few
times a
week

Once a
week or
less

How important is
religion in your life?

Very important

Somewhat
important

Not too
important

Not at all
important

Region

Old Europe

New Europe
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Never

Table 8.2.1.2 shows the results of the linear regression analyzing the relationship between
anti-Americanism, as expressed in opinions of the United States, and cultural similarity, trade,
travel, and support for free market. Anti-Americanism is measured by looking at opinions of the
United States, a variable coded on a scale from 1 (very favorable) to 4 (very unfavorable).
TABLE 8.2.1.2: PEW 2002 database regression results with “Opinion of United States” as
dependent variable (F (14, 2834 = 8.45, R² = .040)
B
Std. Error
Beta
t
Sig.
Old Europe vs. New Europe

-.185

.061

-.109

-3.007

.003**

Immigration problem

-.010

.019

-.012

-.552

.581 ns

Stricter immigration laws

.008

.018

.010

.467

.641 ns

Immigrants influence

.030

.021

.029

1.393

.164 ns

Religious leaders influence

.049

.020

.051

2.435

.015*

Religion separate from state

.019

.019

.018

.960

.337 ns

God and Morality

.005

.038

.003

.134

.894 ns

Times of prayer

-.053

.016

-.094

-3.414

.001***

Religion importance in life

.115

.022

.148

5.127

.000***

Marriage

.013

.038

.007

.350

.726 ns

Homosexuality

.026

.038

.014

.677

.498 ns

Trade

-.009

.024

-.014

-.397

.692 ns

Travel

.143

.045

.063

3.172

.002**

Free Market

.079

.017

.087

4.665

.000***

Note: p ≤ .05*, p ≤ .01**, p ≤ .001***, p ˃ .05 not significant (ns).
Regression analysis revealed that the overall model significantly predicted levels of antiAmericanism in Europe, F (14, 2834) = 8.45, p ≤ .001***. R² for the model was .040 and
adjusted R² was .036. Table 8.2.1.2 displays the un-standardized regression coefficients (B) and
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standard error (Std. Error), the standardized coefficient Beta, as well as the t value and the level
of significance p. In terms of individual relationships between the independent variables and
anti-Americanism, influence of religious leaders (t = 2.43, p ≤ .05*), times of prayer (t = -3.41, p
≤ .001***), importance of religion (t = 5.12, p ≤ .001***) are the only three variables pertaining
to cultural similarity that have significantly predicted levels of anti-Americanism. Two additional
control variables –travel (t = 3.17, p ≤ .01**) and attitudes towards free markets (t = 4.66, p ≤
.001***) are also significantly related to anti-American attitudes, while no significant
relationship was discovered between attitudes towards immigrants, women and homosexuals and
feelings towards the United States. The Old Europe – New Europe regional divide maintains its
significant impact on levels of anti-Americanism (t = -3.00, p ≤ .01**).
“Opinion of Americans” is used as a dependent variable in a second multiple regression,
with the same 13 variable presented above selected as independent variables. Analysis results are
presented in Table 8.2.1.3.
TABLE 8.2.1.3: PEW 2002 database regression results with “Opinion of Americans” as
dependent variable (F (14, 2810) = 7.32, R² = .035)
B
Std. Error
Beta
t
Sig.
Old Europe vs. New Europe

-.203

.057

-.129

-3.539

.000***

Immigration problem

-.013

.018

-.016

-.722

.470 ns

Stricter immigration laws

-.006

.017

-.008

-.354

.723 ns

Immigrants influence

.015

.020

.016

.760

.447 ns

Religious leaders influence

.076

.019

.085

4.072

.000***

Religion separate from state

.012

.018

.013

.659

.510 ns

God and Morality

-.021

.036

-.013

-.594

.553 ns

Times of prayer

-.059

.015

-.111

-3.988

.000***

Religion importance in life

.101

.021

.141

4.819

.000***

Marriage

.029

.035

.016

.818

.413 ns

Homosexuality

.067

.035

.040

1.902

.057 ns
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B

Std. Error

Beta

t

Sig.

Trade

-.054

.022

-.089

-2.454

.014*

Travel

.111

.042

.052

2.620

.009**

Free Market

.050

.016

.059

3.128

.002**

Note: a) p ≤ .05*, p ≤ .01**, p ≤ .001***, p ˃ .05 not significant (ns).
b) An ordered probit analysis was also conducted using the same independent and
dependent variables and its results supported the findings in the table above.
This second regression analysis revealed that the overall model significantly predicted
levels of anti-Americanism in Europe, F (14, 2810) = 7.32, p ≤ .001***. R² for the model was
.035 and adjusted R² was .031 (smaller values that in the previous case). Table 8.2.1.3 displays
the un-standardized regression coefficients (B) and standard error (Std. Error), the standardized
coefficient Beta, as well as the t value and the level of significance p. In terms of individual
relationships between the independent variables and anti-Americanism, influence of religious
leaders is still statistically significant (t = 4.07, p ≤ .001***). Frequency of prayer times (t = 3.98 p ≤ .001***) and the importance of religion (t = 4.81, p ≤ .001***) also maintain their
strong explanatory power. Three of the additional control variables – trade (t = -2.45, p ≤ .05*),
travel (t = 2.62, p ≤ .01**) and attitudes towards free markets (t = 3.12, p ≤ .01**) have been
found to be significantly related to anti-American attitudes, while no significant relationship was
discovered between attitudes towards immigrants, women and homosexuals and feelings towards
the American people. The Old Europe – New Europe regional divide is also shown to have a
significant impact on levels of anti-Americanism (t = 3.53, p ≤ .001***).
To summarize these findings, there is a slight difference in the factors influencing
Europe‘s views on the United States and the American government, compared to feelings
towards the American people, although in both cases stronger anti-Americans are correlated with
lower levels of religiosity, support for free markets and not having travelled to the United States.
The main difference comes from the ―religious leaders influence‖ independent variable.
Europeans who believe that religious leaders have too much influence in their countries (an issue
related to the separation between Church and State) are more likely to dislike the United States
government, but not the American people in general. This suggests that these respondents, while
unhappy with how the U.S. government responds to pressures from the faith-based community,
believe that this intermingling of secular and religious affairs does not negatively reflect upon the
majority of the American people. These results have also shown that there is a strong
correlation between the regions where the interview was conducted (Old Europe vs. New
Europe) and opinions of the United States and of Americans, with Old Europe having
higher levels of anti-Americanism than New Europe.
8.2.2. PEW 2007 – FORM A
Two standard multiple regression analyses were conducted using ―Opinion of United
States‖ and ―Opinion of Americans‖ as dependent variables for the PEW 2007 Form A. Table
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8.2.2.1 presents the wording and the coding of each of the independent variables from the PEW
2007 database used in these regression analyses, as well as the two dependent variables. A and B
next to the variable tell the reader in which of the two PEW 2007 questionnaires that information
can be found.
TABLE 8.2.2.1: PEW 2007 (Form A) variables – wording and measurement scales
Scale
Scale
Scale
Scale
Scale
Variable

1

2

3

4

Religious leaders
influence

Very good

Somewhat
good

Somewhat
bad

Very bad

Which one of these
statements about
belief in God comes
closest to your
opinion?

Not necessary
to believe in
God to be
moral/have
good values

Necessary to
believe in God
to be
moral/have
good values

How often do you
pray outside religious
services?

Several times a
day

Once a day

A few
times a
week

Once a
week or
less

How important is
religion in your life?

Very important

Somewhat
important

Not too
important

Not at all
important

Immigrants influence

Very good

Somewhat
good

Somewhat
bad

Very bad

Opinion on women as
political leaders

Men generally
make better
political leaders
than women

In general,
women and
men make
equally good
political leaders

Women
generally
make better
political
leaders
than men

Which one of these
statements about
homosexuality comes
closer to your
opinion?

Homosexuality- Homosexualityway of life
way of life
society should
society should
accept
not accept
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5

Never

Table continued.
Scale

Scale

Scale

Scale

Scale

Variable

1

2

3

4

5

Do you think the U.S.
should keep military
troops in Iraq until
the situation has
stabilized, or do you
think the U.S. should
remove its troops as
soon as possible?

Keep troops in
Iraq

Remove its
troops

What's your opinion
of U.S. policies in the
Middle East?

Favor Israel

Fair

What is your opinion
of the United States?

Very favorable

Somewhat
favorable

Somewhat
Very
unfavorable unfavorable

What is your opinion
of Americans?

Very favorable

Somewhat
favorable

Somewhat
Very
unfavorable unfavorable

Have you ever
traveled to the U.S.?

Yes

No

Region

Old Europe

New Europe

Favor
Palestinians

The first regression analysis for the PEW 2007 – Form A database revealed that the
overall model significantly predicted levels of anti-Americanism in Europe, F (12, 2507) =
30.56, p ≤ .001***. R² for the model was .128 and adjusted R² was .124. Table 8.2.2.1 presents
the un-standardized regression coefficients (B) and standard error (Std. Error), the standardized
coefficient Beta, as well as the t value and the alpha level of significance.
TABLE 8.2.2.2: PEW 2007 Form A database regression results with “Opinion of United
States” as dependent variable (F (12, 2507) = 30.56, R² = .128)
B
Std. Error
Beta
t
Sig.
Old Europe vs. New Europe

-.139

.040

-.076

-3.510

.000***

Religious leaders influence

.142

.021

.140

6.839

.000***
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Table continued.
B

Std. Error

Beta

t

Sig.

God and Morality

-.054

.042

-.027

-1.287

.198 ns

Prayer

-.019

.017

-.029

-1.113

.266 ns

Importance of religion

.047

.021

.061

2.216

.027*

Immigrants influence

-.020

.021

-.018

-.950

.342 ns

Women as political leaders

.102

.034

.057

3.022

.003**

Homosexuality

-.077

.040

-.038

-1.919

.055 ns

U.S. troops in Iraq

.395

.034

.222

11.722

.000***

U.S. Middle East policies

-.127

.027

-.092

-4.789

.000***

Travel

.284

.042

.137

6.827

.000**

Trade

.027

.019

.031

1.402

.161 ns

Note: a) p ≤ .05*, p ≤ .01**, p ≤ .001***, p ˃ .05 not significant (ns).
b) An ordered probit analysis was also conducted using the same independent and
dependent variables and its results supported the findings in the table above.
In terms of individual relationships between the independent variables and antiAmericanism, the only variables pertaining to the cultural similarity theory (as described in the
previous chapters) that have significantly predicted levels of anti-Americanism are: 1) influence
of religious leaders (t = 6.83, p ≤ .001***), 2) importance of religion (t = 2.21, p ≤ .05*), and 3)
opinions on women as political leaders (t = 3.02, p ≤ .01**). The three additional control
variables - travel (t = 6.82, p ≤ .01**) and attitudes towards U.S. policies in the Middle East both on the topics of Iraq (t = 11.72, p ≤ .001***) and Israel (t = -4.78, p ≤ .001***) - are also
related to anti-American attitudes, while no significant relationship was discovered between
attitudes towards homosexuals and immigrants, beliefs regarding the relationship between faith
and morality, frequency of prayers, and feelings towards the United States. The Old Europe –
New Europe geographical divide is, in this model, significantly related to levels of antiAmericanism (t = -3.51, p ≤ .001***).
A second multiple regression was conducted to analyze the relationship between the same
independent variables mentioned above, and anti-Americanism as measured by opinions on
Americans. Results have shown that this model also holds significant overall explanatory
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strength (F (12, 2458) = 15.76, p ≤ .001***), with an R² value of .072 and adjusted R² of .067.
The coefficients for the individual relationships between the dependent variable – opinion of
Americans – and each of the 11 independent variables is presented below in Table 8.2.2.3.
TABLE 8.2.2.3: PEW 2007 Form A database regression results with “Opinion of
Americans” as dependent variable (F (12, 2458) = 15.76, R² = .070)
B
Std. Error
Beta
t
Sig.
Old Europe vs. New Europe

-.081

.037

-.049

-2.161

.031*

Religious leaders influence

.098

.020

.107

5.008

.000**

God and Morality

.033

.039

.018

.831

.406 ns

Prayer

-.007

.016

-.012

-.449

.653 ns

Importance of religion

.039

.020

.056

1.978

.048*

Immigrants influence

.067

.020

.069

3.396

.001***

Women as political leaders

.005

.032

.003

.145

.885 ns

Homosexuality

-.022

.038

-.012

-.585

.559 ns

U.S. troops in Iraq

.232

.032

.144

7.326

.000***

U.S. Middle East policies

-.036

.025

-.029

-1.447

.148 ns

Travel

.228

.039

.121

5.808

.000***

Trade

-.058

.018

-.074

-3.190

.001***

Note: a) p ≤ .05*, p ≤ .01**, p ≤ .001***, p ˃ .05 not significant (ns).
b) An ordered probit analysis was also conducted using the same independent and
dependent variables and its results supported the findings in the table above.
These results revealed that, unlike the previous model, there is no significant correlation
between levels of anti-Americanism as measured by opinions of the American people, and views
on women in a position of political leadership, homosexuals and the U.S. involvement in the
Palestinian problem. There is also no noticeable relationship between anti-Americanism, the
frequency of prayer times and the belief that faith and morality. This model uncovered an
interesting difference in the strength of the correlation between attitudes towards immigrants and
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anti-Americanism when the targets of this anti-Americanism are the U.S. government and the
American people. If in the former case, there is no correlation, while in the latter, we can notice a
statistically significant relationship (t = 3.39, p ≤ .001***). Two other elements of the cultural
similarity theory, the influence of religious leaders (t = 5.00, p ≤ .001***) and the importance of
religion in a person‘s life (t = 1.97, p ≤ .05*) are both predicting levels of anti-Americanism, as
do three of the control variables: trade (t = -3.19, p≤.001***), travel to the U.S. (t = 5.80, p ≤
.001***) and views on the war in Iraq (t = 7.32, p ≤ .001***). The Old Europe – New Europe
distinction also maintained its explanatory power, although the correlation between this
variable and opinions of Americans is weaker than in the case of feelings towards the United
States (t = -2.16, p ≤ .05*).
8.2.3. PEW 2007 – FORM B
―Opinion of the United States‖ and ―opinion of Americans‖ were used as dependent
variables for two sets of multiple regressions analyzing the correlation between antiAmericanism in Europe and seven independent variables that were not captured by Form A of
the PEW 2007 questionnaire: aspects of cultural similarity (tolerance towards women and
immigrants, and the separation between Church and States), as well as opinions on American
President George W. Bush, the necessity of protecting the environment and the benefits of free
market. Table 8.2.3.1 presents the wording and the coding for each of these nine variables.
TABLE 8.2.3.1: PEW 2007 (Form B) variables – wording and measurement scales
Scale
Scale
Scale
Scale
Variable

1

2

3

4

Most people are better
off in a free market
economy, even though
some people are rich
and some are poor.

Completely agree

Mostly agree

Mostly
disagree

Completely
disagree

Protecting the
environment should be
given priority, even if it
causes slower economic
growth and some loss of
jobs.

Completely agree

Mostly agree

Mostly
disagree

Completely
disagree

Religion is a matter of
personal faith and
should be kept separate
from government
policy?

Completely agree

Mostly agree

Mostly
disagree

Completely
disagree
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Table continued.
Scale

Scale

Scale

Scale

Variable

1

2

3

4

We should restrict and
control entry of people
into our country more
than we do now.

Completely agree

Mostly agree

Mostly
disagree

Completely
disagree

Which one of the
following statements
comes closest to your
opinion about educating
children?

It is more
important for
boys than for
girls

It is equally
important for
girls and boys

It is more
important for
girls than for
boys

How much confidence
you have in U.S.
President George W.
Bush to do the right
thing regarding world
affairs?

A lot of
confidence

Some confidence

Not too
much
confidence

No
confidence at
all

In your view, is global
warming a very serious
problem, somewhat
serious, not too serious,
or not a problem?

Very serious

Somewhat
serious

Not too
serious

Not a
problem

What is your opinion of
the United States?

Very favorable

Somewhat
favorable

Somewhat
unfavorable

Very
unfavorable

What is your opinion of
Americans?

Very favorable

Somewhat
favorable

Somewhat
unfavorable

Very
unfavorable

Region

Old Europe

New Europe

Overall, these eight predictors from Form B of the PEW 2007 survey questionnaires
explain a sizable proportion of variance (R² = .261, F (8, 4030) = 177.50, p ≤ .001***) in levels
of anti-Americanism as measured by attitudes towards the United States. Table 8.2.3.2
displays the standardized and unstandardized coefficients for the individual relationships
between each of the independent variables and the dependent variable.

118

TABLE 8.2.3.2: PEW 2007 Form B database regression results with “Opinion of United
States” as dependent variable (F (8, 4030 = 177.50, R² = .261)
B
Std. Error
Beta
t
Sig.
Old Europe vs. New Europe

-.001

.024

-.001

-.049

.961 ns

Free market

.075

.013

.080

5.743

.000***

Protecting the environment

-.006

.014

-.007

-.466

.641 ns

Religion as a personal matter

-.006

.016

-.005

-.347

.729 ns

Stricter immigration laws

-.002

.012

-.002

-.169

.866 ns

Education for boys and girls

.037

.071

.007

.527

.598 ns

Opinions on George W. Bush

.464

.013

.488

34.592

.000***

Global warming - problem

-.039

.017

-.032

-2.255

.024*

Note: a) p ≤ .05*, p ≤ .01**, p ≤ .001***, p ˃ .05 not significant (ns).
b) An ordered probit analysis was also conducted using the same independent and
dependent variables and its results supported the findings in the table above.
The only three independent variables having a significant predictor strength are views on
the benefits of free market (t = 5.74, p ≤ .001***), on George W. Bush‘s capacity to handle
world affairs (t = 34.59, p ≤ .001***) and on the seriousness of the global warming problem (t =
-2.25, p ≤ .05*). More negative views of the United States are correlated with negative views of
former President George W. Bush, negative views of the benefits of free markets and belief in
the seriousness of the global warming problem. The other factors, including beliefs about the
separation between State and Church and the importance of education for boys and girls, or the
Old Europe – New Europe divide, do not appear to have a strong relationship with a
respondent‘s opinions on the United States.
The results from a second regression using “opinions on Americans” as the dependent
variable are presented below in Table 8.2.3.3.
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TABLE 8.2.3.3: PEW 2007 Form B database regression results with “Opinion of
Americans” as dependent variable (F (8, 3962) = 64.57, R² = .116)
B
Std. Error
Beta
t
Sig.
Old Europe vs. New Europe

.147

.024

.092

5.999

.000***

Free market

.039

.013

.045

2.895

.004**

Protecting the environment

.035

.014

.038

2.443

.015*

Religion as a personal matter

.035

.016

.033

2.169

.030*

Stricter immigration laws

-.056

.012

-.071

-4.696

.000***

Education for boys and girls

-.031

.072

-.006

-.427

.670 ns

Opinions on George W. Bush

.291

.014

.330

21.145

.000***

Global warming - problem

-.008

.018

-.007

-.457

.647 ns

Note: p ≤ .05*, p ≤ .01**, p ≤ .001***, p ˃ .05 not significant (ns).
The explanatory strength of this second regression model is slightly weaker than the one
using opinions of the United States as dependent variable (R² = .116, and the adjusted R² = .114).
It would seem that Europeans interviewed using Form B of the PEW 2007 questionnaire saw a
clearer relationship between these eight independent variables and the American people, than in
the previous example. Trust in the benefits of free market (t = 2.89, p ≤ .01**) and opinions on
American President George W. Bush‘s ability to handle international affairs (t = 21.14, p ≤
.001***) maintained their strong explanatory power, when the focus of anti-Americanism
changes from the U.S. government to the American people. The two variables looking at
environmental attitudes are changing places compared to the previous model: views on the
seriousness of global warming problems are not significantly related to attitudes towards the
Americans, while those on protecting the environment even if it means job loss are (t = 2.44, p ≤
.05*). Two aspect of cultural similarity, tolerance towards immigrants (t = -4.69, p ≤ .001***)
and the separation between Church and State (t = 2.16, p ≤ .05*) are significantly related to
opinions on Americans even if they do not appear to have a relevant impact on anti-Americanism
as measured by views of the United States. The Old Europe – New Europe divide also shows a
strong effect on opinions of the Americans, although not in the direction previously observed (t =
5.99, p ≤ .001***). A second regression analysis showed that once we remove the ―George W.
Bush‖ variable, the European divide in anti-Americanism returns to its original characteristic,
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with Old Europe exhibiting higher levels of anti-Americanism than New Europe (see Appendix 9
for complete results). This suggests that when they focus their anti-Americanism on just one
person (George W. Bush), Old Europeans might be more inclined to see the rest of the
Americans in a positive light.
8.3 . CONCLUSIONS
Multiple regression results from the PEW 2002 and PEW 2007 have offered moderate
support for the cultural similarity theory which argues that there is a relationship between
cultural similarity (tolerance and religiosity levels) and anti-Americanism, even when we control
for additional factors such as direct contact with the American society through trade and travel,
views on American President George W. Bush and his government‘s policies towards Israel, Iraq
and the environment. In general, factors significantly correlated with anti-Americanism
maintained their explanatory strength for both its facets: opinions on the United States (the
government) and opinions on the American people.
Each of the databases containing the trade per GDP ratio showed a significant correlation
between trade dependence and anti-Americanism. In each case, an increase in the strength of a
respondent‘s trade ties with the United States was matched by an increase in levels of antiAmericanism, which contradicts the modernization theory assumption that increased economic
contact between society breeds friendship. On the other hand, more direct contact with the
American society through travel to the United States is negatively correlated with antiAmericanism: respondents who have traveled to the U.S. are less anti-American than those who
haven‘t.
Results have also shown that America‘s image in Europe is positively correlated with
support for a free market economy. In both 2002 and 2007 databases, those respondents who
believe that most people are better off in a free market economy, even though some people are
poor and some are rich are also more like to exhibit friendlier attitudes towards the U.S.
government and the American people. Positive views on how capable American President
George W. Bush is to handle international affairs, as well as his policies towards Israel and the
deployment of troops in Iraq are all correlated with negative feelings towards the U.S.
government. Europeans who have a lot of confidence in George W. Bush to do the right thing
regarding world affair and who also think that the U.S. should keep military troops in Iraq until
the situation has stabilized are more likely to have favorable views of the United States
government, as well as of the American people. Those respondents who perceive U.S. policies in
the Middle East conflict to favor Israel are more inclined to have negative opinions only of the
United States and not the American people.
One of the two PEW 2007 questionnaires also asked several questions about
environmental issues. The two selected for this analysis are about the benefits of environmental
protection even when it hurts the economy, and the seriousness of global warming problems. The
results of the two multiple regression analyses are somewhat puzzling: Europeans who believe
that global warming is a serious problem are slightly more likely to harbor negative feelings
towards the U.S. government, but not the American people, which would suggest that they do
not agree with the way the Bush government was dealing at the time with the issues of global
warming. On the other hand, the variable measuring a respondent‘s willingness to support
environmental protective measures even if they negatively affect their economies is positively
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correlated with just opinions of the Americans, and not with opinions of the U.S. More support
for the environment, in this case, translates into more favorable views of the American people,
which would suggest that although Europeans disagree with the U.S. government‘s handling of
environmental affairs, they also believe in the pro-environment propensities of the general public
in America.
Returning to the cultural similarity theory, we notice a strong correlation between two of
the independent variables measuring various aspects of religiosity and levels of antiAmericanism. In both PEW 2002 and PEW 2002 surveys, respondents who see the influence of
religious leaders in their societies as a positive one and for whom religions is very important in
their lives are more likely to have favorable opinions of the U.S. government and the American
people. Views on the relationship between faith and morality are not a significant predictor of
anti-Americanism in any of the databases used in this chapter, while the frequency of prayer
times is significantly correlated with anti-Americanism only in the 2002 survey (the more you
pray the more pro-American you are). The belief that religion is a matter of personal faith and
should be kept separate from government policy has a strong influence on opinions of the
American people only in the PEW 2007 which would suggest that five years prior, Europeans
did not see the Americans as trying to bring faith into politics as much as in 2007.
Tolerance towards immigrants and views on women as political leaders are correlated
with anti-Americanism only in the 2007 survey, which comes as no surprise if we think about the
heightened tensions regarding these issues in the United States towards the end of George W.
Bush‘s second term in office. While at the beginning of his Presidency Americans were mostly
concerned about the response to the 9/11 attacks, the debates regarding illegal immigration, gay
marriage, abortion and a woman‘s place in the political realm (topic made visible by Hillary
Clinton‘s much publicized Presidential campaign) became much more heated the closer we got
to the 2008 general elections. In general, Europeans who believe that men and women make
equally good political leaders are slightly more likely to have negative opinions of the United
States government, but not of the American people. The opposite is true for tolerance towards
immigrants: respondents who argued that the influence of immigrants in their societies is either
very good or somewhat good were more likely to have favorable and somewhat favorable
opinions of the American people (without any significant impact on levels of anti-Americanism
as measured by attitudes towards the American government), which would again suggest that in
certain cases Europeans dislike for certain policies of the Bush administration did not extend to
the Americans in general.
The Old Europe – New Europe geographical divide maintained its explanatory strength
even when we control for all the factors mentioned above. New Europe has more positive views
on the United States and on the American people than does Old Europe. Chapter IX looks at two
countries, one from Old Europe – France, and one from New Europe – Romania, and the reasons
behind their very different levels of anti-Americanism. This concludes the general empirical
analysis of various aspects of Europe‘s attitudes towards America, including elements of cultural
similarity, policy-driven feelings directed at the U.S., as well as direct economic and personal
contact with the United States and with the American people.
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CHAPTER 9 – FRANCE AND ROMANIA: A TALE OF TWO ANTIAMERICANISMS
9.1.

FRANCE AND ROMANIA – A SIX-HUNDRED YEARS OLD FRIENDSHIP

Romania was recognized in 2006 by France as one of the most francophone countries in
the world, when it became the first ―New European‖ country to host the 11th Francophone
World Summit. There is a special department in the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs
dedicated to the country‘s francophone connections. France was Romania‘s strongest supporter
in its bid for EU membership. During Romania‘s Communist years, the two foreign languages
taught in Romanian schools were Russian and French. Taking all these things into account, one
might expect Romania to follow France‘s lead in European anti-Americanism. And one would be
wrong. Romania is one of the most pro-American countries in Europe, while France is one of the
most anti-American. This chapter explores the reasons behind these different levels of antiAmericanism, using information from the World Values Survey, as well as the 2005
Eurobarometer. This data paints a picture that reflects the general Old Europe – New Europe
findings from the previous chapters: Romania is more culturally similar to the U.S. than France
is in terms of their levels of religiosity and tolerance towards women, homosexuals and
immigrant/foreign workers. This section will present a short historical background of the
relationship between France and its francophone little sister, Romania.
Romanian children have learned for at least the last twenty years that one of the first
interactions between France and Romania dates back to 1300s, when Burgundy knights under the
command of Jean de Nevers came and fought against the Turks alongside famous Romanian
prince Mircea cel Batran. A century later, the French-Romanian anti-Ottoman alliance was
renewed by Moldavian princes from the Movilesti family (Berindei 1967). For the next three
hundred years, these interactions intensified, as the French kings had begun to see Romania‘s
geostrategic value as a first defense bastion for Christian Europe in the face of the increased
power of the Ottoman Empire. French emissaries were sent to all three Romanian princely
courts, and young Romanian boyars started to journey to Paris, in what turns out to be the
beginning of a long cultural friendship between the two countries. In the 19th century, as well as
after World War I, the cream of the Romanian intelligentsia traveled to Paris and was heavily
influenced by French culture. Mihai Eminescu (Romania‘s national poet), Brancusi (one of the
world‘s most illustrious sculptors), philosophers Eliade and Cioran, as well as one of the most
influential play writers of the Theatre of the Absurd and Member of the French Academy Eugen
Ionescu, are just a few of those who have strengthened Romania‘s francophone character (Eliade
1982). Romania‘s penal code was fashioned from the French Napoleonic code, and there are
currently French cultural centers all across Romania run by the French embassy to support of
their francophone ties. The Francophone International Organization has an office in Bucharest
that supervises francophone activities in all Eastern and Central European countries. The
Francophone Office of Higher Education has been operating in a similar fashion since 1994 and
there are over 25 Romanian universities that have dual-degrees programs with French colleges (
(Ambassade de France en Roumanie n.d.).
It is also true that in the 21st century, the relationships between these two countries have
experienced several tense moments. After President Jacques Chirac‘s strong support for
Romania‘s EU membership and the opening of Europe‘s borders to Romanians in search for
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better economic opportunities, tensions arose when a massive influx of Roma settled in France.
Perceived as criminal elements in some circles of French politics, Roma became the target of a
government-supported deportation campaign initiated in 2010 by then French President Nicholas
Sarkozy. Although this attempt to send the Roma back to Romanian (and Bulgaria) has so far
been fairly unsuccessful, it has temporarily strained the otherwise amicable relationship between
the two countries.
But Roma are not the only source of tension in this six-hundred years old friendship.
Romania‘s support for the war in Iraq has caused former French President Jacques Chirac
(quoted here by Graff (2003)) to call it ―not very well behaved and rather reckless.‖ He
continued by telling Romanians that they ―missed a good opportunity to keep quiet‖ and that ―if
they wanted to reduce their chances of joining Europe, they could not have found a better way‖
(Graff 2003). Romania‘s pro-Americanism has been over the years a constant source of irritation
for the French government, and the next section presents a short overview on France‘s own
complicated relationship with the United States over the last two hundred years.
9.2.

FRANCE AND THE UNITED STATES – “ARE AMERICAN DOGS REALLY
BARKING?”

France and the United States have never been at war with each other, at least not
officially. Which is part of the reason why, on a trip to Paris in 1999 (during the American
bombing of Belgrade), I was very surprised to engage in a rather animated conversation with one
of the guides at the War Museum - Musée de l'Armée – about French-American military
relations. The reason this conversation started was because at the time I was translating from
French to English to one my American friends. Our guide took exception to that, and asked me
first if my friend was American. He then decided to stop the tour, to ask me if I was not ashamed
to be friends with one of these ―imperialists keeling innocent people.‖ I blame the rest of the
incident on my temper: I retorted that he, of all people, should be grateful for America‘s help
during World War II, or he would be speaking German now. It turns out that was not the right
thing to say, as I was told in English by this guide at the French National Military Museum that
France was doing just fine during WW II, and that it didn‘t really need any help from a country
that ―never won a war in its history.‖ Instead of just dropping the conversation (and to my
friend‘s despair) I proceeded to point out that at least the Americans didn‘t build a 50 kilometer
long wall to protect a 500 kilometer long border. At which point we were not so politely asked to
leave the museum: ―You and your American friend can leave this museum now!‖ On our way
out, I asked my friend why he wasn‘t upset about how people talked about the United States,
right in front of him. His answer was ―Oh, this was not that bad. I‘ve seen worse. You should
have just told them I‘m from Canada.‖
Coming from a country with strong pro-American inclinations, I was shocked by the
French hostility towards the United States. Having lived in Louisiana for the last eight years, I
am even more surprised, because of the strong ties this southern American state has with France.
So some of the questions I have been asking myself since the 1999 visit to the ―Musée de
l'Armée‖ are: how did it all start? Were the French always anti-Americans? If not, when did this
change occur and why?
Franco-American relations have not always been as tense as they have been over the last
ten years. The French played a significant supporting role in the birth of the United States as an
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independent nation, providing military, economic and diplomatic backing for the New Republic,
even if it was not exactly for selfless reasons. In the second half of the 18th century, France and
Great Britain were trying to tilt the European balance of power in their favor, and the French saw
the American Revolution as an opportunity to reach this goal. The French monarchy however did
not expect for the American political model to become a shining example for the intellectuals in
Paris of how the ―ancien régime‖ could be reformed. Benjamin Franklin‘s visits to Paris were
touted as proof that democracy, science and culture can coexist, and that ―the Americans were
important contributing members of an international community of enlightened citizens‖ (Strauss
1978, 17).
This marks the beginning of a trend in French anti-Americanism. It seems that any time
the French perceive the Americans as truly being in their debt, or as being weaker and nonthreatening, levels of anti-Americanism are low. When America prospers, does not act according
to French plans, or seems to replace France as the leading force in international politics,
economics or culture, however, anti-American feelings catch fire again. Anti-Americanism in
France is inseparable from French insecurities and self-doubt about their country‘s place in the
world.
No sooner had the United States started to emerge from the ashes of the American
Revolution, then had anti-American rhetoric started to spread in France. It was initially directed
not at the American government, nor the American people, but at the weather, flora, and fauna of
the New Republic. This rhetoric came primarily from two ―scientific‖ sources: Georges Louis
Leclerc, Comte de Buffon (Oeuvres Completes 1859) and Cornelius De Paw (De Pauw 1806).
The portrait they painted of North America was a grim one, characterized by a degeneration of
plants, animals and ultimately humans, all of whom were not only smaller and weaker than the
European ones, but also without any prospects of bettering themselves in the future. Chickens
did not lay eggs, American pigs were smaller than European cats, men were cowards and not
interested in women and the women were manly and driven by lust for European-born males.
Crops were anemic, the weather was harsh, the land was covered in salt, and the dogs did not
bark. There were political reasons behind these and other similar attacks against the United
States. Europeans monarchs, while supporting the American anti-colonial struggles as a way to
weaken the British Empire, wanted to ensure that the European citizens did not become so
enamored with the New Republic that they would decide either to immigrate there (therefore
putting a strain on Europe‘s economics), or worse, to emulate the American political model and
replace hereditary monarchies with democratic systems.
Franklin, the American representative in Paris, and later Jefferson, tried to improve this
image in the eyes of the Europeans as they feared that it would translate into political
isolationism at a time when America needed all the support it could gather in Europe‘s capitals.
Unfortunately, the seeds of anti-Americanism were planted, and there was little the Americans
could do to change the views of people who have never traveled to the New Continent or met an
American dog. With the onset of the French Revolution, diplomatic relations between France
and the United States took a turn for the worse. Fearing that the instability and violence in Paris
might spread across the ocean, U.S. signed a secret treaty with Great Britain, which further
angered the French. Roger (2005) writes:
French privateers started attacking American ships. Twenty years after the ―trade,
friendship, and alliance‖ treaty, France and the United States were in a state of
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belligerence [which] makes for a strange epilogue to a century of Enlightenment in
which, even before the birth of the American nation had taken place, the French antiAmerican image war had begun (25).
19th century Franco-American relations did little to silence the anti-American voices in
France. The first half of the century saw the naturalist criticism of the United States replaced by a
cultural one. French travelers to the New Republic, as well as literary giants like Balzac or
Baudelaire have nothing good to say about America‘s cultural endeavors. This period sees the
birth of another long lasting anti-American stereotype: the U.S. as the land where civilization is
trumped by mercantilism and where people are more interested in making money than intelligent
conversation. Tocqueville‘s ―Democracy in America‖ (De Tocqueville 1966) does nothing to
change the negative views of French intelligentsia of America and Americans. Au contraire!
Being perceived as unapologetically pro-American, Tocqueville and his travel companions are
met with a wave of criticism for their views on American democracy, and we see another
stereotype being born: Americans are not as democratic as they like to pretend, because they
have only two parties, they killed the Native Americans and they had slaves (Roger 2005).
The second half of the 19th century witnesses a change in French anti-Americanism, and
it was exemplified by the whole ―Statue of Liberty‖ debacle. Following the 1870 defeat of the
French armies at the hands of the Prussian Empire, and the birth of the French Republic, the
American model became popular again in a small circle of conservative republicans led by
Laboulaye. It was his desire to rekindle the friendly relationship France and the United States
shared a hundred years ago around the ideals of the French Revolution – Liberté, Egalité,
Fraternité! However, the results of his endeavors were completely opposite: it took a long time
for the statue‘s pedestal to be built, and in France, this was publicized as just another sign of
America‘s lack of civilization and gratitude towards France. Philippe Roger places the ―official‖
birth date of French anti-Americanism as the end of the 19th century. Upset about the lack of
respect shown by the Americans to their larger-than-life present, worried about the economic and
military progresses made by the United States (including the successful 1898 Spanish War) and
in internal turmoil following the Dreyfuss Affair, the French turned to the one topic on which
could all agree - anti-Americanism: ―At the high point of civil discord in a divided France, antiAmericanism was the only ‗French passion‘ that calmed the other passions, curbed antagonisms,
and reconciled the staunchest adversaries‖ (Roger 2005, 141). For the first time, a new element
of anti-Americanism emerges, an element that has resurfaced at various times including the
recent American interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan – the United States as an imperialist
power. American dogs were maybe mute, but American cannons were not, and the echoes of the
Spanish War were heard all over the Old Continent.
By the beginning of the 20th century, Europe in general, and France in particular, were
forced to begrudgingly acknowledge that the nation of rude, violent and profit-oriented
Americans they ridiculed for more than a century has risen to challenge Europe for world
domination. WWI made it even clearer that the French were losing this contest, so it is no
surprise that the interwar years are marked by new developments in anti-Americanism, the
effects of which can be seen in contemporary polls not only in France, but all over Europe. First,
we can see the seeds of the pan-European project emerging as an alternative to the inexorable
American take-over. Second, it became fashionable to condemn American cultural values –
movies, music, and literature – as poisonous to Europe‘s civilization. But more important, the
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first half of the 20th century witnessed the United States coming to the rescue of the French
nation not once, but twice. Instead of gratitude, the Americans were met with disdain and
condescension in Paris. De Gaulle‘s decision to pull out of the NATO military command,
although remaining a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Alliance, as well as France‘s pursuit
of nuclear weapons, were a reflection of a general feeling among the French people that they did
not really owe anything to the Americans, that they did not need the Americanism to protect
them from the Soviets, and that they were on the verge of winning WWII even without
America‘s help.
During the Cold War, Franco-American relations remained friendly, yet strained at
governmental levels. Opposition to the war in Vietnam, France‘s pursuit of secularism and
comparative economic and military weakness, and the strength of the political Left all
contributed to the survival of French anti-Americanism over the last sixty years. Americans are
still seen as rude, greedy, uncivilized, and as too religious and selfishly imperialistic. Given that
French views of the United States and its people still have the power to unite a divided country,
and given that these enmities help France to forget its own faults and weaknesses, this may
continue to be a key component of the French ethos for the foreseeable future. It seems unlikely
that the Americans could do anything to make the French like them more. Two hundred years
after Buffon, dogs in America are definitely barking, but there is nobody in France interested in
hearing them.
The next section of this chapter describes a very different relationship between a
European country and the United States – Romania‘s pro-Americanism.
9.3.

ROMANIA AND THE UNITED STATES – “GOD SMILES UPON US!”

In 2002, massive crowds enthusiastically welcomed President George W. Bush in his first
visit to Romania, and the feelings were apparently mutual. During his speech, held in a steady,
cold November rain, a rainbow appeared in the sky, prompting President Bush to exclaim ―God
is smiling on us!‖ For the rest of his presidency, George W. Bush would mention this ―magical‖
moment every time he would meet Romanian artists, athletes, or politicians. At the time, he was
not as enthusiastic about the French who mounted, alongside the Germans, the strongest
opposition to the war in Iraq:
There is a sense of frustration and disappointment amongst the American people toward
the French decision [because] they didn't understand the decisions by the French
leadership to thwart the American desire, and the desire of others, to work on security
and freedom — security for our countries and freedom in Iraq (Associated Press 2003).
This section offers a short overview of Romanian pro-Americanism, and its somewhat
paradoxical character. To understand better the paradox of Romanian pro-Americanism, I start
with a brief personal story. Growing up, I heard numerous stories about World War II from my
maternal grandmother, who lived as a child in the Ploesti region, where Romania‘s oil fields are
located. Her war memories were notably marked by the terror they felt any time American planes
were dropping bombs not only on the oil fields and refineries (supplying fuel for the Nazi army)
but also on the town where she lived. She and her family eventually escaped the bombings by
taking refuge in the countryside, but she never forgot the stars and stripes on the planes bombing
her house and her school. Apparently, the American planes were flying extremely closely to the
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ground to avoid the air defenses around Ploiesti and I found confirmation of her war
recollections on the U.S Air Force‘s website (U.S. Air Force n.d.).
So, imagine my surprise when, upon receiving my acceptance letter from Indiana State
University‘s Political Science Department, I saw tears in my grandmother‘s eyes. I thought she
was upset, but it turns out there were tears of joy. She told me that her dream was always to get
to see the White House, because she wanted to thank President Reagan for helping us get rid of
Communism (being accustomed to Ceausescu‘s lifelong hold on Romania, it was hard for her to
understand that American Presidents leave power after 4 or 8 years, so she assumed Reagan was
still living in the White House in 1999).
No matter what the historical reality about the end of the Cold War might be, her feelings
for the United States were not uncommon among older Romanians –―Yes, the U.S. bombed us
during WW II. And yes, Roosevelt sold us to the Soviets at Malta, but Reagan came and saved
us from Communism.‖ And with that, the previous fifty years of tepid Romanian-American
relations are put behind us, and we start the friendship anew. The remainder of this section will
present a brief historical overview of this friendship, using as main sources the United States
Department of State (US Department of State 2011) and media reports.
In 1968, U.S.–Romanian relations warmed following President Ceausescu‘s show of
distancing himself from the Soviets during the invasion of Czechoslovakia. In 1969, as part of
his ―détente‖ policy, Nixon visits Romania, and ten years later, the Romanian dictator and his
wife are received at the White House by President Carter. Prior to this visit, a trade agreement
signed in April 1975 granted most favored nation (MFN) status to Romania under Section 402 of
the Trade Reform Act of 1974 (US Department of State 2011). This status was renewed yearly
by Congress following a Presidential evaluation of Romania‘s progress toward freedom of
emigration, and it was put to good use by the Communist propaganda machine in Romania.
Every year, after the renewal of the MNF status, the state-owned TV station showed a proud
Ceausescu talking, usually for about two hours, about the American support for his regime.
Year after year, Romanians were left to wonder which one was the real America: the one
backing the dictator, or the one we heard about on our radios through the ―Voice of America‖
and ―Radio Free Europe‖ stations. Those two news agencies, funded by the U.S. Congress
through the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG), a bipartisan federal agency overseeing all
U.S international broadcasting services, were the only sources of reasonably independent news in
Romania before 1989, and I remember being taught very early on, as soon as I learn how to
speak, not to tell anyone about our illegal ―radio sessions.‖ Despite the Ceausescu regime‘s
attempts to jam their signal, these stations succeeded in spreading the word all over the country
about the brutal 1989 crackdown in Timisoara, and thus played a key role in ending the
Communist control over Romania and the rest of the Eastern European countries (Puddington
2000).
After the 1989 regime change in Romania, relations between Bucharest and Washington
did not evolve as fast as the majority of the Romanians would have liked. After the 1990 visit to
Romania by then Secretary of State James Baker, and the anti-democratic events of early 1990s
that culminated with the ―Mineriada‖—attacks by coal miners on peaceful protesters in the
capital city of Bucharest—relations between U.S. and Romania became warmer. A strong
catalyst for this was that, following the 1992 elections, Romania demonstrated a decisive turn
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away from Russia in their foreign and domestic policies. Five years later, with Romanians
actively pushing for EU and NATO membership, President Clinton visited Romania and was
received with open arms by a large crowd. Despite the fact that in that very year Romania‘s bid
for NATO membership had been put on hold due to American reservations about Romania‘s
political and economic reforms, tens of thousands of Romanians still warmly welcomed the first
American President to visit post-Communist Romania (CNN Time 1997).
The 9/11 terrorist attacks and Romania‘s full support for the American-led wars in Iraq
and Afghanistan marked a new stage in U.S.–Romanian relations. A NATO member since 2004,
Romanian troops have fought in Iraq and are still currently deployed in Afghanistan. American
President George W. Bush has visited Romania twice, in 2002 and 2007. With Turkey denying
Americans military access to their national airspace, Romania became an attractive alternative
option for the geostrategic access to the Black Sea, and from there, to Iraq, Afghanistan and, if
necessary, Iran. In 2005, Romanian President Basescu made his first official visit to Washington,
and a year later, then Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice visited Bucharest and signed an
agreement that allowed for the use of the Mihail Kogalniceanu Air Base by U.S. troops. These
moves toward military cooperation drew sharp criticism from Romania‘s longtime foe Russia,
which saw this as an attempt to diminish Russia‘s influence in Eastern Europe.
The tensions between Russia and Romania escalated in 2010, when following a visit to
Bucharest by Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Ellen
Tauscher, Romania agreed to host elements of the U.S. Phased Adaptive Approach to European
missile defense within the 2015 timeframe (Agenţia Naţională de Presă 2011). An article in the
Russian newspaper Prava makes it very clear that the government in Moscow was less than
pleased with the heightened level of military cooperation between Romania and the United
States:
Contrary to the statements of the President of Romania, the missile defense deployment is
directed precisely against Russia. We could take retaliatory measures such as deploying
Iskander and transferring fighter bombers in the area. In this case, the United States and
Romania, as they say, found each other. Russia will have to respond not only to the
Americans but also to the Romanians. There is no guarantee that it will be one and the
same response. For example, the deployment of Iskander in Transnistria is unlikely to
impress Washington, but would be a different story for Bucharest (Trukhachev 2011).
And here lies one of the key components of U.S.–Romanian relations, and of Romania‘s
pro-Americanism, especially when compared to French anti-Americanism. Yes, Romanians are
more culturally similar to the Americans than the French are (see next section - public opinion
data on cultural similarity). Yes, they did not like being scolded by French President Chirac
when they decided to support the war in Iraq. Yes, Romanian immigrants to the United States are
treated better and with more respect than are those who either travel to, or look for a better
economic future in France. But above all, Romania has always needed protection against
Russia. There is a saying, based on some historical facts, that every time Romanians have
signed a peace agreement with the Russians, they lost a part of their territory.
As of this writing in 2011, just as was the case six decades prior, the U.S. is seen as by
the government in Bucharest as the primary alternative to Russian influence, but unlike the postWWII world, the U.S. needs Romania too due to its geostrategic location. Under these
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circumstances, maybe it is not that paradoxical after all that despite being bombed by U.S. planes
during WWII, sold to the Soviets at Malta, abandoned to Ceausescu for fifty years, criticized for
slow democratic reforms after 1989, and all but ignored until 2002 in their attempts to join
NATO, Romanians still are, and will for the foreseeable future be, pro-American.
9.4.

FRANCE, ROMANIA AND THE UNITED STATES: CULTURAL SIMILARITY
AND ANTI-AMERICANISM IN THE 21ST CENTURY

This section looks at elements of cultural similarity that have been found to have a
significant relationship with attitudes towards the U.S. in Old and New Europe. Besides
economic factors, geostrategic considerations, and domestic politics games (which were the foci
of the previous three sections of this chapter), I argue here that cultural similarity is an
additional, major influence on a country‘s levels of anti-Americanism. In the case of Romania
and France, we are interested to see if their six-hundred years old friendship and francophone ties
have created strong cultural similarities in the 21st century, or if their different levels of antiAmericans are actually reflected in different cultural characteristics regarding tolerance and
religiosity.
The 2005 and 2006 waves of the World Values Survey provided the empirical data for an
in-depth look at cultural similarity between a country from Old Europe – France, one from New
Europe – Romania, and the United States. Discussions of levels of anti-Americanism in France
and Romania were based on information from the 2005 Eurobarometer 63.4.
9.4.1. ANTI-AMERICANISM
While Romania‘s support for the 2003 war in Iraq has drawn sharp criticism from Paris,
this was just one of many manifestations of different levels of anti-Americanism in Old and New
Europe. In 2005, several questions from the Eurobarometer surveys measured feelings towards
the United States in the 27 EU member states, and the differences between France and Romania
are clear. The Charts visually presenting this data can be found in Appendix 1, after the
bibliographic information.
Almost 59 percent of Romanians, compared to only 16 percent of French respondents,
believe that the United States plays a positive role in supporting world peace. 57 percent of
Romanians and 29 percent of the French see America‘s impact on economic growth worldwide
as a positive one, while over 70 percent of those interviewed in France (compared to only 13
percent in Romania) think that USA plays a negative role in fighting poverty worldwide as well
as in protecting the environment. Both the French (85 percent) and the Romanians (65 percent)
support an EU foreign policy more independent of the United States. This finding suggests that
pro-Americanism in Romania does not necessarily co-occur with negative attitudes towards the
European Union. However, when asked to compare the two on several dimensions, only a little
over 20 percent of Romanians compared to more than half of the French believe that the overall
quality of life in Europe is much better or somewhat better than in the United States, and that
Europe is ahead of the U.S. when it comes to fighting discrimination.
Two years after the Romanian government‘s support for the war in Iraq, this confirms the
existence of a fairly clear divide in levels of anti-Americanism in France and Romania. It would
seem that former Romanian President Ion Iliescu‘s decision to join the American-led ―coalition
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of the willing‖ was a reflection of a generalized pro-American feeling in an otherwise
francophone society. As Chapters 3-8 have previously shown, there is a strong relationship
between cultural similarity and anti-Americanism in Old vs. New Europe – the more antiAmerican Old Europe is less culturally similar to the United States than New Europe is. This
chapter brings into focus another question: are France and Romania so culturally ―dissimilar‖ to
make one of them look more like the United States than its European ―cousin‖? The next section
looks at two elements of cultural similarity, tolerance and religiosity, and how they are reflected
in the cases of France, Romania and the United States. Charts presenting this data can be found
in Appendix 9.
9.4.2. TOLERANCE
Before talking specifically about tolerance towards women, homosexuals and
immigrants/foreign workers, let‘s first take a look at what are considered important qualities in
French, American and Romanian children. In the last place we can find ―imagination‖, with only
31 percent of Americans, 25 percent of the French and a little over 18 percent of the Romanians
viewing this trait as important in their children. The most significant child quality for the French
and the American is to be tolerant and respect other people in their societies (87 percent of
respondents in France and 79 percent in the U.S. – compared to 60 percent in Romania), while
for the Romanians is work ethic – 85 percent of Romanians (compared to 62 percent in both
France and the United States) believe it is important for children to be taught to work hard in life.
Over 50 percent of Americans and Romanians think that religious faith is a central child quality,
while only 9 percent of the French agree with that point of view. Based on these answers, one
would expect that levels of tolerance in France to parallel those in the U.S. than in the Romania –
U.S. pairing, while in the case of religiosity, the U.S. and Romania should look more alike than
the U.S. and France.
We begin our inquiry by looking at tolerance towards homosexuals and
immigrants/foreign workers. When asked about what groups of individuals they would not want
as neighbors, both France and Romania had higher percentage of respondents than the United
States mentioning people of a different race, or who speak a different language, practice a
different religion, and have AIDS, as well homosexuals and immigrants/foreign workers among
the ―undesirables.‖ For all three countries the most objectionable group as neighbors are the drug
addicts, with the heavy drinkers coming in close second. While these answers might simply
reflect the fact that Europeans are not used to live in as diverse neighborhoods as the Americans
do, when asked about the justifiability of homosexuality, the U.S. and Romania present a fairly
similar picture on intolerance. A percentage of French higher than those in Romania and the U.S.
combined believes that homosexuality is always justifiable. Same scenario repeats itself when
people are asked if, when jobs are scarce, domestic workers should be given priority over the
immigrants.
Regarding tolerance towards women, while over 65 percent of respondents from France
and the United States that men and women have equal rights in the job market, even when jobs
are scarce, only 41 percent of Romanians share their views. Sexist/intolerant attitudes towards
women and gender equality issues are also reflected in the views of those interviewed in
Romania about women as business executives – more than half of respondents agree or strongly
agree than men make better business executives and political leaders than women, compared to
less than 25 percent in France and United States. Romania closes the tolerance towards women
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gap when it comes to opinions on the importance of college education for boys and girls,
although it still lags behind France and the United States – 80 percent of Romanians do not
believe that a university education is more important for boys than for girls (compared to over 95
percent of the French and Americans). France is more culturally similar to the United States than
Romania is on these topics related to tolerance towards women.
While on issues of gender equality there does not seem to be a positive relationship
between cultural similarity and anti-Americanism, things change when we look at topics, such as
abortion, divorce or single-parent household, in which gender and religious beliefs are closer
intertwined. 62 percent of French respondents (compared to 52 percent of Americans and 48
percent of Romanians) approve of women as single parents, while over 25 percent believe that
abortion and divorce are always justifiable. Only 7 percent of Americans and 4 percent of
Romanians agree with this view on abortion, with only slightly higher percentages in the case of
divorce. This latter observation brings to attention the importance of religiosity as an element of
cultural similarity, supporting the results from the previous chapters which showed that faith was
a remarkably strong predictor for levels of anti-Americanism: the more religious, the more proAmerican. The next section looks at cultural similarity between Old Europe, New Europe and the
United States in terms of their levels of religiosity.
9.4.3. RELIGIOSITY
While officially an atheistic society for more than 50 years during Communism, Romania
has been exhibiting for the last two decades something similar to a spiritual revival that makes
this country from New Europe look more like the United States than secular France. For more
than three in four respondents from Romania and the U.S. religion and God are very important or
rather important in their lives, compared to less than half of the French. 93 percent of
Romanians, 72 percent of the Americans and only 47 percent of the French consider themselves
a religious person. It is also interesting to notice that while 17 percent of the French are
convinced atheists, less than 5 percent of the Americans and less than one in a hundred
Romanians has atheistic beliefs. This translates into higher trust in organized religions as well as
more frequent church attendance in Romania and the United States, compared to France where
over half of the people never attend religious services outside funerals and weddings. There is a
clear faith-divide between France and Romania, and their different levels of religiosity match
their different attitudes towards the United States: the more religious and more similar to the
U.S., the more pro-American.
9.5.

CONCLUSIONS

This chapter has shown that not only are Romanians much more pro-American than the
French, but Romania and France are also more culturally dissimilar than their francophone ties
and six hundred years of shared history would have suggested. Table 9.5.1 summarizes the
finding presented in the previous section regarding different levels of anti-Americanism in
France and Romania.

132

TABLE 9.5.1: ANTI-AMERICANISM IN FRANCE AND ROMANIA IN THE 21ST
CENTURY
FRANCE
ROMANIA

USA positive role in world peace

15.6%

58.7%

USA positive role in world
economy

29.2%

57.4%

USA positive role in fighting
world poverty

10.7%

52.6%

USA positive role in
environment protection

8.2%

56%

EU foreign policy should be
more independent of the USA

84.9%

64.9%

Europe is ahead of the USA on
fighting discrimination

52.1%

22.5%

Quality of life in Europe is better
than in the USA

56.3%

25.5%

Two years after the onset of the Iraq war, the wave of anti-American feelings flowing
from France failed to reach the Romanians for whom the United States is still very much a
political, economic and social model worth emulating and an overall positive influence
worldwide. In France, things are very different, and there are no signs of a renewed friendship
between the two countries. Talking about French anti-Americanism, Pascal Bruckner explains
that it will never truly disappear because it has become:
―[…] a life's work for a number of sociologists, novelists, philosophers, and artists. There
is a stock of prejudices endlessly renewed and which emerge unchanged out of every
crisis. The hatred for America as a nation derives from a mixture of ignorance, jealousy,
and pettiness. It is usually accompanied by a pro-found nostalgia for French grandeur
from the time of the Empire or Charles de Gaulle, and from resentment and worship of
the past‖ (Bruckner and Golsan 2005, 18).
Romania and France are different on more than just their anti-Americanism levels. Those
cultural ties bonding these two countries so tightly in the Interwar years were significantly
weakened by fifty years of Communist rule in Romania, followed by twenty years of proAmericanism. Table 9.5.2 summarizes the cultural similarities between Romania, France and the
United States.
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TABLE 9.5.2: CULTURAL SIMILARITY – FRANCE, UNITED STATES AND
ROMANIA IN THE 21ST CENTURY
FRANCE UNITED STATES ROMANIA
Religious faith important for children

8.7%

50.8%

64%

Tolerance and respect for other people are
important children qualities

86.8%

78.7%

59.7%

Religion very important in life

13.0%

47.4%

58.0%

God very important in life

11.2%

57.8%

66.3%

I am a religious person

46.9%

72.1%

93.4%

I never attend church services

60.1%

25.6%

4.5%

I have confidence in national churches

46%

66.3%

88%

Homosexuality is never justifiable

14.8%

32.5%

73.0%

Prostitution is never justifiable

41.2%

43.2%

69.2%

Abortion is never justifiable

13.8%

25.5%

48.4%

Divorce is never justifiable

8.7%

5.8%

34.7%

University education is more important for
a boy than for a girl

6.8%

7.9%

19.3%

Disapprove of women as single parents

26.4%

47.8%

38.2%

Men make better political leaders than
women do

21.2%

24.7%

55%

Men make better business executives than
women do

14.4%

16.5%

51.1%

Employers should hire men instead of
women when jobs are scarce

18.1%

6.8%

35.2%

Employers should hire domestic workers
instead of immigrants when jobs are scarce

42.1%

55.4%

65.1%

For as much as they dislike the United States, the French are more similar to the
Americans in their views on gender equality than the Romanians are, with the exception of single
motherhood issues. On other topics, such as homosexuality, abortion or the right of immigrants
to jobs even in bad economies, Romania and the United States share slightly more intolerant
attitudes than the French. But the issue that stands out as the single most striking difference
between France on one side, and Romania and the U.S. on the other is religion. Secularism, so
predominant in the French society, has failed to take roots in 21st century Romania, which could
134

be at least in part as a reaction to the forced atheism imposed by the Communist regime.
Romania and the United States are religious, traditional societies, with conservative beliefs and
mores. This particular aspect of cultural similarity has been found to be strongly correlated with
levels of anti-Americanism, but the picture painted in this chapter is more complex than that.
Romanians have come to see the U.S. as their strongest defense against possible trouble brewing
in Moscow, while the French will never forget that ―Pax Americanna‖ took over and effectively
ended ―La Belle Époque‖:
France is a proud nation which regards itself as superior to all other nations in many
important ways: it is usually just as negative toward other nations as it is toward the
United States now. In this sense France is very much like the United States, which also
regards itself as superior and a nation to which other peoples should want to come, rather
than as a nation from which some of its citizens leave as emigrants (Rose 1952, 469).
The last chapter of this dissertation presents a summary of all the findings in this
dissertation and opens the door for future research on anti-Americanism and cultural similarity in
a divided European Union.
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CHAPTER 10 – CONCLUSIONS
Donald Rumsfeld may have been wrong about many things during his time as the
Secretary of Defense for George W. Bush, but on one issue he was right. Old Europe, including
countries like France, Germany, Italy, Spain, the Netherlands and Belgium, is significantly more
anti-American than New Europe, which includes countries such as Romania, Bulgaria, Poland
and Hungary. In this project, however, I have made a number of observations that go beyond
than this simple conclusion. I examined factors that could be behind these different levels of antiAmericanism in Old Europe and New Europe, and one key answer that emerged was ―cultural
similarity.‖ There are, of course, other factors that impact attitudes towards the United States and
Americans, such as the frequent travels to and from the U.S., a country‘s trade ties with the
American government, and people‘s views on U.S. policies in the Middle East and towards the
environment. But even when we take all these elements into account, cultural similarity still
plays a significant role in why Old Europe is more anti-American than is New Europe. The
United States and New Europe resemble each other more culturally than Old Europe and the
U.S. do, particularly in their levels of religiosity. Secularism never took root in New Europe and
the United States with the force that it has in Old Europe. Romanians and Americans go to
church more often, pray more frequently, and place more importance on religion in their lives
than do the French.
The second element of cultural similarity investigated in this dissertation is tolerance.
There is a significant relationship between levels of anti-Americanism and tolerance towards
women, immigrants/foreign workers and immigrants in Old Europe versus New Europe. New
Europe and the United States are, in general, more intolerant than Old Europe. There is an
exception here, however, in terms of gender equality issues. French and Americans are more
likely than are Romanians to support equal rights to a job for men and women even when jobs
are scarce. French and Americans are also more likely than are Romanians to view female
politicians as equally qualified with their male counterparts for leadership positions. On other
topics where religion tends to influence public opinion, however—such as in the cases of
abortion or prostitution—Old Europeans have a more open-minded and tolerant attitude than do
New Europeans and Americans. To draw a simplistic caricature outlining these findings—if you
are from New Europe then you are relatively sexist, xenophobic, homophobic, religious, and proAmerican relative to your Old European counterparts.
There are, of course, several avenues for advancement of this research program. For
example, future work could take additional factors into account as potentially impacting levels of
anti-Americanism, in terms of both cultural and non-cultural influences. Further, focusing on
additional Old and New European countries, and viewing the relationship between cultural issues
and public support of non-U.S. countries world would help to identify the degree to which these
findings are generalizable to other cases. But even without taking these additional steps, I believe
that the results presented in this dissertation provide a better understanding of European antiAmericanism than was previously the case in the already extensive literature on this topic. There
is a clear cultural divide in the European Union between Old Europe and New Europe that
parallels their respective attitudes towards the United States and the American people.
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APPENDIX 1
WORLD VALUES SURVEY DATABASE – CODEBOOK
QUESTION

0

Important in life:
Religion

1

2

3

4

Very
important

Rather
important

Not very
important

Not at all
important

Agree

Neither
agree nor
disagree

Disagree

Agree

Neither
agree nor
disagree

Disagree

Important child
qualities: tolerance
and respect for other
people

Not
mentioned

Important

Important child
qualities: religious
faith

Not
mentioned

Important

Which of the
following groups
you would not want
as neighbors:
Immigrants/foreign
workers

Not
mentioned

Mentioned

Which of the
following groups
you would not want
as neighbors:
Homosexuals
Jobs scarce: Men
should have more
right to a job than
women

Not
mentioned

Mentioned

Jobs scarce:
Employers should
give priority to
(nation) people than
immigrants
A woman has to
have children to be
fulfilled

Not
necessary

Needs
children
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5

Table continued.
QUESTION

0

1

Marriage is an outdated institution

Disagree

Agree

Woman as a single
parent

Disapprove

Approve

2

3

4

5

Men make better
political leaders than
women do

Agree
strongly

Agree

Disagree

Disagree
strongly

University is more
important for a boy
than for a girl

Agree
strongly

Agree

Disagree

Disagree
strongly

How much
confidence do you
have in Churches?

A great
deal

Quite a
lot

Not very
much

None at
all

Immigrant policy

Let anyone
come

As long
as jobs
are
available

Strict
limits

Prohibit
people
from
coming

How often do you
attend religious
services
(6 = Once a year,
7=Less often,
8=never, practically
never)

More than
once a
week

Once a
week

Once a
month

Only on
special
holy days/
Christmas/
Easter

Other
specific
holy
days

Do you consider
yourself a religious
person?

A religious
person

Not a
religious
person

A
convinced
atheist

2

3

4

5

Churches give
answers to social
problems
How important is
God in your life?
(10 = very
important)

No

Yes

Not at all
important
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Table continued.
QUESTION

0

1

2

3

4

5

Politicians who
don´t believe in God
are unfit for public
office

Agree
strongly

Agree

Neither
agree or
disagree

Disagree

Strongly
disagree

Better if more
people with strong
religious beliefs in
public office

Agree
strongly

Agree

Neither
agree or
disagree

Disagree

Strongly
disagree

Religious leaders
should not influence
government

Agree
strongly

Agree

Neither
agree or
disagree

Disagree

Strongly
disagree

Justifiable:
homosexuality
(10 = always
justifiable)

Never
justifiable

2

3

4

5

Justifiable:
prostitution
(10 = always
justifiable)

Never
justifiable

2

3

4

5

Justifiable: abortion
(10 = always
justifiable)

Never
justifiable

2

3

4

5

Justifiable: divorce
(10 = always
justifiable)

Never
justifiable

2

3

4

5
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APPENDIX 2
VOICE OF THE PEOPLE – MILLENIUM EDITION DATABASE CODEBOOK
QUESTION
How often do you attend religious
services these days?
(5 = once a year, 6 = less often, 7 =
never, practically never)
Would you say that there exists one and
only one true religion, that there is truth
in many religions or that there is no
essential truth in any religion?
How important is God in your life? (10
= very important)
Do you take some moments of prayer,
meditation or something like that?
Which of these statements comes closest
to your beliefs?

1
More than
once a week

2
Once a
week

3
Once a
month

One and
only one
true religion

Many true
religions

No true
religion

Not at all
important
Yes

2

3

4

There is a
personal
God

There is
some sort of
spirit or life
force

I don‘t
know
what to
think

I don‘t
really think
there is any
sort of
spirit, God
or life force

Education is more important for boys
than for girls.
Both the husband and the wife should
contribute to the household income?
On the whole, men make better political
leaders than women do.
When jobs are scarce, men should have
more rights to a job than women?
A woman needs to have children in
order to be really fulfilled.
Sometimes when a woman says no to
sex, she doesn't always mean it.

Agree

Disagree

Agree

Disagree

Agree

Disagree

Agree

Disagree

Agree

Disagree

Agree

Disagree
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4
Only on
special
holy days

No

APPENDIX 3
PEW 2002 DATABASE CODEBOOK
QUESTION
Is the influence of
religious leaders very
good, somewhat good,
somewhat bad or very
bad in our country?
Is the influence of
immigrants very good,
somewhat good,
somewhat bad or very
bad in our country?
Religion is a matter of
personal faith and should
be kept separate from
government policy
Our people are not
perfect, but our culture is
superior to others.
Our way of life needs to
be protected against
foreign influence?
We should restrict and
control entry of people
into our country more
than we do now.
What kind of marriage
do you think is the more
satisfying way of life?

Which one of these
statements about belief
in God comes closest to
your opinion?
Which one of these
statements about
homosexuality comes
closer to your opinion?
What is your opinion of
the United States?

1
Very good

2
Somewhat
good

3
Somewhat
bad

4
Very bad

Very good

Somewhat
good

Somewhat
bad

Very bad

Completely
agree

Mostly agree

Mostly
disagree

Completely
disagree

Completely
agree

Mostly agree

Mostly
disagree

Completely
disagree

Completely
agree

Mostly agree

Mostly
disagree

Completely
disagree

Completely
agree

Mostly agree

Mostly
disagree

Completely
disagree

Husband
provides for
family, wife
cares for house
and kids
Not necessary
to believe in
God to have
moral/good
values
Homosexuality
is a way of life
society should
accept

Both have jobs
and take care
of house and
children

Very favorable

Necessary to
believe in God
to have
moral/good
values
Homosexuality
is a way of life
society should
not accept
Somewhat
favorable
148

Somewhat
Very
unfavorable unfavorable

5

Table continued.
QUESTION
What is your opinion of
Americans?
In making international
policy decisions, to what
extent do you think the
United States takes into
account the interests of
countries like our
country?
In your opinion, do
United States' policies
increase the gap between
rich and poor countries,
lessen the gap between
rich and poor countries,
or do United States
policies have no effect
on the gap between rich
and poor countries?

1
Very favorable
Great deal

Increase gap
between rich
and poor

In terms of solving world United States
problems, does the
does too much
United States do too
much, too little, or the
right amount in helping
solve world problems?
It's good that American
It's good that
ideas and customs are
American
spreading here, OR it's
ideas and
bad that American ideas
customs are
and customs are
spreading here
spreading here.
Outside of attending
Several times a
religious services, do
day
you pray several times a
day, once a day, a few
times a week, once a
week or less, or never?
How important is
Very
religion in your life?
important

2
Somewhat
favorable
Fair amount

3
4
Somewhat
Very
unfavorable unfavorable
Not too
Not at all
much

No effect

Lessen gap
between
rich and
poor

United States
does the right
amount

United
States does
too little

United
States does
nothing

Once a day

A few
times a
week

Once a
week or
less

Somewhat
important

Not too
important

Not at all
important

5

It‘s bad that
American
ideas and
customs are
spreading here

149

Never

APPENDIX 4
2006 UNITED STATES CITIZENSHIP, INVOLVEMENT AND DEMOCRACY SURVEY
AND 2002 EUROPEAN SOCIAL SURVEY DATABASE CODEBOOK
QUESTION
Gays and lesbians free to live life as
they whish
(5 = disagree strongly)
How religious are you?
(10 = very religious)
How often do you attend religious
services apart from special occasions?
(5 = only on special holy days, 6 =
less often, 7=never)
Qualification for immigration: good
educational qualifications
(10 = extremely important)
Qualification for immigration: close
family living here
(10 = extremely important)
Qualification for immigration: speak
country‘s official language
Qualification for immigration:
Christian background
(10 = extremely important)
Qualification for immigration: be
white
(10 = extremely important)
Taxes and services: immigrants take
out more than they put in or less
(10 = generally put in more)
Country's cultural life undermined or
enriched by immigrants
(10 = cultural life enriched)
Immigrants make country's crime
problems worse or better
(10 = crime problems made better)
Better for a country if almost
everyone share customs and traditions
(5 = disagree strongly)
Better for a country if a variety of
different religions
(5 = disagree strongly)

0

1
Agree
strongly

2
Agree

Not at all
religious

1

2

Every
day

3
Neither
agree nor
disagree
3

4
Disagree

Once a
week

At least
once a
month

3

4

4

Extremely
unimportant

1

More
than
once a
week
2

Extremely
unimportant

1

2

3

4

Extremely
unimportant
Extremely
unimportant

1

2

3

4

1

2

3

4

Extremely
unimportant

1

2

3

4

Generally
take out
more
Cultural life
undermined

1

2

3

4

1

2

3

4

Crime
problems
made worse

1

2

3

4

Agree
strongly

Agree

Disagree

Agree
strongly

Agree

Neither
agree nor
disagree
Neither
agree nor
disagree
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Disagree

APPENDIX 5
PEW 2007 DATABASE CODEBOOK
QUESTION
Is immigration a problem in our
country?

1
Very big
problem

2
A moderately
big problem

3
A small
problem

4
Not a
problem at
all

What is your opinion of the
United States?

Very
favorable

Somewhat
favorable

Somewhat
unfavorable

Very
unfavorable

What is your opinion of the
Americans?

Very
favorable

Somewhat
favorable

Somewhat
unfavorable

Very
unfavorable

The influence of religious leaders
in our country is __

Very good

Somewhat
good

Somewhat
bad

Very bad

The influence of immigrants in
our country is ____

Very good

Somewhat
good

Somewhat
bad

Very bad

Religion is a matter of personal
faith and should be kept separate
from government policy.

Completely
agree

Mostly agree

Mostly
disagree

Completely
disagree

In making international policy
decisions, do you think the U.S/
takes into account the interests of
countries like our country?

Great deal

Fair amount

Not too
much

Not at all

In making international policy
decisions, do you think the
United States take into account
the interests of other countries
around the world?

Great deal

Fair amount

Not too
much

Not at all

What effect do U.S. policies
have on the gap between rich and
poor countries?

Increase gap
between rich
and poor

No effect

Lessen gap
between
rich and
poor

Which of the following phrases
comes closer to your view?

It's good that
American
ideas and
customs are
spreading
here

It's bad that
American
ideas and
customs are
spreading
here
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Table continued.
QUESTION
Which one of the following
statements comes closest to your
opinion about men and women
as political leaders?

1
Men
generally
make better
political
leaders than
women

2
In general,
women and
men make
equally good
political
leaders

3
Women
generally
make better
political
leaders than
men

4

Which one of these comes
closest to your opinion, number
1 or number 2?

Number 1 –
It is not
necessary to
believe in
God in order
to be moral
and have
good values

Number 2 – It
is necessary
to believe in
God in order
to be moral
and have
good values

And which one of these comes
closer to your opinion, number 1
or number 2?

Number 1 –
Homosexuali
ty is a way of
life that
should be
accepted by
society

Number 2 –
Homosexualit
y is a way of
life that
should not be
accepted by
society

Outside of attending religious
services, how often do you pray?
(5 = never)

Several times
a day

Once a day

A few times
a week

Once a week
or less

How important is religion in
your life?

Very
important

Somewhat
important

Not too
important

Not at all
important

And which comes closer to
describing your view?

The United
States
promotes
democracy
wherever it
can

The United
States
promotes
democracy
mostly where
it serves its
interests
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APPENDIX 6
EUROBAROMETER 62 – 2004 DATABASE CODEBOOK
QUESTION
Should the EU foreign policy be
more independent of the USA?

1
Tend to agree

2
Tend to disagree

3

USA role in peace in the world

Positive

Neither nor

Negative

USA role in fighting terrorism

Positive

Neither nor

Negative

USA role in economic growth
worldwide

Positive

Neither nor

Negative

USA role in fighting poverty
worldwide

Positive

Neither nor

Negative

USA role in environment protection

Positive

Neither nor

Negative

EU role in peace in the world

Positive

Neither nor

Negative

EU role in fighting terrorism

Positive

Neither nor

Negative

EU role in economic growth
worldwide

Positive

Neither nor

Negative

EU role in fighting poverty
worldwide

Positive

Neither nor

Negative

EU role in environment protection

Positive

Neither nor

Negative
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APPENDIX 7
EUROBAROMETER 63 – 2005 DATABASE CODEBOOK
QUESTION

1

2

3

EU foreign policy more
independent of the United States

Tend to agree

Don‘t know

Tend to disagree

USA role in peace in the world

Positive

Neither nor

Negative

USA role in fighting terrorism

Positive

Neither nor

Negative

USA role in economic growth
worldwide

Positive

Neither nor

Negative

USA role in fighting poverty
worldwide

Positive

Neither nor

Negative

USA role in environment protection

Positive

Neither nor

Negative

EU role in peace in the world

Positive

Neither nor

Negative

EU role in fighting terrorism

Positive

Neither nor

Negative

EU role in economic growth
worldwide

Positive

Neither nor

Negative

EU role in fighting poverty
worldwide

Positive

Neither nor

Negative

EU role in environment protection

Positive

Neither nor

Negative

EU compared to the U.S. – life
quality
(4 = definitely less good)

Much better

Somewhat better

Somewhat less
good

Europe compared to the U.S. –
scientific research

Europe ahead of the
United States

At the same
level

Europe behind
the United
States

Europe compared to the U.S. –
medical research

Europe ahead of the
United States

At the same
level

Europe behind
the United
States
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Table continued.
QUESTION

1

2

3

Europe compared to the U.S. –
environment protection

Europe ahead of the
United States

At the same
level

Europe behind
the United
States

Europe compared to the U.S. –
innovation technology

Europe ahead of the
United States

At the same
level

Europe behind
the United
States

Europe compared to the U.S. –
healthcare system

Europe ahead of the
United States

At the same
level

Europe behind
the United
States

Europe compared to the U.S. –
education

Europe ahead of the
United States

At the same
level

Europe behind
the United
States

Europe compared to the U.S. –
fighting social disparities

Europe ahead of the
United States

At the same
level

Europe behind
the United
States

Europe compared to the U.S. –
fighting unemployment

Europe ahead of the
United States

At the same
level

Europe behind
the United
States

Europe compared to the U.S. –
fighting discrimination

Europe ahead of the
United States

At the same
level

Europe behind
the United
States
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APPENDIX 8
TABLE SHOWING REGRESSION RESULTS FOR PEW 2007 – FORM B DATABASE,
WITHOUT THE “OPINIONS OF GEORGE W. BUSH” INDEPENDENT VARIABLE
Dependent Variable: Please tell me if you have a very favorable, somewhat favorable,
somewhat unfavorable or very unfavorable opinion of the United States?
t

Sig.

13.772

.000

B

Std. Error

(Constant)

2.351

.171

Free market

.148

.015

.157

10.133

.000

Protecting the environment.

-.023

.016

-.024

-1.490

.136

Church and State

-.048

.018

-.041

-2.655

.008

Stricter immigration

.030

.013

.035

2.279

.023

Children education

.071

.080

.014

.888

.375

Global warming

-.080

.019

-.066

-4.156

.000

Old Europe vs. New Europe

-.170

.026

-.100

-6.501

.000
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APPENDIX 9
CHARTS SHOWING LEVELS OF ANTI-AMERICANISM IN FRANCE AND
ROMANIA
(Chapter 9, section 9.4)
Chart 1 – USA role in world peace

USA ROLE: PEACE IN THE WORLD
65.4%
58.7%

France
Romania

21.3%
15.6%

15.0% 13.1%
4.0%

Positive

Negative

Neither nor

6.9%

DK

Chart 2 – USA role in economic growth worldwide

USA ROLE: ECONOMIC GROWTH WORLDWIDE
57.4%
48.6%

France

29.2%

Romania

19.4%
11.3%

Positive

Negative

12.6%

Neither nor
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9.6%

12.0%

DK

Chart 3: USA role in fighting poverty worldwide

USA ROLE: FIGHTING POVERTY WORLDWIDE
70.0%

52.6%

France
Romania

22.8%
13.3%

10.7%

13.4%

11.3%
5.9%

Positive

Negative

Neither nor

DK

Chart 4: USA role in protecting the environment

USA ROLE: ENVIRONMENT PROTECTION
77.1%

56.0%
France
Romania
18.1%

13.6%
8.2%

Positive

8.2%

Negative

Neither nor
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12.3%
6.5%

DK

Chart 5: Support for an EU foreign policy more independent of the USA

Should EU foreign policy be more independent of the USA?
84.9%

64.9%

France
23.3%
9.0%

Tend to agree

Romania

11.8%
6.1%

Tend to disagree

DK

Chart 6: Europe compared to the USA on fighting discrimination

Europe compared to the USA on fighting discrimination
52.1%

32.4%
22.5%

20.9%

21.3%

14.4%

Ahead

Behind

24.2%

Romania
12.2%

At the same level
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France

DK

Chart 7: Europe compared to the USA on overall quality of life

Europe compared to the USA: quality of life
45.0%

France

33.6%

Romania
22.4%
17.9%

16.9%
11.5%

11.3%
8.6%

4.2%

Much better

Somewhat
better

Somewhat less Definitely less
good
good
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11.6%

12.1%

5.1%

Identical

DK

APPENDIX 10
CHARTS SHOWING LEVELS OF TOLRANCE AND RELIGIOSITY IN FRANCE,
ROMANIA AND THE UNITED STATES
(Chapter 9, section 9.4)
Chart1: Important child qualities

Important child qualities
obedience

17.8%
28.4%
41.2%
23.6%

unselfishness

37.8%
55.1%
64.0%

religious faith

50.8%
8.7%
30.9%
40.4%

determination perseverance

55.0%
54.0%
thrift saving money and things

30.0%

Romania

42.9%

United States
59.7%
tolerance and respect for other people

78.7%
86.8%
18.5%

imagination

31.9%
25.0%
70.1%
72.5%
78.9%

feeling of responsibility

84.9%
hard work

62.0%
62.2%
29.7%

independence

54.1%
37.2%
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France

Chart 2: People that you wouldn‘t want as neighbors

People that you don't want as neighbors

13.2%
11.1%

People who speak a different
language

Unmarried couples living together

27.6%
17.2%
8.4%
13.4%
76.0%
72.9%
85.1%

Heavy drinkers

17.1%
People of a different religion

2.6%
30.3%
67.5%

Homosexuals

26.0%
34.1%

Romania
United States
France

18.6%
13.2%

Immigrants/foreign workers

43.2%
42.6%
People who have AIDS

15.9%
37.4%
20.3%

People of a different race

4.1%
26.8%
84.5%
93.8%
89.0%

Drug addicts

0.0%

20.0%

40.0%
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60.0%

80.0%

100.0%

Chart 3: When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women

When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job
than women
73.8%
66.4%

40.9%

France

35.2%
26.8%

United States
23.9%

18.1%

Romania

8.1%

6.8%

Agree

Disagree

Neither

Chart 4: When jobs are scarce, employers should give priority to (nation) people than immigrants

When jobs are scarce, employers should give priority to
(nation) people than immigrants
65.1%
55.4%
46.4%
42.1%
France
24.6%
20.0%
14.6%

Agree

Disagree

11.5%

Neither
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United States
20.3%

Romania

Chart 5: Men make better business executives than women do

Men make better business executives than women do
54.8%

53.6%

34.7%
30.9%

27.8%

29.9%
23.5%

14.0%

France
United States
Romania

14.2%
11.9%

2.5% 2.3%
Agree strongly

Agree

Disagree

Strongly disagree

Chart 6: Men make better political leaders than women do

Men make better political leaders than women do
57.0%
45.1%
40.0%
33.7%

France
26.2%

15.0%

20.3%
17.4%

18.3%18.8%

3.8% 4.4%
Agree strongly

Agree

Disagree
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Strongly disagree

United
States
Romania

Chart 7: Women as single parents

Do you approve or disapprove of women as single parents?
62.3%
52.2%
48.2%

47.8%
38.2%

France
United States

26.4%

Romania
13.6%

11.2%
0.0%
Approve

Disapprove

Depends

Chart 8: Education for boys and girls

University is more important for a boy than for a girl
73.1%
58.4%
50.0%
France
30.7%

33.7%

20.2%

Romania

14.4%
4.9%

5.0% 6.8%

Agree strongly

Agree

1.8% 1.1%

Disagree
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United States

Strongly disagree

Chart 9: Homosexuality – justifiable?

Is homosexuality justifiable?
73.0%

France
32.5%

United States
27.3%

14.8%

Romania
14.8%
2.1%

Never justifiable

Always justifiable

Chart 10: Prostitution – justifiable?

Is prostitution justifiable?
69.2%

41.2%

43.2%

France
United States
Romania
3.8%

Never justifiable

3.0%

1.6%

Always justifiable
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Chart 11: Abortion – justifiable?

Is abortion justifiable?
48.4%

France
25.8%

25.5%

United States
Romania

13.8%
7.1%

Never justifiable

4.4%

Always justifiable

Chart 12: Divorce – justifiable?

Is divorce justifiable?
34.7%
27.4%
France
United States

12.4%
8.7%

7.7%

5.8%

Never justifiable

Always justifiable

167

Romania

Chart 13: How important is religion in your life?

How important is religion in your life?
58.0%
47.4%
32.5%
27.9%
24.2%

France

30.7%

28.4%
United
States

19.7%

13.0%

8.7%

7.2%

2.4%
Very important

Rather important

Not very important

Not at all important

Chart 14: How important in God in your life?

How important is God in your life?
66.3%
57.8%

France
United States

26.1%

Romania
11.2%
5.3%

0.9%

Not at all important

Very important
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Chart 15: Do you consider yourself a religious person?

Do you consider yourself a religious person?
93.4%

72.1%

France

46.9%

United States

36.0%

Romania
24.4%
17.1%
6.0%

A religious person

Not a religious person
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3.6%

0.6%

A convinced atheist

Chart 16: How often do you attend religious services?

How often do you attend religious services?

4.5%
Never practically never

25.6%
60.1%

15.6%
Less often

12.0%
7.2%

3.0%
Once a year

4.6%
5.2%

30.9%

Only on special holy
days/Christmas/Easter days

Romania

8.9%

United States

16.4%

France
18.7%
Once a month

12.9%
3.8%

22.8%
Once a week

24.2%
5.6%

4.4%
More than once a week

11.8%
1.6%

0.0%

20.0%

40.0%
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60.0%

80.0%

Chart 17: How much confidence do you have in churches?

How much confidence do you have in churches?
59.1%

France
United States
41.3%
36.2%

25.0%

29.0%

Romania
26.6%26.5%

10.9%

26.3%

9.5%

7.2%
2.5%

A great deal

Quite a lot

Not very much

171

None at all

APPENDIX 11
TABLE SHOWING CHANGES IN “FAVORABLE” AND “SOMEWHAT
FAVORABLE” OPINIONS OF THE UNITED STATES AS MEASURED BY THE PEW
2002 AND PEW 2007 SURVEYS
Question: Please tell me if you have a very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat
unfavorable or very unfavorable opinion of the United States?
Country
Bulgaria
Czech Republic
Poland
Slovak Republic
France
Germany
Italy
Great Britain

2002
73.8%
70.2%
77.4%
65.8%
70.6%
70.6%
73.8%
81.8%
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2007
55.8%
47.3%
67%
43.2%
39.1%
31.5%
58.4%
82%

APPENDIX 12

CHART SHOWING CHANGES IN “FAVORABLE” AND “SOMEWHAT
FAVORABLE” OPINIONS OF THE UNITED STATES AS MEASURED BY THE PEW
2002 AND PEW 2007 SURVEYS

Very favorable or somewhat favorable opinions of the United States in
Old Europe and New Europe (2002 and 2007 data)

82

81.8
77.4
73.8
70.6
70.2

67

65.8

Bulgaria
Czech Republic

58.4
55.8

Poland
Slovak Republic

47.3

France

43.2

Germany

39.1

Italy

31.5
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Great Britain
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